Opinion of the Court
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff was previously employed by Wake County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”)
for approximately fourteen years as a Master Deputy Sheriff. In July 2020, Plaintiff
submitted her notice of retirement, effective 1 December 2020. On 25 November 2020,
nearing her retirement, Plaintiff sent an email to WCSO staff expressing her
gratitude for the opportunity to have worked with everyone and “stating there are
good times to come[.]” According to Plaintiff’s complaint, she made this statement in
reference to “the recent and ongoing plight of [l]aw [e]nforcement officers in the wake
of George Floyd’s death and the Covid-19 impact on the department.”1
According to Plaintiff, then-Sheriff Baker took offense to this email and took
adverse actions towards Plaintiff, removing her from her scheduled overtime and off-
duty assignments during her last week of service without any “given rationale.”
Plaintiff further alleged that Sheriff Baker asked that Plaintiff return her patrol
vehicle and equipment early and that she was “excluded from a customary retiree
honors ceremony with Sheriff Baker.”
In June 2021, Plaintiff brought an adverse employment action against Sheriff
Baker in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff of Wake County, and Unknown
Surety Company (the “First Action”) in Wake County Superior Court, contending
Sheriff Baker had discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of
1 A copy of the actual email was not included in the Record on Appeal, and all references of the
email come from Plaintiff’s complaint.
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the Civil Rights Act. Sheriff Baker removed the First Action from Wake County
Superior Court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina. The Court subsequently dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, finding Plaintiff
“failed to state facts sufficient to state a Title VII racial discrimination, disparate
treatment, and retaliation claim.”
On 13 September 2023, Plaintiff initiated another lawsuit by filing a new
complaint against Defendants WCSO and Sheriff Willie Rowe2 in his official capacity
(the “Second Action”) in Wake County Superior Court. Plaintiff brought two Corum
claims—a violation of Section 1, Article 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, and a
violation of Section 1, Article 19 of the North Carolina Constitution—and a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Defendants moved to dismiss the
Second Action pursuant to, inter alia, the doctrine of res judicata, arguing the factual
allegations brought by Plaintiff in the Second Action were the same as the previous
action.
The trial court agreed with Defendants, finding that “the ‘Factual Allegations’
in Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case are almost a verbatim copy of the ‘Factual
Allegations’ in Plaintiff’s Complaint in the First Action.” The trial court took judicial
notice of Plaintiff’s First Action, and concluded that, although Plaintiff brought new
legal theories, these three new claims “involve the exact same alleged conduct and
2 Sheriff Willie Rowe, as Sheriff Baker’s successor, was automatically substituted as a public
official pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 25(f)(1) (2025).
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same series of events” as her previous claims and thus dismissed Plaintiff’s Second
Action as barred on the grounds of res judicata. Plaintiff timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review a final judgment from a superior court
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2023).
III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the granting of a motion to dismiss de novo. Taylor v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 382 N.C. 677, 679 (2022). “[U]nder de novo review, the appellate court
as the reviewing court considers the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss anew: It freely
substitutes its own assessment of whether the allegations of the complaint are
sufficient to state a claim for the trial court’s assessment.” Id.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the question is
whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim. We consider [the] plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether, when liberally construed, it states enough to give the substantive elements of a legally recognized claim.
Allred v. Cap. Area Soccer League, Inc., 194 N.C. App. 280, 282–83 (2008) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. Analysis
On appeal, Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting Defendants’
motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata. Specifically, Plaintiff contends “res
judicata cannot be applied to [the] Corum claims in this manner” as this undermines
the very purpose of a Corum claim, which Plaintiff asserts is “to be brought only in
the alternative, after no other adequate remedy is available.” We disagree.
Claims of violations of rights granted by the North Carolina Constitution are
known as “Corum claims.” See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783 (1992)
(providing that “our common law guarantees [a] plaintiff a direct action under the
State Constitution for alleged violations of his constitutional freedom”). “To ensure
that every right does indeed have a remedy in our court system, Corum offers a
common law cause of action when existing relief does not sufficiently redress a
violation of a particular constitutional right.” Askew v. City of Kinston, 386 N.C. 286,
293 (2024) (citation modified).
“The doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue
preclusion) are companion doctrines which have been developed by the Courts ‘for the
dual purposes of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously
decided matters and promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.’”
Little v. Hamel, 134 N.C. App. 485, 487 (1999) (quoting Bockweg v. Anderson, 333
N.C. 486, 491 (1993)). “Res judicata precludes a second suit involving the same claim
between the same parties or those in privity with them when there has been a final
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judgment on the merits in a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id.
(citing Nw. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Cnty. of Gaston, 110 N.C. App. 531, 536 (1993)). “A
judgment operates as an estoppel not only as to all matters actually determined or
litigated in the proceeding, ‘but also as to all relevant and material matters within
the scope of the proceeding which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
could and should have brought forward for determination.’” Id. at 487–88 (quoting
Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 22 (1985)).
This Court has explained that, for res judicata to apply,
a party must show that the previous suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits, that the same cause of action is involved, and that both the party asserting res judicata and the party against whom res judicata is asserted were either parties or stand in privity with parties.
Doe 1K v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Charlotte, 283 N.C. App. 171, 174 (2022) aff’d, 387
N.C. 12 (2025). Furthermore, we have explained that
subsequent actions which attempt to proceed by asserting a new legal theory or by seeking a different remedy are prohibited under the principles of res judicata because the judgment in the former action or proceeding is conclusive in the latter not only as to all matters actually litigated and determined, but also as to all matters which could properly have been litigated and determined in the former action or proceeding. A party is required to bring forth the whole case at one time and will not be permitted to split the claim or divide the grounds for recovery.
ACC Const., Inc. v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 239 N.C. App. 252, 262 (2015) (emphasis
added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v.
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Peabody, 217 N.C. App. 1, 7 (2011) (“A party is required to bring forth the whole case
at one time and will not be permitted to split the claim or divide the grounds for
recovery; thus, a party will not be permitted, except in special circumstances, to
reopen the subject of the . . . litigation with respect to matters which might have been
brought forward in the previous proceeding. The defense of res judicata may not be
avoided by shifting legal theories or asserting a new or different ground for relief.”
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff’s Corum claims and IIED claim could have been “litigated and
determined in the former action” as these claims are formed from the very same
factual allegations asserted in the First Action and were mostly stated verbatim. See
ACC Const., Inc., 239 N.C. App. at 262.
Plaintiff, however, argues “[a] Corum claim is not a claim that should be tacked
on to other causes of action . . . . Rather, it is available only when no other adequate
remedy exists to redress the harm suffered by the plaintiff[,]” and “[b]ecause a Corum
claim represents an extraordinary exercise of constitutional power, it should be
invoked solely in those limited circumstances where no alternative remedy is
available.” Plaintiff contends that, had she “attempted to assert a Corum claim in the
prior federal action, Defendants would almost certainly have argued that Title VII
provided an adequate alternative remedy, warranting dismissal of the Corum claim
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at the outset.”3
Our courts, however, have recognized that Corum claims may be raised
alongside other claims. In Craig v. New Hanover County Board of Education, the
plaintiff brought four claims against the New Hanover County Board of Education
and the principal at Roland Grise Middle School, in her official and individual
capacity. 363 N.C. 334, 335 (2009). The first claim was for common law negligence,
and the other three were Corum claims. Id. The Board moved for summary judgment,
asserting the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff’s action. Id. The
trial court denied the Board’s motion, but a divided panel of this Court reversed. Id.
at 336 (citing Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App.
651, 654–55 (2007)). On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Court
agreed with the Court of Appeals’ majority that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
barred the plaintiff’s claim of negligence, leaving the plaintiff without an adequate
remedy. Id. at 342. Our Supreme Court, however, disagreed that the plaintiff’s Corum
claims were barred, as the plaintiff “should be allowed to bring claims directly under
our State Constitution that will not be susceptible to an immunity defense” per
Corum. Id. at 338. The Court explained
[t]he practical effect of the Court of Appeals’ holding otherwise would be to allow the doctrine of sovereign immunity to ‘stand as a barrier to North Carolina citizens
3 Notably, Plaintiff fails to mention that she brought the First Action in a state court, where
she could have brought a state constitution claim, prior to Sheriff Baker removing the First Action to federal court.
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who seek to remedy violations of their rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights,’ exactly contrary to our prior holding in Corum.
Id. (quoting Corum, 330 N.C. at 785–86). “[T]o be considered adequate in redressing
a constitutional wrong, a plaintiff must have at least the opportunity to enter the
courthouse doors and present his claim.” Id. at 339–40 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Court reversed the Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial court’s order denying the
Board’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to proceed with
litigation. Id. at 342.
Craig illustrates that even if a conventional claim is barred, a Corum claim in
the same action may still survive. Our Supreme Court’s intent is not that a Corum
claim be brought as a collateral revival of a conventional claim that has already
failed—not as an exception to the doctrine of res judicata—but as an alternative
theory to the conventional claim in the same action. See Williams, 217 N.C. App. at 7
(“The defense of res judicata may not be avoided by shifting legal theories or asserting
a new or different ground for relief.” (citation omitted)).
Although Plaintiff sought to bring these Corum claims as a new legal ground
for relief after losing her Title VII claim, her Corum claims could have been “litigated
and determined in the former action,” as they are formed from the very same factual
allegations from the First Action filed in North Carolina state courts. We therefore
conclude the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Second Action on the grounds
of res judicata. See ACC Const., Inc., 239 N.C. App. at 262.
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V. Conclusion
Upon review, we conclude the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
on the grounds of res judicata where Plaintiff could have brought them in her original
action, and the new claims were based on the same factual allegations as the former
action.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.
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