Bronx District Attorney v. Jackson

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

Bronx District Attorney v. Jackson

173 Misc. 2d 676, 662 N.Y.S.2d 984, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 465

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedJune 4, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 173 Misc. 2d 676 (Bronx District Attorney v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bronx District Attorney v. Jackson, 173 Misc. 2d 676, 662 N.Y.S.2d 984, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 465 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order dated July 15, 1996 affirmed, without costs.

The office of the Bronx District Attorney obtained a final judgment of possession based upon the tenant’s conduct of illegal narcotics trade in the subject premises (RPAPL 715, 711 [5]). Thereafter, landlord New York City Housing Authority, without participation of the District Attorney, commenced a nonpayment proceeding and accepted rent from the tenant pursuant to a stipulated settlement. Civil Court properly denied tenant’s motion to vacate the possessory judgment on the ground that the prosecution of the nonpayment had "vitiated” the holdover and "revived” the landlord-tenant relationship.

The District Attorney’s office and the Housing Authority are independent entities with separate and distinct legal mandates; the District Attorney is not the alter ego of the landlord in a proceeding under RPAPL 715 (Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Off. v Freshley, 160 Misc 2d 302, 307). Thus, the Housing Authority’s maintenance of a nonpayment proceeding and acceptance of rent did not affect the validity of the final judgment previously granted to the prosecutor or preclude its enforcement (cf., Ansonia Assocs. v Pearlstein, 122 Misc 2d 566). Further, the Housing Authority, as landlord, cannot reinstate a tenancy that was rendered void by virtue of illegality or criminal conduct (Real Property Law § 231 [1]). "Clearly, it is the legislative intent that the acceptance of rent by landlord or doing any act constituting waiver will have no effect in a proceeding for eviction based on illegal use * * * when the matter relates to a situation where the Legislature has established a public policy and the enforcement of such a waiver would violate the public policy” (Murphy v Relaxation Plus Commodore, 83 Misc 2d 838, 840 [App Term, 1st Dept]).

Parness, J. P., McCooe and Davis, JJ., concur.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order dated July 15, 1996 affirmed, without costs.

The office of the Bronx District Attorney obtained a final judgment of possession based upon the tenant’s conduct of illegal narcotics trade in the subject premises (RPAPL 715, 711 [5]). Thereafter, landlord New York City Housing Authority, without participation of the District Attorney, commenced a nonpayment proceeding and accepted rent from the tenant pursuant to a stipulated settlement. Civil Court properly denied tenant’s motion to vacate the possessory judgment on the ground that the prosecution of the nonpayment had "vitiated” the holdover and "revived” the landlord-tenant relationship.

The District Attorney’s office and the Housing Authority are independent entities with separate and distinct legal mandates; the District Attorney is not the alter ego of the landlord in a proceeding under RPAPL 715 (Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Off. v Freshley, 160 Misc 2d 302, 307). Thus, the Housing Authority’s maintenance of a nonpayment proceeding and acceptance of rent did not affect the validity of the final judgment previously granted to the prosecutor or preclude its enforcement (cf., Ansonia Assocs. v Pearlstein, 122 Misc 2d 566). Further, the Housing Authority, as landlord, cannot reinstate a tenancy that was rendered void by virtue of illegality or criminal conduct (Real Property Law § 231 [1]). "Clearly, it is the legislative intent that the acceptance of rent by landlord or doing any act constituting waiver will have no effect in a proceeding for eviction based on illegal use * * * when the matter relates to a situation where the Legislature has established a public policy and the enforcement of such a waiver would violate the public policy” (Murphy v Relaxation Plus Commodore, 83 Misc 2d 838, 840 [App Term, 1st Dept]).

Parness, J. P., McCooe and Davis, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

173 Misc. 2d 676, 662 N.Y.S.2d 984, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bronx-district-attorney-v-jackson-nyappterm-1997.

Opinion

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