WALLACE, District Judge.
The plaintiffs, Lois S. Brock and James J. Brock, citizens of Oklahoma, bring this action against the defendant, Anderson-Prichard Oil Corporation, a Delaware corporation (herein referred to as A-P) to recover for alleged breaches of a written contract between plaintiffs and A-P while plaintiffs (under the name of Consumers Oil Co.,) were acting as a wholesale distributor of A-P oil products. Plaintiffs urge they were charged more by A-P for gasoline than the amount provided in the agreement; and, in addition, that A-P encroached upon the area allotted to plaintiffs for exclusive distribution, by selling gasoline and other products in Yerden and Mineo, Oklahoma. In answering, A-P denies it charged the [581] plaintiffs more for gasoline than that provided for in the agreement between the parties; and, also alleges there was no violation of plaintiffs’ exclusive distribution area inasmuch as Verden was exempt from the contract and A-P had the right to terminate the exclusive territory contract as to Mineo.
After studying the submitted briefs and reviewing the introduced evidence, the court has concluded that plaintiffs have not established a right of recovery against A-P for regular or ethyl gasoline sold to plaintiffs pursuant to the written contract of May 26,1947.
On the issue of overcharges, plaintiffs’ basic complaint is that there was a breach of that portion of the agreement wherein A-P promised to furnish Challenge Gasoline “at the low price for 73-75 octane as shown in the Chicago Journal of Commerce, date of delivery.”
The evidence indicates that from the inception of the agreement until December 23, 1949, plaintiffs were billed on the basis of the low of the “F.O.B. Group 3 Market”. However, on December 23, 1949, on through the 22nd of January, 1952, the period complained of, plaintiffs were billed at the low of a new market designation appearing in the Journal as “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)”.1
Plaintiffs urge that because the “F.O.B. Group 3 Market” was used for almost three years, that such market designation became as much a part of the written agreement as if specifically referred to in the contract; and, that A-P could not thereafter use the higher market designation “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” when it made an appearance in the Journal and thereby in effect alter the terms of a written agreement without notice to or.consent of the plaintiffs. However, although the low of the “F.O.B. Group 3” designation was applicable under the agreement in question so long as it alone appeared in the Journal giving the high-low of 73-75 octane, the use of such market designation was at all times subject to the additional provision in the agreement stating that: “It is understood and agreed that, “in posting the above prices on the various octane brackets as shown in the Chicago Journal of Commerce, should there be a change in specifications or in octane numbers or brackets, the prices for the products referred to or delivered to the buyer, shall be in accordance with the grade of material delivered and the bracket representing same in the Journal”. The expert testimony is conclusive that when the new market designation “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” was printed in the Journal, that such constituted a change in “brackets” as commonly understood in the oil industry; and, inasmuch as plaintiffs were receiving petroleum products from Oklahoma for shipment in Oklahoma, the low of the “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” was the applicable quotation rather than the previously relied upon “F.O.B. Group 3” designation dealing with northern shipments. Obviously, the terms of a written contract cannot be altered by common trade practice and custom. However, in the instant case the issue is one of interpretation rather than alteration. Consequently, expert opinion is admissible to determine the trade meaning of technical words and thereby arrive at the true intent of the contracting parties.2
[582] Although it may be that A-P dealt with plaintiffs in a hard-fisted business manner; nonetheless, there is no indication that A-P exceeded its legal right by failing to give plaintiffs notice of the bracket change. The wording of the contract itself established the rights of the parties; and, A-P had the contractual authority to price the gasoline in conformity with the terms of the contract without special and pointed notice to the plaintiffs of a change in brackets.
A recognizing of A-P’s right to charge the low shown on the “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” quotation completely vitiates plaintiffs’ asserted claim of overcharges as to regular gasoline sold to them; and, undermines a substantial portion of the asserted ethyl overcharges. However, plaintiffs also urge that in addition to the alleged departing from the applicable low cited in the Journal, that A-P committed a separate breach of contract in charging plaintiffs more than above regular for ethyl, beginning about July 1, 1950.3 In reply A-P argues that such increase was permissible under the contract inasmuch as the octane count was raised.4
Without passing upon whether the terms bf the agreement permitted such increase, the evidence indicates that plaintiffs cannot at this time challenge such charges. Prior to the time A-P increased the price of ethyl to 1<¡¡ over that of regular, specific notice was given plaintiffs.5 As a result of such notice plaintiffs talked with A-P representatives about the proposed increase. After deliberate consideration plaintiffs chose to pay the requested price.
It is well settled that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment, and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment, cannot be recovered on the ground that there was no liability to pay in the first instance;6 and, under the authorities it is equally clear that the plaintiffs’ payments must be deemed voluntary in character.7 These sums, voluntarily paid by [583] plaintiffs with full knowledge of all pertinent facts, cannot now be the object of a suit pitched upon contractual breach.
Neither does the evidence support plaintiffs’ additional claims that A-P in selling petroleum products to Talkington Brothers of Verden, Oklahoma, and in directly supplying an A-P station in Mineo, Oklahoma, constituted violations of the exclusive distributing franchise granted plaintiffs by A-P.
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WALLACE, District Judge.
The plaintiffs, Lois S. Brock and James J. Brock, citizens of Oklahoma, bring this action against the defendant, Anderson-Prichard Oil Corporation, a Delaware corporation (herein referred to as A-P) to recover for alleged breaches of a written contract between plaintiffs and A-P while plaintiffs (under the name of Consumers Oil Co.,) were acting as a wholesale distributor of A-P oil products. Plaintiffs urge they were charged more by A-P for gasoline than the amount provided in the agreement; and, in addition, that A-P encroached upon the area allotted to plaintiffs for exclusive distribution, by selling gasoline and other products in Yerden and Mineo, Oklahoma. In answering, A-P denies it charged the [581] plaintiffs more for gasoline than that provided for in the agreement between the parties; and, also alleges there was no violation of plaintiffs’ exclusive distribution area inasmuch as Verden was exempt from the contract and A-P had the right to terminate the exclusive territory contract as to Mineo.
After studying the submitted briefs and reviewing the introduced evidence, the court has concluded that plaintiffs have not established a right of recovery against A-P for regular or ethyl gasoline sold to plaintiffs pursuant to the written contract of May 26,1947.
On the issue of overcharges, plaintiffs’ basic complaint is that there was a breach of that portion of the agreement wherein A-P promised to furnish Challenge Gasoline “at the low price for 73-75 octane as shown in the Chicago Journal of Commerce, date of delivery.”
The evidence indicates that from the inception of the agreement until December 23, 1949, plaintiffs were billed on the basis of the low of the “F.O.B. Group 3 Market”. However, on December 23, 1949, on through the 22nd of January, 1952, the period complained of, plaintiffs were billed at the low of a new market designation appearing in the Journal as “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)”.1
Plaintiffs urge that because the “F.O.B. Group 3 Market” was used for almost three years, that such market designation became as much a part of the written agreement as if specifically referred to in the contract; and, that A-P could not thereafter use the higher market designation “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” when it made an appearance in the Journal and thereby in effect alter the terms of a written agreement without notice to or.consent of the plaintiffs. However, although the low of the “F.O.B. Group 3” designation was applicable under the agreement in question so long as it alone appeared in the Journal giving the high-low of 73-75 octane, the use of such market designation was at all times subject to the additional provision in the agreement stating that: “It is understood and agreed that, “in posting the above prices on the various octane brackets as shown in the Chicago Journal of Commerce, should there be a change in specifications or in octane numbers or brackets, the prices for the products referred to or delivered to the buyer, shall be in accordance with the grade of material delivered and the bracket representing same in the Journal”. The expert testimony is conclusive that when the new market designation “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” was printed in the Journal, that such constituted a change in “brackets” as commonly understood in the oil industry; and, inasmuch as plaintiffs were receiving petroleum products from Oklahoma for shipment in Oklahoma, the low of the “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” was the applicable quotation rather than the previously relied upon “F.O.B. Group 3” designation dealing with northern shipments. Obviously, the terms of a written contract cannot be altered by common trade practice and custom. However, in the instant case the issue is one of interpretation rather than alteration. Consequently, expert opinion is admissible to determine the trade meaning of technical words and thereby arrive at the true intent of the contracting parties.2
[582] Although it may be that A-P dealt with plaintiffs in a hard-fisted business manner; nonetheless, there is no indication that A-P exceeded its legal right by failing to give plaintiffs notice of the bracket change. The wording of the contract itself established the rights of the parties; and, A-P had the contractual authority to price the gasoline in conformity with the terms of the contract without special and pointed notice to the plaintiffs of a change in brackets.
A recognizing of A-P’s right to charge the low shown on the “Oklahoma (Oklahoma shipment)” quotation completely vitiates plaintiffs’ asserted claim of overcharges as to regular gasoline sold to them; and, undermines a substantial portion of the asserted ethyl overcharges. However, plaintiffs also urge that in addition to the alleged departing from the applicable low cited in the Journal, that A-P committed a separate breach of contract in charging plaintiffs more than above regular for ethyl, beginning about July 1, 1950.3 In reply A-P argues that such increase was permissible under the contract inasmuch as the octane count was raised.4
Without passing upon whether the terms bf the agreement permitted such increase, the evidence indicates that plaintiffs cannot at this time challenge such charges. Prior to the time A-P increased the price of ethyl to 1<¡¡ over that of regular, specific notice was given plaintiffs.5 As a result of such notice plaintiffs talked with A-P representatives about the proposed increase. After deliberate consideration plaintiffs chose to pay the requested price.
It is well settled that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment, and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment, cannot be recovered on the ground that there was no liability to pay in the first instance;6 and, under the authorities it is equally clear that the plaintiffs’ payments must be deemed voluntary in character.7 These sums, voluntarily paid by [583] plaintiffs with full knowledge of all pertinent facts, cannot now be the object of a suit pitched upon contractual breach.
Neither does the evidence support plaintiffs’ additional claims that A-P in selling petroleum products to Talkington Brothers of Verden, Oklahoma, and in directly supplying an A-P station in Mineo, Oklahoma, constituted violations of the exclusive distributing franchise granted plaintiffs by A-P.
The agreement of May 26, 1947, although implying an exclusive district existed, did not specifically define the extent of such district.8 Plaintiffs’ strongest evidence that all of Verden fell within their exclusive control is found in a letter dated March 29, 1948, written to Talkington Brothers by an A-P Assistant to Sales Directors.9 However, the postscript attached to the copy of this letter mailed to plaintiffs,10 plus the parol evidence of persons in positions to know, indicate Talkington Brothers had been supplied directly by A-P with plaintiffs’ knowledge and consent, and, that such station in Verden, although located within the general geographic location of plaintiffs’ exclusive district, was expressly excepted from plaintiffs’ territory. The evidence is convincing that at the time A-P wrote the letter in question, allegedly acknowledging a breach of its agreement with plaintiffs, the object of such letter was to qid plaintiffs by persuading Talkington Brothers to permit plaintiffs to service the Talkington account, which account previously for a considerable period of time had been serviced by A-P. Inasmuch as the writing bearing on this particular issue is indefinite in character, parol and other extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve such uncertainty.
As to the alleged Mineo violation of plaintiffs’ exclusive distributorship, plaintiffs’ claim must fail for several distinct reasons. In the first place, the written letter relied upon by plaintiffs does not of itself conclusively establish that the town of Mineo was included in plaintiffs’ territory.11 In addition, and more controlling, the agreement of October 15, 1948 leasing to plaintiffs the Mineo station, just purchased by A-P from Deep Rock, expressly gave A-P the authority, upon 10 days notice, to cancel the lease and take over the operation of the station. This lease agreement further provided that such agreement “supersedes and cancels any and all former agreements between the parties in respect to the subject matter hereof * *” In light of this agreement the court believes that the right of A-P to operate such station included the right to directly supply its station with petroleum products; and, it is uneontroverted that [584] A-P cancelled plaintiffs’ lease pursuant to proper notice. Moreover, after a pointed controversy over the relative rights of the parties under the station lease agreement a settlement as to the Mineo station was reached. At the time of such settlement both parties clearly understood that A-P was to take over the operation of the station including the supplying of petroleum products.
The defendant is entitled to judgment. Within 15 days counsel should submit a journal entry which conforms with this opinion.