British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ

437 F. Supp. 804, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20648, 10 ERC (BNA) 1501, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14446
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 17, 1977
Docket76 Civ. 1276 (MP)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 437 F. Supp. 804 (British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 437 F. Supp. 804, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20648, 10 ERC (BNA) 1501, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14446 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

Opinion

Decision

POLLACK, District Judge:

This case is before the Court on remand for an evidentiary hearing on whether the delay (now 17 months) by the defendant, Port Authority (PA), in determining whether its existing or other noise regulations shall be applicable to the supersonic jet transport “Concorde” and whether the ban meanwhile of operations thereof at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) are reasonable or constitute unfair discrimination and an undue burden on commerce.

The evidentiary hearing has been held and the matter was duly submitted for decision on the proofs adduced and the arguments and briefs thereon.

Upon due consideration thereof the Court concludes that the delay has been excessive and unjustified and that the ban is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable. The Concorde thereby has been deprived of an opportunity to show that it is environmen *807 tally acceptable at this international airport. The Court’s findings thereon follow.

I.

The plaintiffs, British Airways and Air France, are international air carriers who manufacture and operate the Concorde which they desire to place in transatlantic service to and from JFK.

The defendant, Port Authority, is a joint agency of the States of New York and New Jersey and is the lessee and operator of JFK. The individual defendants are the PA commissioners.

On February 4,1976, pursuant to his statutory powers, 49 U.S.C. § 1354(a), following an exhaustive study and receipt of a final environmental impact statement (EIS) from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the then Secretary of Transportation, Hon. William T. Coleman, Jr. directed amendment by FAA of the operating specifications held by plaintiffs so as to license experimental test operations of Concorde in transatlantic service to and from Dulles International Airport and to and from JFK on a limited basis for a limited period under closely prescribed conditions. See 14 C.F.R. § 129. The operations at Dulles have gone forward accordingly.

On March 11,1976, following notice from plaintiffs of intended commencement of such operations at JFK, the PA banned SSTs from JFK pending an announced six-month study of the environmental effects of the Concorde including a study of its operating experience at Dulles, DeGaulle and Heathrow airports. The PA’s avowed purpose was to have an opportunity to set noise standards applicable to SSTs. It did not and has not done so. Instead, after the remand was ordered, the PA extended its ban indefinitely, ostensibly to do further research and analysis on the subject matter. The scope of the further studies is nebulous and undefined (the consultant was asked to devise a program), and nothing has been undertaken or funded (it is speculated that $500,000 to $1,000,000 would be required therefor). Meanwhile, the Concorde is being deprived of a chance to prove itself environmentally acceptable at JFK, even by limited experimental tests.

II.

Air commerce is governed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq. An express noise abatement provision was added to the Act in 1968, 49 U.S.C. § 1431. Minor amendments were made in 1972 to this noise abatement provision. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. Ill, 1973).

In establishing the national scheme of control of aviation by the statutes cited, Congress indicated that it was reserving to local airport proprietors what the Court of Appeals has termed as the “limited role” of promulgating reasonable nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory regulations to establish acceptable noise levels for the airfield and its environs. “Any other conduct by an airport proprietor would frustrate the statutory scheme and unconstitutionally burden the commerce Congress sought to foster.” British Airways, et ano. v. Port Authority, etc., et al., 558 F.2d 75 at 84 (2d Cir. 1977).

The Court of Appeals has held herein that Secretary Coleman’s order for a trial of the Concorde at JFK did not collide with or preclude the initial noise study and ban by the PA. 1 However, it held also that implicit in the responsibility reserved to the airport proprietor in the federal scheme “is the assumption that this responsibility will be exercised in a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner.” (Ibid, at 82).

The federal aviation and noise control statutes and licensing regulations evidence the national character of the instant subject matter and local environmental restrictions are binding on federal li *808 censes only if the local action is reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Cf. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 1740, 52 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977). “Congress has left room only for local action that advances and is consistent with federal policy; other noncomplementary exercises of local prerogative are forbidden.” (British Airways, supra, p. 84). The reserved national and international interests of the United States and of private parties licensed thereunder may not be negated or prejudiced by the invalid use of a prior opportunity of the local airport proprietor of an international facility to set noise standards under which aircraft may operate there.

There are no absolute standards by which it may be determined whether a local owner is exercising an allocated, coordinated right of regulation with reasonable dispatch. What is reasonable can be decided only in the light of the general and specific problems facing the owner, and on evaluation of the manner in which those problems are addressed and handled under the circumstances. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 867 (4th Cir. 1961).

In light of its regulatory privilege and responsibility to control aircraft noise at JFK, a review of the reasonableness of the P.A.’s present ban starts with an examination of what was known or available to it when the ban was imposed and of the justifiability of its delay in setting a different noise standard than the one which P.A. now applies to all jet aircraft. 2

III.

In 1951, the P.A. prohibited operation of jet aircraft at JFK without its permission. A consulting firm was thereafter retained to assist P.A. to establish a noise standard acceptable to the P.A. for jet aircraft. In 1958, the P.A. established the noise regulation which presently governs the permissible noise level of planes departing from JFK.

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437 F. Supp. 804, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20648, 10 ERC (BNA) 1501, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/british-airways-bd-v-port-auth-of-ny-nj-nysd-1977.