Bronson's v. Chappell

79 U.S. 681, 20 L. Ed. 436, 12 Wall. 681, 1870 U.S. LEXIS 1221
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedNovember 27, 1871
StatusPublished
Cited by46 cases

This text of 79 U.S. 681 (Bronson's v. Chappell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bronson's v. Chappell, 79 U.S. 681, 20 L. Ed. 436, 12 Wall. 681, 1870 U.S. LEXIS 1221 (1871).

Opinion

Mr. Justice SWAYNE

delivered the opinion of the court

But a single question has been argued in this court, and that is one arisiug upon the facts as developed in the record. This opinion will be confined to that subject.

William C. Bostwick, acting for Frederick Bronson, negotiated the sale of a tract of land in Wisconsin to the defendants. According to his custom in such cases, Bronson forwarded to Bostwick the draft of a contract to be executed by the buyers. At the foot of the draft was a note in these words :•

“ William C. Bostwick, Esq., of Galena, is authorized to receive and receipt for the first payment on this contract. All subsequent payments to be made to F. Bronson, in the city of New York.”

The defendants expressed to Bostwick a preference to receive a deed and give a mortgage. This was communicated to Bronson, who acceded to the proposition and forwarded to Bostwick a deed and the draft of a bond and mortgage. Oil the 25th of March, 1865, the defendants- paid to Bostwick $1500 of the purchase-money, and executed the bond and mortgage to secure the payment of the balance. According to the condition of the bond it rvas to be paid to the obligee in the city of New York, in instalments, as follows: $781.20 on the 18th of Nov' nber, 1865, and the remaining sum of $1562.40 in seven equal aunual payments, from the 12th of February, 1865, with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent, per aunurn. The contract was erroneously construed by Bronsou as requiring the interest on all the instalments to be paid with each one as it fell due. The other parties seem to have acquiesced in this construction. On the 4th of December, 1865, the defendants paid to Bostwick, as the agent of Bronson, $825.36, in discharge of the amount claimed to be due on the 30th of November, 1865, and took his receipt accox-dingly. On the 28th of February, 1866, *683 they paid Bostwiek $980 to meet the second instalment and interest, as claimed, with exchange, and took his receipt as before. Bostwiek failed in December, 1866. These moneys were never paid over to Bronson. He denied the authority of Bostwiek to receive them,-and demanded payment from the defendants. They refused, and Bronsou'thereupon tiled this bill to foreclose the mortgage. The validity of these payments is the question presented for our determination.

Agents are special, general, or universal. Where written evidence of their appointment is not required, it maybe implied from circumstances. These circumstances are the acts of the agent and their recognition, or acquiescence, by the principal. The same considerations fix the category of the agency and the limits of the authority conferred. Where one, without objection, suffers another to do acts which proceed upon the ground of authority from him, or by his. conduct adopts and sanctions such acts after they are done, he will be bound, although no previous"authority exist, in all respects as if the requisite power had been given in the most formal manner. If he has justified the belief of a third party that the person assuming to be his agent was authorized to do what was done, it is no. answer for him to say that no authority had beeu given, or that it did not reach so far, and that the third party had acted upon a mistaken conclusion. .He is estopped to take refuge in such a defence. If a loss is to be borne, the author of the error must bear it. If business has been transacted in certain cases it is implied that the like business may be transacted.in others. The inference to be drawn is, that everything fairly within the scope of the powers exercised in the past may be done in the future, until notice of revocation or disclaimer is brought home to those whose interests are concerned. Under such circumstances the presence or absence of authority in point of fact, is immaterial to the rights of third persons whose interests are involved. The seeming and reality are followed by the same consequences. In either case the legal result is the same.

*684 Bronson, as executor, had a large body of lands in Wisconsin for sale. For several years-prior to the purchase-by the defendants, Bronson had beett i-mtke habit of receiving and forwarding propositions to Bostwick. If approved,' Bronson executed and forwarded contracts for the. property, to be executed by the other parties. In .the early part of" the year 1860 Bostwick was startled by a memorandum touching payments, on a draft sent out by Bronson, like that in the draft sent to Bostwick for execution by the defendants. On the 9th of February he addressed a letter to Bronson, in which, he said :

“My attention was naturally arrested by the note at bottom of tho contract of Tormey, and if it is .to be interpreted as an intimation that a withdrawal of m'y agency is contemplated, it Would cause me not less surprise than pain, not so much by any means from tho pecuniary consideration connected with it, as from'the implied dissatisfaction on your part with the manner in which I have transacted your business; and it occasions the more surprise that I have always endeavored to attend with fidelity and promptness to your business and interests, and have never before had any intimation whatsoever from you that you. were not entirely satisfied. I am wholly at a loss to conceive wherein I have given dissatisfaction, or failed to do all that was necessary to do, or could be done under the particular circumstances of any case inyolving your business or interests in my hands.”

On the 15'th of the’same month Bronson replied as follows:

“Tho memorandum at the foot of Tormey’s contract I have recently put on all of my land contracts.to repel tho construction lately soi ;ht to be put on them, that the first or other payments, if received, by the agent, is an implied waiver of the claim for exchange, and of the stipulation in the body of the contract, that the money is to be paid to me in the city of N.ew York. In other words, it is but a repetition of a clause in the contract, as applicable to all except the first payment.'’

This correspondence suggests several remarks;

Bostwick speaks- of his employment as having been, and then being, an “ agency ” for Bronson. He inquires whether *685 it was contemplated by Bronson to revoke it. Bronson does not deny or revoke it. He says the object of the memorandum was to repel the construction that the receipt of “the first or other payments by the agent” was “an implied waiver of the claim for exchange,” and which was the same thing in effect — a waiver of the stipulation in the contract that the money was to be paid to him “in the city of New York.” It recognizes the authority of the agent to receive the subsequent paymeuts as well as the first one, provided exchange were paid upon the former by the debtor.

The language employed by Bronson will admit ofino other -construction. It applies with full force to the bond of these defendants. They paid exchange as well as the 'principal and interest of the instalments in question. There is no evidence in the. record that the authority thus admitted to exist was ever withdrawn. It must be presumed to have continued until the relations of 'the parties were terminated by Bostwick’s failure and insolvency.

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Bluebook (online)
79 U.S. 681, 20 L. Ed. 436, 12 Wall. 681, 1870 U.S. LEXIS 1221, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bronsons-v-chappell-scotus-1871.