Bristol Builders Supply Co. v. McReynolds

162 S.E. 8, 157 Va. 468, 1932 Va. LEXIS 306
Supreme Court of Virginia·Decided January 14, 1932·Published·Cited by 26 cases

Opinion

Campbell, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from and award of the Industrial Commission of Virginia, in favor of appellee and her minor children and against appellants.

The salient facts are these:

The employer, Bristol Builders Supply Company, Inc., was engaged in the milling business in Bristol, Virginia, and had in its employ as a foreman the deceased husband of the claimant. As employer and employee, they came within the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law of Virginia (Acts 1918, chapter 400, as amended), requiring the employer to pay compensation to its employees for injuries or death resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment.

On May 14, 1930, while engaged in the course of his employment, Horace G. McReynolds, husband of claimant, accidentally had a splinter embedded in his right arm just above the elbow. The splinter was removed, the wound mopped out with mercurochrome, and antiseptic dressing was applied. An infection of the wound followed, which was evidenced by redness extending three inches below the elbow. The following day employee was given a 1500 unit dose of antitoxin. Though still suffering from the wound, he reported for duty over a period of several days. On [470] June 5, 1930, pneumonia developed, sudden in onset, accompanied by low leucocyte count, and on June 12th he departed this life.

The sole question in this case is whether or not the claimant’s deceased died of septic pneumonia. If death did result from septic pneumonia, claimant is entitled to compensation; otherwise, she is not.

In Gobble v. Clinch Valley Lbr. Co., 141 Va. 303, 127 S. E. 175, 176, it is said:

“The workmen’s compensation act (Acts 1918, chapter 400, page 637), although in derogation of the common law, is highly remedial, and should be liberally construed in favor of the workman. It is an effort on the part of the State to insure the workman to a limited extent against loss from accidents in his' employment, to give him a speedy and expeditious remedy for his injury, and to place upon industry the burden of losses incident to its conduct. The compensation is furnished in weekly installments when most needed, promptly after the injury, and the immediate need of physicians and hospital service and supplies are furnished at the expense of the employer. Acts of this character have proved so beneficial that they have been adopted in nearly every State of the union.”

The error assigned is:

“The Industrial Commission erred in awarding compensation because the evidence showed that the claimant’s husband died as a result of pneumonia and that the pneumonia did not result from the accident.”

Appellants rely upon what they contend is the uncontradicted evidence of the two attending physicians, that the wound received by the employee did not produce the disease.

In the opinion of the Commission it is said: “The severity of the infection is not accurately shown in the record because, in the early stages following the accident, accurate [471] observations regarding temperature, blood count and local manifestations were not made.”

The general rule is that when an attending physician is positive in his diagnosis of a disease, great weight will be given by the courts to his opinion. However, when it appears, as we think it does appear in this case, that the diagnosis is shaded by doubt, and there is medical expert opinion contrary to the opinion of the attending physician, then the trier of the fact is left free to adopt that view which is most consistent with reason and justice. So hesitant was the first attending physician to commit himself as to the nature of the disease which produced death, that during his examination the hearing Commissioner felt impelled to take charge of the examination. This is shown by the following:

By the commissioner:

“Q. There are very few things, doctor, we know, but we do have opinions, and especially a man who attended the patient, under the circumstances as developed in this case, knows the circumstances as developed in this case, knows more about it than anybody in the world and I believe it is your duty to give us your best opinion and your reasons for it, whatever it is?

"A. I don’t know. I wouldn’t like to commit myself.

“Q. You mean to say you have no opinion?

"A. I have some opinion but I wouldn’t like to express it.

“Q. Dr. Vance, the Commission is entitled to that opinion and we will have to insist on your giving it to us.

“A. We see a case or two develop pneumonia this way and see hundreds without any accident. If I had to say yes or no I would say the accident had nothing to do with the pneumonia.

<(Q. That is your best opinion?

“A. Yes, sir.”

The final conclusion of the other attending physician is thus displayed by the record.

[472] “Q. In your opinion, did the wound have any connection ' with the case of pneumonia that killed him?

“A. I couldn’t say it did, sir.

“Q. Is it your best judgment it did not?

“A. That it did not, yes, sir; so far as I know. I can’t see any connection.”

In conflict with the above expressed conclusions, two additional physicians, introduced by the claimant and testifying as experts, stated that in their opinion the disease was superinduced by the wound.

The Commissioner, confronted with this situation, appointed a commission composed of three disinterested physicians and propounded to them this hypothetical question:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Bristol Builders Supply Co. v. McReynolds, 162 S.E. 8, 157 Va. 468, 1932 Va. LEXIS 306 (Va. 1932).

162 S.E. 8 (Bristol Builders Supply Co. v. McReynolds) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

John O. Henry v. County of Henrico
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2012
County of Henrico v. John O. Henry
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2012
AM Liner East, Inc. v. Osburn
627 S.E.2d 516 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2006)
Artis v. Ottenberg's Bakers, Inc.
596 S.E.2d 547 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2004)
Clinchfield Coal Company v. Roger Lewis Jordan
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2003
Denson v. Virginia Retirement System
53 Va. Cir. 386 (Isle of Wight County Circuit Court, 2000)
Barbara W. Johnson v. Virginia Retirement System
515 S.E.2d 784 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1999)
Patricia D. Hutton v. Sterling Casket Hardware, et.
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1997
Timothy Gray v. ATS Service/Accustaff, Inc.
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1996
ATS Service/Accustaff, Inc. v. Timothy Gray
Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1996
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves
339 S.E.2d 570 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
Robinette v. Kayo Oil Co.
171 S.E.2d 172 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1969)
Baltimore v. Benedict Coal Corp.
29 S.E.2d 234 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1944)