Brodzki v. United States

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 31, 2012
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2012-0164
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA F I L E D

.|AN 3 1 2012 Anthony Brodzki, ) Clerk, U.S. Dist_rict_& Bankruptcy ) courts for the Distr\ct of columbia Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action N0. ) United States of America, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiffs complaint against the United States and his application to proceed in forma pauperis The application will be granted and the case will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(h)(3) (requiring dismissal of an action "at any time” the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction).

Plaintiff is a resident of North Richland Hills, Texas, suing the United States for $500 million in damages and injunctive relief. A claim for monetary damages against the United States is cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. Such a claim is maintainable, however, only after the plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies by "first present[ing] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2675. 'l`his exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. See GAF Corp. v. Um'tea' States, 818 F.2d 901, 917-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987); jackson v. Um`lea’ States, 730 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Stokes v. U.S. Poslal Service, 937 F. Supp. ll, 14 (D.D.C. 1996). The plaintiff has not indicated that he exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA. Therefore, his claim for damages

must be dismissed for failure to exahust. See Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 Fed.Appx. 445,

445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("[T]he district court properly dismissed case [based on unexhausted FTCA claim] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.").

Plaintiff seeks "inj unctive relief against the United States secret service and the president of the United States . . . to end the harassment and the invasion of privacy, and the civil rights violations . . . ." Compl. at 2-3. However, plaintiffs rambling statements provide no rational basis for issuing an injunction and, in fact, "constitute the sort of patently insubstantial claims" that deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction T00ley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Cala’well v. Kagan, 777 F. Supp.2d 177, 178 (D.D.C. 201 1) ("A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the complaint ‘is patently insubstantial, presenting no federal question suitable for decision.' ") (quoting Tooley, 586 F.3d at l009). Hence, the

complaint will be dismissed in its entirety. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum

OPlnion.

/ Uni d St t istrict Judge Date: January _&, 2012 5 j [K!,{,¢/l,?