Brock v. . Porter

16 S.E.2d 410, 220 N.C. 28, 1941 N.C. LEXIS 459

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: September 17, 1941
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stacy, O. J.

The parties have submitted a written contract for construction. Its terms are not in dispute. What is its effect? This is the question for decision. Patton v. Lumber Co., 179 N. C., 103, 101 S. E., 613; Spragins v. White, 108 N. C., 449, 13 S. E., 171; Festerman v. Parker, 32 N. C., 477; Young v. Jeffreys, 20 N. C., 357.

It will be observed that tbe parties themselves undertook to spell out their meaning by limiting the agreement to such heirs or assigns “who occupy the premises,” and it is provided that water for household purposes shall be furnished “to party or parties occupying said premises.” This includes the smaller dwelling erected on the premises as well as the larger one. The limitation of the agreement is not to a single dwelling-erected on the premises, nor yet to a single party occupying the premises. “The parties had a legal right to make their own contract, and if it is clearly expressed, it must be enforced as it is written.” Potato Co. v. Jenette, 172 N. C., 1, 89 S. E., 791. The instrument is explicit. It leaves nothing to inference. It speaks for itself. Cole v. Fibre Co., 200 N. C., 484, 157 S. E., 857; Spragins v. White, supra.

The provision that the monthly payments should begin when the Hales had “constructed a dwelling-house” on their premises was intended to fix the time for the commencement of the monthly payments, and not to limit the use of the water to a single dwelling. There is no suggestion that the contract fails to express the exact agreement of the parties. It is of their making. Perry v. Surety Co., 190 N. C., 284, 129 S. E., 721.

Reversed.