MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
HENRY J. BOROFF, Bankruptcy Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Brixi-us (“Brixius”) and Jeffrey Butler (“Butler”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) against the Defendant, George C. Christian (the “Defendant” or “Debtor”) on a complaint to determine the nondischargeability of a debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
A. Factual Background
The material facts are not disputed. Brixi-us and a former tenant, Robin Regan (“Re-gan”), jointly leased an apartment located at 69 Prospect Street, Unit 42, Northampton,
Massachusetts (the “Apartment”) from Prospect Realty (“Prospect”) (a business trade name pursuant to which the Debtor conducted business) for the period of May 1, 1989 through May 31, 1990. The monthly rent was set at $575.00. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, Brixius and Regan paid to Prospect the first and last month’s rent as well as a security deposit equal to one month’s rental. Neither at the inception of the lease term nor at any time during the course of the tenancy did Prospect provide Brixius, Regan or Butler a writing indicating the location or the number of the bank account holding the security deposit or the last month’s rent.
On or about August 31, 1989, with the knowledge and consent of Prospect, Butler replaced Regan on the lease. The Plaintiffs executed a written lease renewal for a term of 15 months which extended the lease term through August 31, 1991. The “Lease Extension Agreement”
also provided that “all terms and conditions [would] remain the same except that rent for the renewal period [would be increased to] $595.00.” At the end of the lease term, the Plaintiffs vacated the Apartment. However, Prospect failed to return the security deposit or pay the Plaintiffs the required interest on the security deposit or interest on the last month’s rent. Prospect also failed to provide to the Plaintiffs, within 30 days of the termination of the tenancy, an itemized list of damages, necessary repairs and cost of repairs to the premises arising out of the tenancy.
In response to the aforesaid failures by Prospect to make payment, the Plaintiffs filed a three count complaint against Prospect and the Debtor in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts District Court, Northhampton Division, Civil No. 9245 CV 383, seeking relief pursuant to Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. eh. 186, § 15B
and Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 93A,
§ 9.
Count I sought' an award of three times the amount of the security deposit plus interest, costs and attorneys fees, pursuant to ch. 186, § 15B(2), (3), (4) and (7). Count II sought an award of interest on the last month’s rent, pursuant to ch. 186, § 15B(2). Count III sought an award of three times the security deposit plus interest, costs and attorneys fees, pursuant to Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9
. On January 19, 1993,
the Northampton District Court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Plaintiff. The Debtor responded by filing a timely Notice of Appeal and a claim for a jury trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court, Hamp-den Division. Plaintiffs followed by filing a motion for summary judgment in the Superi- or Court case. However, prior to action by the Superior Court on said motion for summary judgment, the Debtor and his wife, Marilyn A. Christian, filed the instant Chapter 7 petition on July 16, 1993 in this Court. Notwithstanding the Chapter 7 filing, on July 29, 1994, Superior Court Justice Spina entered judgment for the Plaintiffs against the Debtor and Prospect in the Superior Court action in the amount of $5,322.79 plus interest, costs and attorney’s fees. Subsequently, this case was voluntarily converted to a Chapter 11 case.
The Plaintiffs filed the instant adversary proceeding on November 15, 1993. Through their Complaint, the Plaintiffs seek a determination that their claim is established in the amount of the District and Superior Court judgments, and should be deemed non-dis-chargeable, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). The Plaintiffs argue that (1) Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their state law claims under the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (2) summary judgment is appropriate since the Defendant failed to present any facts which controvert the Plaintiffs’ claim that the Debtor violated his statutory duties under Massachusetts law; (3) the Debtor’s defenses
are meritless; (4) the claim is not dischargeable under § 523(a)(4) in that it arose out of a defalcation by the Debtor while he was acting in a fiduciary capacity. Plaintiffs urge the Court to find a fiduciary relationship created by a statutory trust relationship grounded in Mass.Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 186, § 15B.
The Debtor filed an opposition and brief. He argues that (1) there is no final judgment, either from the District Court or the Superi- or Court,
and that such finality is a necessary element of collateral estoppel, and (2) Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 186, § 15B does not create a fiduciary relationship between landlord and tenant for the purposes of § 523(a)(4).
After the hearing on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the Court took the Plaintiffs motion under advisement.
II. DISCUSSION
A
Fiduciary Capacity under § 528(a) (j))
The Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
See Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In the instant case, the material facts demonstrating the Debtor’s breach of Mass.Gen.Laws.Ann. ch. 186, § 15B are not disputed.
In order for the Plaintiffs to prevail under § 523(a)(4), the Plaintiffs must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor committed fraud or defalcation, while acting in a fiduciary capacity.
See Grogan v. Garner,
498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). A defalcation is nothing more than a failure to account for money held in a fiduciary capacity and does not require a showing of intentional wrongdoing.
Hoff v. Carroll (In re Carroll),
140 B.R. 313, 316 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992);
Kwiat v. Doucette (In re Kwiat),
81 B.R. 184, 189 (D.Mass.1987). Therefore, if it can be established that the Debtor held the security deposit (and interest thereon) in a fiduciary capacity, the failure to pay it over to the Plaintiffs at the termination of their tenancy constituted defalcation.
The meaning of “fiduciary capacity” under § 523(a)(4)
is a narrowly defined federal question which is limited in its application to express or technical trust relationships, not trusts which the law implies from a contract.
See e.g., Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Corp.,
293 U.S. 328, 333, 55 S.Ct. 151, 153-54, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934). Thus, implied or constructive trusts and trusts ex maleficio are not susceptible to the establishment of a fiduciary relationship under the Bankruptcy Code.
See Id.
at 333, 55 S.Ct. at 153-54;
see also Wagner v. Abood (In re Abood),
172 B.R. 166, 167 (Bankr.D.R.I. 1994).
In determining whether a technical trust relationship exists, courts have consistently considered state law relevant in determining whether a debtor was acting as a fiduciary under the Bankruptcy Code.
See e.g., In re Snyder,
101 B.R. 822, 831 (Bankr.D.Mass.1989), aff
'd in part, reversed in part,
923 F.2d 840 (1st Cir.1990),
cert. denied,
500 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 2030, 114 L.Ed.2d 115 (1991);
In re Kwiat,
81 B.R. 184, 188 (D.Mass.1987). Specifically, state law is consulted for guidance on whether the requisite trust relationship exists.
See In re Kwiat,
81 B.R. at 188. In order to create a fiduciary relationship, a state statute must define the trust res, spell out the trustee’s fiduciary duties and impose a trust prior to and without reference to the wrong which created the debt.
Woodworkin
g
Enterprises, Inc. v. Baird,
114 B.R. 198, 202 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1990).
Statutorily created “trusts” create fiduciary duties that are dependent upon the relationship between the parties, but are not created by agreement of the parties nor created ex post facto as a remedial measure to right a wrong.
See e.g., Ouaif v. Johnson,
4 F.3d 950, 953-54 (11th Cir.1993);
Discount Home Center, Inc. v. Turner (In re Turner),
134 B.R. 646, 653-56 (Bankr.N.D.Okla.1991). To show a fiduciary capacity arising from a statutorily created trust for the purposes of § 523(a)(4), a creditor must point to an express legislative design to create a trust relationship.
Tway v. Tway (In re Tway),
161 B.R. 274, 279 (Bankr.W.D.Okl.1993);
Pacific-Midwest Gas Co. v. Hutton (in re Hutton),
117 B.R. 1009, 1013 (Bankr.N.D.Okla. 1990);
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Myers
(In re Myers),
52 B.R. 901, 905 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1985).
Cases analyzing state statutory schemes have produced mixed results in determining whether fiduciary duties were created for purposes of § 523(a)(4).
E.g. In re Marchiando,
13 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir.1994) (Illinois statute did not impose fiduciary duties on licensed lottery ticket agents for nondis-chargeability purposes);
Quaif v. Johnson, 4
F.3d 950 (Georgia statute created fiduciary duties on the part of debtor insurance agent);
Coburn Co. of Beaumont v. Nicholas (In re Nicholas),
956 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.1992) (Texas Construction Trust Fund Statute creates fiduciary duties);
Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Interstate Agency, Inc. (In re Interstate Agency, Inc.),
760 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.1985) (Michigan law creates fiduciary relation between insurance agency and insurance principal);
Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell,
615 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.1980) (Oklahoma statute clearly imposed fiduciary duties on construction mortgagors);
Lemars Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cutler (In re Cutler),
74 B.R. 712 (N.D.Iowa1987) (relationship between insurance company and insurance agent was debtor-creditor and not fiduciary under Iowa law);
Anderson v. Currin (In re Currin),
55 B.R. 928, 923-33 (Bankr.D.Colo.1985) (Colorado’s real estate broker’s licensing statute imposed fiduciary duties on brokers).
There is little precedent available to aid in determining whether Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 186, § 15B, creates a trust relationship between lessors and tenants for purposes of § 523(a)(4). The Plaintiffs point to the holding of
Alaska Teamster-Employer Pension Trust v. Wise (In re Wise),
120 B.R. 537 (Bankr.D.Alaska 1990). In the
Wise
case, the court considered whether an Alaska statute, which governed the retention of security deposits and pre-paid rent under its Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act, created a statutory trust to establish the element of fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4).
Id.
at 538. That statute provided in part:
(c) [a]ll money paid to the landlord by the tenant as prepaid rent or as a security deposit in a lease or rental agreement shall be promptly deposited by the landlord, wherever practicable, in a trust account in a bank, savings and loan association, or licenses escrow agent, and the landlord shall provide to the tenant the terms and conditions under which the prepaid rent or security deposit or portions of them may be withheld by landlord; nothing in this chapter prohibits the landlord from commingling prepaid rents and security deposits in a single financial account.
Alaska Stat. § 34.03.070(c) (1990). The
Wise
court recited the elements of § 523(a)(4), and simply concluded that the applicable Alaska statute “seems to be the type of statute which creates a statutory trust relationship called for by § 523(a)(4) to establish nondis-chargeability for a fiduciary for defalcation.” 120 B.R. at 538. While the conclusion reached by the
Wise
court may be the correct result, it does not aid in analyzing the Massachusetts statute.
This Court finds the discussion of statutorily created trusts in the recent Seventh Circuit
Marchiando
decision particularly well-reasoned. In that case, the applicable Illinois state statute provided that a licensed lottery ticket agent would serve as a trustee of lottery proceeds, was prohibited from commingling them, and was required to pay them over to the state.
Id.
at 1113. Violation of the statute subjected the ticket agent to criminal prosecution.
Id.
In the
Mar-chiando
case, the debtor store owner failed to remit the proceeds of her lottery ticket sales to the Illinois Department of the Lottery. Notwithstanding the statutory language, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Illinois statute did not intend to impose a trust or fiduciary relationship until the wrong was committed:
Technically, Marchiando became the trustee as soon as she received her license to sell lottery tickets. Realistically, the trust did not begin until she failed to remit ticket receipts. For until then she had no duties of a fiduciary character toward the Department of Lottery or anything or anyone else. Until then, she was just a ticket agent. The state, afraid that she might be a disloyal agent, required her to keep proceeds of her ticket sales separate from her other funds and threatened her with criminal punishment if she did not. These were
devices by which the state sought to establish and enforce a lien in the proceeds[.]
Id.
at 1116.
The
Marchiando
Court also focused on the underlying need for fiduciary status growing out of the inequality of relationship:
The fiduciary may know much more by reason of professional status, or the relation may be one that requires the principal to repose a special confidence in the fiduciary; both factors are present in the case of a lawyer-client relation and also the relation between director and shareholder or managing partner and limited partner. Or the principal may be a child, lacking not only knowledge but also the power to act upon it. These are all situations in which one party to the relation is incapable of monitoring the other’s performance of his undertaking, and therefore the law does not treat the relation as a relation at arm’s length between equals.
Id.
at 1116. Rejecting the notion that a ticket agent had superior power or expertise in relation to a state bureaucracy, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the absence of an “inequality of relation” between the state and ticket agent obviated the need to impose fiduciary duties on the ticket agent.
Id.
The
Marchiando
court warned:
If ... a fiduciary is anyone whom a state calls a fiduciary ... states will have it in their power to deny a fresh start to their debtor by declaring all contractual relations fiduciary.... They are apt to seek a preferred position for their own debts by declaring people who do business with the state fiduciaries of the state or its agencies.
Id.
Application of the
Marchiando
analysis to the instant proceeding dictates a finding of nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(4).
Firstly, the Debtor’s fiduciary duties did not arise at the moment he failed to remit the proceeds of the security deposit in accordance with the statutory scheme. On the contrary, upon receipt of a security deposit, a lessor is obliged to perform the following duties under the statute: (1) to maintain a record of the security deposit available for inspection by the tenant; (2) to hold the security deposit in a separate interest bearing account; (8) to provide to the tenant, within 30 days of receiving the security deposit, a receipt indicating the name and location of the bank as well as the amount and account number of said deposit.
See
Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. eh. 186, § 15B(2)(d), (3)(a).
A lessor is also obligated to remit yearly accountings to the tenant if the tenancy extends for a period of one year or longer.
Id.
§ 15B(3)(b). Within thirty (30) days after the termination of the tenancy, the lessor is obliged to remit the full security deposit and interest thereon, less any statutorily authorized deductions and expenses.
Id.
§ 15B(4). These duties arise irrespective of any breach or wrong committed by the landlord. If the lessor fails to comply with these statutory obligations, the lessor forfeits the right to retain any portion of the security deposit or to counterclaim for any damage in an action by a tenant to recover the security deposit.
Id.
§ 15B(6).
Secondly,
Marchiando
suggests that fiduciary obligations may be statutorily imposed if there is an “inequality of relation” based on power or expertise, where one party is incapable of monitoring the other’s performance of his undertaking. Chapter 186, § 15B manifests the legislature’s concern for the welfare of residential tenants who are generally in an inferior bargaining position and find traditional avenues of legal redress relatively useless and costly.
See Mellor v. Berman,
390 Mass. 275, 282, 454 N.E.2d 907, 912 (1983);
Hampshire Village Associates v. District Court of Hampshire,
381 Mass. 148, 152-53, 408 N.E.2d 830, 833 (1980),
cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1062, 101 S.Ct. 785, 66 L.Ed.2d 604 (1980);
Shwachman v. Khoroshansky,
15 Mass.App.Ct. 1002, 1002-03, 448 N.E.2d 409, 411 (1983);
Goes v. Feldman,
8 Mass.App.Ct. 84, 91, 391 N.E.2d 943, 947 (1979).
See also Castenholz v. Caira,
21 Mass.App.Ct. 758,
763, 490 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1986) (“The purpose of [ch. 186, § 15B] subsection (7) is not to pillory the landlord, but to make resort to litigation feasible for tenants.”). This Court finds that the lessor/residential tenant relationship is very seldomly a “relation at arm’s length between equals” and, therefore, calls for the imposition of fiduciary duties on the lessor and for the benefit of the tenant.
See In re Marckiando,
13 F.3d at 1116.
Finally,
Marckiando
cautioned against giving state legislatures unfettered discretion to declare certain contractual relations with the state “fiduciary” in nature for § 523(a)(4) purposes. That concern is not applicable here. The Massachusetts legislature did not enact ch. 186, § 15B to enhance the Commonwealth’s own debt collection program. The purpose of the statute, as stated above, is to protect tenants from potential abuse by lessors who are typically in a superior bargaining position in relation to their tenants.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Chapter 186, § 15B of the Massachusetts General Laws imposes fiduciary duties on the residential landlord for the benefit of the tenant for nondischargeability purposes under § 523(a)(4). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ undisputed claim, arising from Defendant’s violation of ch. 186, § 15B(2)(a)-(c), (3)(a), (3)(b) and (4), and arising from the Debtor’s defalcation is deemed nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4).
B. Punitive Damages
The Court is finally left to determine the propriety of excepting from discharge punitive damages to which the Plaintiffs may be entitled under Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. eh. 186, § 15B and Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9.
Section 523 provides that “[a] discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt-
... (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). The broad definition of “claim” is not only set forth in the Code
but has also been acknowledged by the Supreme Court.
See Pennsylvania Dept of Public Welfare v. Davenport
495 U.S. 552, 558,110 S.Ct. 2126, 2130, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990) (“the meanings of “debt” and “claim” [are] coextensive....” As is' apparent, Congress chose expansive language in both definitions [of' ‘claim’ and ‘debt’]).
See also Johnson v. Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991).
Also deserving of examination and consideration is 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4). Section 726(a)(4) provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be distributed—
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or
punitive damages,
arising before the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such elaim[.]
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). The bankruptcy court in
Placer U.S. Inc. v. Dahlstrom (In re Dahlstrom),
129 B.R. 240, 242 (Bankr.D.Utah 1991), suggested that the inclusion of punitive damages in the distribution scheme for Chapter 7 property reveals Congress’ intent to administer punitive damages as “debts” under the Bankruptcy Code.
Notwithstanding the above statutory provisions which seem to suggest that punitive damages are “debts” for nondischargeability purposes, the Court is also mindful of
§ 523(a)(7) which provides for nondischarge-ability of a debt owed to a government unit for a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture ... [that] is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.”
See
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). Some courts have been obliged to find that § 523(a)(7) signifies Congress’ intent to except from discharge noncompensatory damages
only
if owed to a government agency.
E.g. Ellwanger v. Bette Joyce McBroom Estate (In re Ellwanger),
105 B.R. 551, 555-56 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1989);
Petruzzi v. DeLuca (In re Deluca),
111 B.R. 839, 842 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1990);
McCullough v. Suter (In re Suter),
59 B.R. 944, 947 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986). However, this Court is more persuaded by Judge Clark’s logic in
Dahlstrom.
Judge Clark stated:
[t]here is nothing in the language of § 523(a) or its legislative history to indicate that subsection (a)(7) was intended to preclude private entities from pursuing nondischargeability judgments of punitive damages under its other subsection. Moreover, the focus of the two subsections are entirely different. Subsection (a)(7) focuses on the nature of the act which gave rise to the liability.
129 B.R. at 246. Section § 523(a)(4) similarly focuses on the nature of the act for nondis-chargeability purposes. Specifically, subsection (a)(4) calls for a determination of “fraud or defalcation while [the debtor was] acting in a fiduciary capacity”. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
This Court also notes that a majority of courts interpreting. § 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) have held that both actual and punitive damages are excepted from discharge by those statutes.
See Dahlstrom,
129 B.R. 240, 243-44 (providing an extensive listing of cases). In the First Circuit, there is little caselaw on this issue.
E.g., Reynolds-Marshall v. Hallum,
162 B.R. 51 (D.Me.1993) (punitive damages award found nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6));
Sack v. Friedlander (In re Friedlander),
170 B.R. 472 (Bankr.D.Mass.1994) (punitive damages award found nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)). The District Court in
Reynolds-Marshall
considered, among other issues, whether or not the discharge exception for willful and malicious injury encompassed punitive damages that arose from conduct that was adjudged willful and malicious in the state court. In that case, Chief Judge Carter noted that although there may be disagreement among bankruptcy and district courts
over whether punitive damages may be found nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6):
[tjhese disagreements ... essentially boil down to policy; namely, the emphasis that a particular court gives to the ‘fresh start’ policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code.... Courts which view- the fresh start policy as informing every provision of the Code tend to read the discharge exceptions narrowly, to provide only for compensation to creditors for willful and malicious while not encompassing punitive damage award that will burden the debtor for years beyond the discharge. Other Courts view the language of the discharge exceptions as overriding the fresh-start policy with respect to debts incurred as a result of fraud, willful and malicious injury, and other conduct that Congress did not intend for the bankruptcy law to forgive.
Id.
at 59-60.
The fresh start promised by the Bankruptcy Code is not an entitlement. The Supreme Court, in
Grogan,
has made it clear that the fresh start is available only to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.” 498 U.S. at 286-87, 111 S.Ct. at 659. “[T]he Bankruptcy Court is not a forum for excusing misconduct. And there is no discharge for discharge’s sake in bankruptcy. Discharge is a means to achieve the legitimate purpose of providing
honest
debtors with a
deserved
‘fresh start’.”
Bryan v. Manley (In re Manley),
135 B.R. 137, 147 (Bankr.N.D.Okl.1992). A recent Ninth Circuit opinion,
Bugna v. McArthur (In re Bugna),
33 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.1994), which denied the dischargeability of punitive damages under § 523(a)(4), similarly stated:
[debtors] who incur liability for punitive damages through commission of fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity are neither honest nor unfortunate, and they do not deserve the benefit of the fresh start policy. For this reason, we have previously rejected the same fresh start argument in finding that section 528(a)(6) bars discharge of punitive damages, (citation omitted). We see know reason why [debtor’s] argument carries any greater weight in the context of section 523(a)(4).
Id.
at 1059.
The
Manley
court, another court which has held punitive damages nondisehargeable under § 523(a)(4), acknowledged that equity courts “should be reluctant to
award
punitive damages.” 135 B.R. at 146. However, the Oklahoma bankruptcy court astutely remarked that equity courts should be “reluctant to enjoin enforcement of those which are properly awarded by other courts,” since “punitive damages may be allowed by the [s]tate for reasons of policy.”
See id.
at 146.
The Massachusetts Legislature, for reasons of policy, has decided to award punitive damages for a
non innocent
breach of designated provisions of Massachusetts General Laws, eh. 186, § 15B. “Section 15B ... is not a minefield of potential multiple penalties for a landlord who makes an innocent mistake.”
Castenholz,
21 Mass.App.Ct. at 762, 490 N.E.2d at 497;
see
Mass.Gen.Laws, ch. 186, § 15B(7). Similarly, for reasons of policy, regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney General under the authority of Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 93A § 2(c), provide that a violation of ch. 186, § 15B is an “unfair or deceptive practice” for ch. 93A purposes.
This Court has determined that Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 186, § 15B imposes a fiduciary relationship between a residential landlord and tenant for nondis-chargeability purposes under § 523(a)(4). Since “there is no conflict between the ‘fresh start’ policy and the punishment of
some
debtors”,
see In re Manley,
135 B.R. at 147, this Court does not hesitate to except from discharge punitive damages which are not “arbitrarily penal” in that they only seek to punish certain culpable conduct by residential landlords.
See Castenholz,
21 MassApp.Ct. at 763, 490 N.E.2d at 497. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the punitive damages, which may be imposed under ch. 186, § 15B and ch. 93A, § 9 and the regulations promulgated thereunder, are nondisehargeable under § 523(a)(4).
Cf. In re Friedlander,
170 B.R. at 480 (punitive damages portion of judgment debt under ch. 93A, § 11 can be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A)).
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby awards partial summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on their Complaint by finding and ruling that (1) the debt arising from Defendant’s violation of Massachusetts General Laws eh. 186, §§ 15B(2)(a)-(c), (8)(a), (3)(b) and (4), and (2) the punitive damages which may be awarded pursuant to ch. 186, § 15B and pursuant to ch. 93A, § 9 are nondis-chargeable, pursuant to § 523(a)(4). The Court will schedule a further hearing on the assessment of damages, costs and attorneys fees.