Broadview Hts. v. Dunn

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 2, 2026
• Docket: 115523
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Broadview Hts. v. Dunn, 2026-Ohio-1199.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF BROADVIEW HEIGHTS, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115523 v. :

MICHAEL C. DUNN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case Nos. 25CRB01518 and 25TRC07728

Appearances:

Dean DePiero, City of Broadview Heights Assistant Law Director and Prosecutor, for appellee.

Michael C. Dunn, pro se.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

In this accelerated appeal, defendant-appellant Michael Dunn

(“Dunn”), pro se, appeals from two cases that were adjudicated in the Parma

Municipal Court. App.R. 11.1 and Loc. App.R. 11.1 govern accelerated appeals; the purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow this court to render a brief and

conclusory opinion. State v. Priest, 2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.).

On May 30, 2025, Dunn was ticketed and arrested in the City of

Broadview Heights. Two complaints were filed against Dunn in the Parma

Municipal Court. In Parma M.C. No. 25TRC07728, Dunn was charged with five

traffic violations. In Parma M.C. No. 25CRB01518, Dunn was charged with two

drug-related offenses.

For the reasons discussed below, we dismiss the appeal as it relates to

Parma M.C. No. 25CRB01518; we affirm the trial court’s judgment as it relates to

Parma M.C. No. 25TRC07728.

Arraignment on the two cases was scheduled for June 6, 2025. Dunn,

pro se, appeared at arraignment and challenged the trial court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction over the cases and personal jurisdiction over him. Dunn refused to enter

a not guilty plea; the trial court entered it for him.

On July 6, 2025, Dunn filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional

grounds. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied it. The matter

proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which the court acquitted Dunn of

the drug-related offenses charged in Parma M.C. No. 25CRB01518 and found him

guilty of the traffic-related violations charged in Parma M.C. No. 25TRC07728. The

trial court sentenced Dunn to 180 days of jail, with 160 days suspended, and

imposed fines and costs. Dunn now appeals and raises two assignments of error for our review.

In his first assignment of error, Dunn contends that the trial court did not have

personal jurisdiction over him. In the second assignment of error, Dunn contends

that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the two cases.

Initially, we note that there is no live controversy for us to consider

relative to Parma M.C. No. 25CRB01518 because the trial court acquitted Dunn of

those charges. See Cleveland v. Spears, 2019-Ohio-3041, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing

Bayview Loan Servicing v. Salem, 2015-Ohio-2615 (9th Dist.) (“Appellate courts

cannot review questions that do not involve live controversies.”). Thus, this appeal

is dismissed as it relates to Parma M.C. No. 25CRB01518.

Relative to Parma M.C. No. 25TRC07728, we find that the trial court

had both personal jurisdiction over Dunn and subject-matter jurisdiction over the

case.

In Dunn’s first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court

lacked personal jurisdiction over him. We disagree.

“Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to render a valid

judgment against a particular individual.” State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784,

¶ 36. “In a criminal matter, the court acquires jurisdiction over a person by lawfully

issued process, followed by the arrest and arraignment of the accused and his

[or her] plea to the charge.” Id., citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 490 (1927);

see also State v. Jeffries, 2023-Ohio-4657, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (“In a criminal case, the court secures jurisdiction over the person by the lawful process of arrest and

arraignment of the defendant and his [or her] plea to the charge.”).

Dunn appeared at arraignment and contended that the trial court did

not have jurisdiction over him. To the extent Dunn contends that the trial court did

not have jurisdiction over him because he refused to enter a not guilty plea, the trial

court properly entered it on his behalf. Crim.R. 11(A) provides in relevant part that

“[i]f a defendant refuses to plead, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty on behalf

of the defendant.”

Further, personal jurisdiction can be waived by, among other things,

a defendant’s voluntary appearance or actions. In re C.T., 2010-Ohio-5887, ¶ 12

(2d Dist.). After Dunn appeared at arraignment and the trial court entered a not

guilty plea on his behalf, Dunn continued to appear in court and litigated the matter

through a bench trial. Thus, Dunn waived the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

In Dunn’s second assignment of error, he contends that the trial court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We disagree with that contention as well.

“Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory

power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” Corder v. Ohio

Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14. “‘A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is

determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a

particular case.’” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 19.

“Instead, ‘the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.’” Id., quoting State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23. Subject-matter

jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court’s power to adjudicate and render

judgment in a case and “in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court lacks

the authority to do anything but announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss.”

Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 21. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be

waived. State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 46 (1995).

The general subject-matter jurisdiction of Ohio municipal courts is

defined statutorily by the legislature. Specifically, R.C. 1901.02(B) vests the Parma

Municipal Court with jurisdiction over several municipalities, including Broadview

Heights. Thus, because the infractions at issue occurred in Broadview Heights, the

Parma Municipal Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate them.

Dunn challenges the form of the traffic ticket issued to him.

Traf.R. 3(A) provides that “[i]n traffic cases, the complaint and summons shall be

the ‘Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket[.]’” A traffic ticket that complies with the Uniform

Traffic Rules is a valid complaint, giving sufficient notice and establishing

jurisdiction. Shaker Hts. v. El-Bey, 2017-Ohio-929, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.).

Dunn’s contention that the traffic ticket was invalid because it was not

notarized is unfounded. Traf.R. 3(A) does not contain a requirement that a traffic

ticket be notarized. State v. Rippl, 2009-Ohio-1599, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Dunn’s

contention that the traffic ticket was invalid because it lacked a handwritten

signature is also meritless. The ticket contained the issuing officer’s name in type-

faced print. An officer’s name affixed on a ticket in printed form satisfies the Traf.R. 3 signature requirement. Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 2002 Ohio App.

LEXIS 550, *8 (8th Dist. Feb. 14, 2002).

The second assignment of error is overruled.

In sum, there is no live controversy for us to consider relative to

Parma M.C. No. 25CRB01518 and the trial court had both personal jurisdiction over

Dunn and subject-matter jurisdiction over Parma M.C. No. 25TRC07728.

The appeal is dismissed as it relates to Parma M.C. No. 25CRB01518;

the trial court’s judgment as it relates to Parma M.C. No. 25TRC07728 is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Parma

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction

having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to

municipal court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________ MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR