Brocklehurst v. Paul

2012 Ohio 4356
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided September 21, 2012·No. 2012-CA-19·Published

Opinion

[Cite as Brocklehurst v. Paul, 2012-Ohio-4356.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JUDGES: GREGG H. BROCKLEHURST : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2012-CA-19 AMANDA PAUL (DUNCAN) : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. DE2005-0772

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 21, 2012

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JAMES KRISCHAK CHRISTOPHER SHOOK 320 Main Street 33 West Main Street Box 190 Box 4190 Zanesville, OH 43072 Newark, OH 43058-4190 [Cite as Brocklehurst v. Paul, 2012-Ohio-4356.]

Gwin, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Amanda Paul Duncan appeals a judgment of the

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Muskingum County, Ohio,

which terminated the parties’ shared-parenting plan and named Plaintiff-appellee Greg

Brocklehurst as the residential parent of the parties’ two children. Appellant assigns a

single error to the trial court:

{¶2} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING A

CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE TERMINATION

OF THE PARTIES’ SHARED-PARENTING PLAN.”

{¶3} The record indicates in May 2006, the parties entered into a shared-

parenting plan which the court adopted. In July 2009, appellee filed a motion to

terminate the shared-parenting plan or in the alternative to modify its terms. The matter

was heard before a magistrate, who entered an eighteen page decision. The trial court

overruled appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s opinion and this appeal resulted.

{¶4} The magistrate correctly cited Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St. 3d 415, 674

N.E.2d 1159 (1997), as requiring a change in circumstances that is more than slight or

inconsequential but rather is substantial. The Davis court reminded us the paramount

concern must always be the best interest of the children.

{¶5} R.C. 3109.04 (E) provides a court may not modify a shared parenting

agreement unless it finds that the change is in the best interest of the children and, if the

parents do not agree or consent, that the harm likely to be caused by the change of

environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the

children. Muskingum County, Case No. 2012-CA-19 3

{¶6} The magistrate found there had been a change in circumstances since the

parties entered into their shared parenting decree. Among the changes the magistrate

enumerated was the mother’s marriage to a convicted felon and the birth of their child.

The magistrate also found on April 1, 2009, appellant entered a plea of guilty to one

count of theft by deception, two counts of forgery, fifth degree felonies, and one first

degree misdemeanor count of theft by deception. She was sentenced to two years

community control.

{¶7} The magistrate found in 2009, appellant and her new husband were

involved in an argument in which the new husband shoved appellant to the ground.

She moved out of the home, but returned with the children on June 5, 2009. On June 9,

2009, appellant and her husband were involved in another altercation in which the

husband burned appellant with a cigarette and shoved her against the kitchen counter

while choking her. When appellant informed him she was moving out for good, he

threatened to kill her. Subsequently, the husband punched appellant in the chest with

such force that she sought medical treatment at the hospital emergency room. The

magistrate found all three of the minor children were present during the incident on June

9, and were present in the same room when the new husband punched her in the chest.

{¶8} On June 12, 2009, appellant filed a petition for a domestic violence civil

protection order and was granted an ex parte order. Six days later she dismissed her

petition and the court dissolved the ex parte protection order. At some point, appellant

and her husband filed a petition for a dissolution of their marriage, but later dismissed it.

{¶9} In late June 2009, the Licking County Children’s Services filed an action in

Juvenile Court alleging the twins and the younger child were dependent. The court Muskingum County, Case No. 2012-CA-19 4

granted the Children’s Services temporary custody of the twins and placed them in

appellee’s home under the agency’s protective supervision.

{¶10} As a result of the June 9, 2009, incident between appellant and her

husband, the City of Newark filed a criminal domestic violence charge against him in

Municipal Court. The court issued a temporary protection order keeping him away from

appellant. The criminal case was subsequently dismissed because appellant failed to

appear for the hearing.

{¶11} The magistrate found appellant failed to cooperate with Children’s Services

with regard to safeguarding her children, and that was the reason they removed the

children from her custody. The magistrate found appellant admitted facilitating her

husband’s violation of the temporary protection order by having contact with him while

the order was in effect. The magistrate found appellant continues to communicate

several times a week with him. Most recently, appellant obtained a five-year domestic

violence civil protection order prohibiting her husband from being within five hundred

feet of her or the children. The order does not prohibit communications between the

parties.

{¶12} The magistrate found appellant had not instituted any action to terminate

the marriage. The magistrate found appellant had repeatedly lied to various medical

and legal personnel regarding the altercation on June 9th in order to protect her

husband. The magistrate found appellant was not credible when she testified her

relationship with her husband was over. Muskingum County, Case No. 2012-CA-19 5

{¶13} The magistrate found all of the above events had occurred after the court

entered the shared-parenting decree, and together they constitute a material change in

appellant’s circumstances and in the children’s circumstances.

{¶14} Appellant argues the Supreme Court has held the changed conditions must

be substantial, continuing, and have a material adverse effect upon the child. Davis,

supra. The rationale behind the statute and the case law is to spare children from a “tug

of war” between the parents. Wyss v. Wyss, 3 Ohio App.3d 412, 416, 445 N.E.2d 1153

(10th Dist. 1982). A court should not modify a shared parenting agreement solely

because the non-custodial parent can show he or she can provide a better environment

for the child. Id. The court must find a change in circumstances so substantial that it is

in the best interest of the child to make a change.

{¶15} Custody changes are some of the most difficult decisions a court must

make and for this reason we accord the trial judge wide latitude in considering the

evidence. We may not reverse unless we find the court abused its discretion. Miller v.

Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 523 N.E.2d. 846 (1988). The Supreme Court has frequently

reminded us that the term “abuse of discretion” implies the court’s attitude was

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,

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Related

Wyss v. Wyss
445 N.E.2d 1153 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1982)
State v. Ferranto
148 N.E. 362 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1925)
Blakemore v. Blakemore
450 N.E.2d 1140 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
Miller v. Miller
523 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1988)
Davis v. Flickinger
674 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)