Brollier v. Bankers Mortgage Co.

20 P.2d 817, 137 Kan. 298, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 103
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedApril 8, 1933
DocketNo. 30,954
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 20 P.2d 817 (Brollier v. Bankers Mortgage Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brollier v. Bankers Mortgage Co., 20 P.2d 817, 137 Kan. 298, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 103 (kan 1933).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Burcit, J.:

Plaintiff purchased of defendant a bond for $1,000 of a type- which defendant issued. The price was payable in installments. In May, 1929, she surrendered the bond and took two others for $1,000 each. On May 2, 1930, she brought an action for a declaratory judgment, first, that the bonds are void; or, second, if the bonds are not void, that she is entitled to surrender them on terms provided in the building and loan association statute. In either event, she would get back all her money with interest, some[299]*299thing which is utterly incompatible with the contracts. The district court found for defendant and rendered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff appeals.

Defendant is a private corporation, organized in 1919, pursuant to subdivision 53 of chapter 125 of the Laws of 1911, authorizing organization of investment and loan companies with power to lend money on real estate, chattel or personal security. (R. S. 17-202, subdiv. 53.) In 1919 and previously, charters were procured on application to the charter board. If after investigation the board determined the undertaking was one for which a corporation could be formed, the application was granted. (R. S. 17-401 to 17-403.) Defendant’s charter stated the purpose for which the corporation was formed as follows:

“To loan money on real estate, personal and chattel security.”

In 1925 defendant amended its charter to read:

“This corporation is organized for profit, and the purposes for which it is formed are to loan money on real estate, chattels, or personal securities; to sell its bonds, secured by first mortgages on real estate.”

In 1925 and previously the law required charter amendments to be approved by the charter board. (R. S. 17-216.)

The original bond issued to plaintiff was dated March 11, 1925. The two bonds issued on surrender of the original bond were issued on May 7,1929. One bore that date, and the other bore the original date March 11, 1925. A copy of the face of the latter and a copy of the security provision of the privileges and conditions forming part of the instrument are appended to this opinion.

Before amendment of its charter defendant had engaged in the business of selling bonds of the general character of those issued to plaintiff. Since amendment of its charter defendant has continued to issue such bonds. Defendant’s interpretation of the law and of its charter has been acquiesced in by the state of Kansas. As will appear later, defendant’s business has been conducted under strict and constant state supervision and the state does not now question authority of defendant to issue and sell its bonds. Plaintiff dealt with defendant as having lawful authority to make the contracts in controversy, and plaintiff is forbidden to assert in this action, for any purpose, that the bonds are void for lack o.f a statute or for lack of a charter under which defendant could conduct its business [300]*300of issuing such bonds. (Harris v. Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123.)

The original bond had express provisions relating to surrender of the bond for stated cash surrender values at the end of each year beginning with the second year. While the bonds in controversy contain provisions for loan values and for surrender for paid-up bonds, contain nonforfeiture clauses applicable in case of default, and contain provisions for optional settlement at maturity, they do not provide for surrender for cash before maturity except in case of death or disability of the holder.

Arguments that plaintiff has privilege to surrender the bonds and that surrender and surrender value are governed by the building and loan association statute proceed from two premises — first, that the bond transactions'are essentially building and loan transactions; and second, that the building and loan statute was amended to classify financial agencies, operating as defendant operates, with building and loan associations for purpose of regulation, including withdrawal of funds.

It so happens there are nine other domestic corporations and nine foreign corporations doing the same kind of business in Kansas that defendant does. One of the foreign corporations, the' Investors Syndicate, of Minneapolis, Minn., has been doing business in the state since 1914. Plaintiff’s action having been brought to the attention of some of these companies, their attorneys asked and were given permission. to file briefs amid curice. The attorney-general was given leave to file a brief on plaintiff’s side. In a subdivision of a reply brief, headed “The Legal Status of the Bankers Mortgage Company,” plaintiff undertakes to make her position so clear it may not be misunderstood concerning the proposition that the bond transactions between plaintiff and defendant were essentially building and loan association transactions. The reply brief says:

“The business of this concern is that of a savings institution ... He [a bondholder] is not an ordinary creditor of the concern at all. That is a mere technicality; he is directly interested in the mortgages in which his funds are invested. . . . These bonds are receipts of an investment agency for the funds which it expects to invest for the benefit of these small investors.”

Defendant is a private corporation having a capital stock owned by stockholders. The certificates of stock issued to stockholders are in the usual form of such instruments. Plaintiff is not a holder actually or beneficially of any share of the capital stock of the corporation.

[301]*301In the conduct of its business the company issues and sells what it calls guaranteed first-mortgage savings bonds. The name given the instruments is fairly descriptive. The instruments are properly called bonds because they are undertakings of the company to pay money. Payment of the money to the bondholder is secured— “guaranteed”- — by deposit with and assignment to the bank commissioner of the state of Kansas of first mortgages on real estate. The bonds are called savings bonds because an investor of moderate means may pay for a bond out of savings, in periodical installments.

Some of the bonds are or were called guaranteed first-mortgage, six per cent savings bonds. The reason for the interest characterization will appear from an illustration. An investor buys a bond for $1,000, payable ten years from date. During that period he pays only $720. His payments, with interest at six per cent compounded ' annually, amount to $1,000, the sum he receives at maturity of the bond. The eleven-year bonds in question are similar in character.

To conduct its business the company must have a central office and certain fixed assets. The company must have- in some form what corresponds to departments for discharge of its two chief functions, a selling department to sell bonds and a loan department to make loans on real estate. Conduct of the business embraces innumerable details. The company must pay salaries to officers and employees, commissions to agents, and expenses of various kinds. In case of foreclosure of mortgages, it may acquire certificates of sale and deeds of land, which become part of the assets of the company.

What are the directors of this corporation doing in conducting the business described? The answer is simple and obvious.

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Related

Stumph v. Wheat Belt Building & Loan Ass'n
79 P.2d 896 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1938)
Motter v. Bankers Mortgage Co.
93 F.2d 778 (Tenth Circuit, 1937)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
20 P.2d 817, 137 Kan. 298, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brollier-v-bankers-mortgage-co-kan-1933.