IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII BRONSON NAKAAHIKI, CIVIL NO. 25-00401 DKW-KJM #A6001816,1 ORDER DISMISSING SECOND Plaintiff, AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND vs.
KAUAI POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS,
Defendants.
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Bronson Nakaahiki’s Second Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (SAC) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 ECF No. 7. In the SAC, Nakaahiki asserts claims against an unspecified number of unnamed Kauai Police Department (“KPD”) officers based on a collection of events, the first of which occurred sometime in February 2025. ECF No. 7 at PageID.64-66, 68-70. After conducting the required screening pursuant to
1Nakaahiki is currently incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility. See VINE, https://vinelink.vineapps.com/search/HI/Person (select “ID Number”; enter “A6001816”; and select “Search”) (last visited Nov. 3, 2025). 2Although Nakaahiki cites Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the basis for this action, see ECF No. 7 at PageID.60, as Nakaahiki acknowledged in both of his earlier pleadings, see ECF No. 1 at PageID.1; ECF No. 5 at PageID.33, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the relevant cause of action for his claims. See Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but is instead a vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.”). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the Court DISMISSES the SAC with partial leave to amend. If Nakaahiki wants to proceed, he must file an amended
pleading that cures the below-described deficiencies in his excessive force claims in Count II (and those claims only) on or before November 24, 2025. Nakaahiki’s other claims are DISMISSED with prejudice, and those claims may not be
included in any amended pleading that Nakaahiki might file. Alternatively, instead of filing an amended pleading, Nakaahiki may inform the Court in writing on or before November 24, 2025 that he would like to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not
count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).3 I. STATUTORY SCREENING The Court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints
filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018). Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
3In general, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from filing a civil action in forma pauperis if he or she has on three or more occasions brought an action in federal court that was dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v.
Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id. In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants’
pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d
at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013). II. BACKGROUND4
Sometime in February 2025, two KPD officers pulled Nakaahiki over as he was driving. ECF No. 7 at PageID.65. The officers told Nakaahiki that he had an
4The SAC alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of screening. See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014). outstanding warrant. Id. At some point after Nakaahiki asked to see the warrant, he was “yanked” out of his car and “slammed” to the ground by the unidentified
officers. Id. According to Nakaahiki, he was not “resisting” and was not “armed and dangerous.” Id. On March 15, 2025, three men “mob[b]ed” Nakaahiki after he crashed a
vehicle he was driving into their pasture. Id. at PageID.64. The men dislocated Nakaahiki’s shoulder, “messed up” his jaw, and caused his eyes to swell shut. Id. When KPD officers arrived at the scene, they arrested Nakaahiki, but not the three men who had mobbed him. Id.
Nakaahiki also alleges that “every day” since his truck was seized without a warrant, KPD officers have been harassing him.5 Id. at PageID.66. According to Nakaahiki, he has been pulled over without “probable cause” and shot with water
while he was having a “[nervous] breakdown.” Id. Nakaahiki commenced this lawsuit by signing the original Complaint on September 1, 2025. Id. at PageID.8. After the Court granted Nakaahiki in forma pauperis status, ECF No. 3, the Court screened and dismissed the original
Complaint with partial leave to amend, ECF No. 4. The Court explained, among other things, that Nakaahiki could not sue the KPD, he had not alleged a plausible municipal liability claim against the County of Kauai, and he could not rely on
5Nakaahiki does not say when his truck was seized, when he was harassed, or by whom. state criminal statutes to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at PageID.24- 30.
In his First Amended Complaint (FAC), Nakaahiki reasserted claims against an unspecified number of unnamed KPD officers based on the same undated events described in the original Complaint. Id. at 37-39, 41-43. In dismissing the
FAC, the Court explained, among other things, that the pleading did not meet the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it did not appear that Nakaahiki’s various claims were properly joined in the same lawsuit. ECF No. 6 at PageID.49-52. The Court also identified the deficiencies in
Nakaahiki’s various claims. Id. at PageID.53-57. The Court received the SAC on October 23, 2025. ECF No. 7. In the SAC, Nakaahiki again asserts a variety of claims against an unspecified number of KPD
officers in both their individual and official capacities. See id. at PageID.60. Nakaahiki’s claims can be organized into three groups. The first group relates to the March 15, 2025 incident. Nakaahiki alleges that police should have arrested the three men who mobbed and beat him (Count I); those involved should be
charged with negligent injury in the first degree (Count IV) and negligent injury in the second degree (Count V); and Nakaahiki’s equal protection rights were violated on account of an unidentified disability (Count VI). Id. at PageID.64, 68-
70. The second group includes excessive force claims against two officers based on the encounter that occurred sometime in February 2025 (Count II). Id. at PageID.65. Finally, the third group includes claims based on alleged harassment
that Nakaahiki experienced after KPD “took [his] truck” (Count III). Id. at PageID.66. Nakaahiki seeks $900 billion in damages. Id. at PageID.67. III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under color of’ law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.’” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020). B. Official Capacity Claims Nakaahiki names the unidentified KPD officers in both their individual and
official capacities. ECF No. 7 at PageID.60. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). Thus, Nakaahiki’s claims against any KPD officers in their official capacities must meet the standard for a municipal liability claim
under Monell. As the Court previously explained to Nakaahiki, ECF No. 4 at PageID.25- 26, Monell “established that municipalities can be liable for infringement of
constitutional rights, under certain circumstances.” Horton ex rel. Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2019). “In particular, municipalities may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional injuries pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or
discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Id. at 602-03. “A plaintiff must . . . show ‘deliberate action attributable to the municipality [that] directly caused a deprivation of federal rights.’” Id. at 603 (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)). “[W]hile Monell claims cannot predicate municipal liability for constitutional violations of its officers under the theory of respondeat superior, such claims are still contingent on a violation of constitutional rights.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir.
2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As before, Nakaahiki has not plausibly alleged that the KPD officers acted pursuant to an official policy; that their actions were consistent with a pervasive
practice or custom; that the KPD failed to train, supervise, or discipline the officers; or that the officers’ actions were the result of decision of a final policymaker. Indeed, the SAC does not include any factual allegations related to
the County of Kauai. Because Nakaahiki has not stated a plausible Monell claim, despite having three opportunities to do so, Nakaahiki’s official-capacity claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
C. Joinder Nakaahiki attempts to join three groups of claims in a single lawsuit—that is, claims based on a March 15, 2025 event (Counts I, IV, V, and VI), excessive force claims based on a February 2025 encounter with two KPD officers (Count
II), and claims based on ongoing harassment (Count III). ECF No. 7 at PageID.64- 66, 68-70. As the Court has already explained to Nakaahiki, see ECF No. 6 at
PageID.51-52, when a single defendant is named, a party may bring as many claims as it has against that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “To name different defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy Rule 20, governing joinder of parties.” Weeks v. Espinda, No. 10-00305, 2010 WL
2218631, at *3 (D. Haw. June 2, 2010). Rule 20(a)(2) allows multiple defendants to be joined in one action only if (1) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A), (B). “Unrelated claims involving different defendants belong in different suits.”
What v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, No. 13-00373, 2014 WL 176610, at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2014). Nakaahiki does not allege that the three groups of claims involve the same
officers, nor has he shown that his claims across the three groups arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Thus, Nakaahiki’s three groups of claims do not belong in the same lawsuit. For the following reasons, the Court will give Nakaahiki one more opportunity to amend his excessive force claims in Count II,
and his remaining claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. D. Law Enforcement In Count I, Nakaahiki alleges that KPD officers chose not to arrest three men
who “mob[b]ed” and beat him. ECF No. 7 at PageID.64. As the Court previously explained to Nakaahiki, he cannot pursue claims based solely on a police officer’s decision regarding an investigation or arrest. See Van Hook v. Idaho, No. 1:21-CV-00199, 2022 WL 344439, at *9 (D. Idaho Feb. 4,
2022) (“Plaintiff has no constitutional or common law right to have his civil rights complaints and potential criminal complaints investigated or prosecuted by the FBI, the United States Attorney General, or any other governmental entity.”); see
also Est. of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen.”) (cleaned up).
Although Nakaahiki alleges that the three men dislocated his shoulder, “messed up” his jaw, and caused his eyes to swell shut, see ECF No. 7 at PageID.64, he does not allege that any KPD officer had anything to do with these
injuries. Nakaahiki’s claims in Count I are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. E. Excessive Force In Count II, Nakaahiki alleges that two KPD officers used excessive force during an incident sometime in February 2025. ECF No. 7 at PageID.65.
“The operative question in excessive force cases is whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427–28 (2017) (quotation marks and citation
omitted) (brackets in original). “The reasonableness of the use of force is evaluated under an ‘objective’ inquiry that pays careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. at 428 (quotation marks omitted). “Whether a use of force was reasonable will depend on the facts of the particular
case, including, but not limited to, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone, whether the suspect resisted or attempted to evade arrest, and the severity of the crime at issue.” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th
Cir. 2019). In addition, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
“That inquiry is dispositive: When an officer carries out a seizure that is reasonable, taking into account all relevant circumstances, there is no valid excessive force claim.” Mendez, 581 U.S. at 428.
Before any excessive force claims based on the allegations in Count II can proceed or be properly evaluated, Nakaahiki must provide additional information regarding his encounter with the two KPD officers. For example, although Nakaahiki alleges that he did not resist arrest, “[was not] considered armed and
[dangerous],” and was not provided with the warrant the officers were apparently there to execute, ECF No. 7 at PageID.65, Nakaahiki does not say what instructions (if any) the officers gave him, whether he complied with any
instructions given, whether he was provided the basis underlying the warrant, whether one or both officers yanked him out of his car, what that looked like, what happened after he was “slammed” to the ground, and what injuries (if any) he experienced and what caused them. See Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d
463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Neither tackling nor punching a suspect to make an arrest necessarily constitutes excessive force.”). Because it is possible that Nakaahiki can cure the deficiencies in his excessive force claims, these claims (and
these claims only) are DISMISSED with leave to amend. F. State Criminal Law Although Nakaahiki seeks relief solely pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in
Counts IV and V, he again appears to base some of his claims on state criminal statutes. See ECF No. 7 at PageID.68-69 (referring to “negligent injury in the first” and “negligent injury in the second” degree). As the Court has twice
explained to Nakaahiki, he cannot do this. See ECF No. 4 at PageID.29-30; ECF No. 6 at PageID.56-57. Nakaahiki’s claims in Counts IV and V are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. See Buckheit v. Dennis, 713 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“As a general rule, a violation of state law does not lead to
liability under § 1983.”); see also Beitch v. Wheeler, No. CV 15-00872-VBF (GJS), 2015 WL 13752415, at *5 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015) (stating that a violation of a state criminal law provision is not a basis for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 15-00872-VBF (GJS), 2015 WL 13762928 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015). G. Equal Protection In Count VI, Nakaahiki again refers to “equality of rights equal protection.”
ECF No. 7 at PageID.70. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people equally.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In general, “[t]o state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected
class.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Despite this previous guidance, Nakaahiki again has not plausibly alleged that he is a member of a protected class, nor has he plausibly alleged that any KPD officer intentionally or purposefully discriminated against him because of that
purported membership. To the extent Nakaahiki now alleges that he has an unidentified “disability,” the disabled are not a protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.
1996) (“For the purposes of equal protection analysis, the disabled do not constitute a suspect class.”). In addition, Nakaahiki does not describe the nature of his disability, and he does not allege that any KPD officers were aware of and discriminated against him because of that disability. Nakaahiki’s equal protection
claims in Count VI are DISMISSED with prejudice. H. Harassment Finally, Nakaahiki alleges in Count III that unidentified KPD officers have
been harassing him “every day” since his truck was taken as evidence. ECF No. 7 at PageID.66. Nakaahiki does not say when his truck was purportedly taken, he does not say when he was pulled over or why, nor does he describe the
circumstances surrounding him being “[shot] . . . with water.” Id. And, significantly, Nakaahiki does not identify what federal right was allegedly violated.6 Nakaahiki’s allegations in Count III are therefore too vague and
conclusory to state a plausible claim for relief. See, e.g., Eager v. Six Unknown Honolulu Police Dep’t Officers, No. Civ. 15-00098, 2015 WL 1608771, at *1-2 (D. Haw. Apr. 10, 2015). Nakaahiki’s claims in Count III are also DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. Doe Defendants Nakaahiki is reminded that Doe defendants are generally disfavored because it is effectively impossible for the United States Marshals to serve an anonymous
defendant. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Sometimes, however, a plaintiff cannot know the names of all defendants prior to bringing suit. In such instances, a plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as John or Jane Doe, alleging specific facts showing how each Doe defendant violated
his rights. The plaintiff may then use the discovery process to obtain the names of
6To the extent Nakaahiki suggests that KPD officers stopped him without probable cause, the Court notes that probable cause is not required for police to initiate a traffic stop. See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops.”). Doe defendants and, once they are identified, seek leave to amend to name those defendants. But a plaintiff may not use “Doe” placeholders if it is clear that
discovery will not uncover their identities, or that the complaint will be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642).
For his excessive force claims in Count II, Nakaahiki must refer to the unknown KPD officers as John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and so on, and he must allege facts showing how each officer violated his federal rights. If Nakaahiki can state a plausible claim for relief, he will be granted early discovery to try to identify the
officers’ names so that the operative pleading can be served on them. IV. LEAVE TO AMEND The SAC, ECF No. 7, is DISMISSED with partial leave to amend.
Nakaahiki must file any amended pleading addressing the flaws in his excessive force claims in Count II (and those claims only) on or before November 24, 2025. All of Nakaahiki’s other claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and should not be realleged in any amended pleading. Nakaahiki may not expand his claims beyond
those already alleged in Count II. Claims that do not properly relate to those in Count II of the SAC are subject to dismissal. Nakaahiki must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules for the District of Hawaii. Local Rule 10.4 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself, without reference to any prior pleading. An amended complaint must be short and plain, comply with Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and be submitted on the Court’s prisoner civil rights form. See LR99.2(a). An amended complaint will supersede the SAC. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).
Defendants not renamed and claims not realleged in an amended complaint may be deemed voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). V. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
If Nakaahiki fails to file an amended complaint or is unable to amend his claims in Count II to cure their deficiencies, a subsequent dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). Under this “3-strikes” provision, a prisoner
may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis, if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). VI. CONCLUSION (1) The Court DISMISSES the SAC, ECF No. 7, with partial leave to amend. (2) If Nakaahiki wants to proceed with his excessive force claims in Count II, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in those claims (and those claims only) on or before November 24, 2025. (3) ALTERNATIVELY, instead of filing an amended pleading, Nakaahiki
may inform the Court in writing on or before November 24, 2025, that he would like to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (4) Failure to comply with these deadlines may result in AUTOMATIC DISMISSAL of this suit without further notice, and Nakaahiki may incur a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (5) The Clerk 1s DIRECTED to send Nakaahiki a blank prisoner civil rights complaint form so that he can comply with this order if he elects to file an amended pleading. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: November 3, 2025 at Honolulu, Hawai‘. /s/ Derrick K. Watson dot Derrick K. Watson Rn Chief United States District Judge Bronson Nakaahiki v. Kauai Police Department Officers; Civil No. 25-00401 DKW-KJM; ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND