Brindle Will

60 A.2d 1, 360 Pa. 53, 1948 Pa. LEXIS 467
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 27, 1948
DocketAppeals, 15 and 20
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 60 A.2d 1 (Brindle Will) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brindle Will, 60 A.2d 1, 360 Pa. 53, 1948 Pa. LEXIS 467 (Pa. 1948).

Opinions

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Linn,

There are four appeals, two from the common pleas and two from the orphans’ court. They involve the property of Anna Fox Brindle who died April 7, 1944, leaving a will dated March 10, 1942, probated April 10, 1944. She left surviving a brother, Frank Fox, and a number of cousins. By this will she gave her property 1 to F. W. Steffey in trust for her brother for life, with the right, in specified circumstances, 2 to use the principal. *56 She devised, her homestead, on the death of the brother, to Mildred Watts Zook, and directed that the rest of her property be divided equally between Mrs. Zook and F. W. Steffey. Neither Mrs. Zook nor Steffey was in any way related to her. Mr. Steffey was also appointed executor. Belleville, where she resided, is a small village of about 1200 inhabitants in Mifflin County. It contained a national bank of which Mrs. Zook’s husband was president, and F. W. Steffey, cashier. Testatrix was about 73 years of age when she made her will and about 75 when she died. Her only surviving brother, Frank Fox, was then about 67 years of age and was described as “a helpless, incurable incompetent, requiring constant attendance of some person to feed and care for him.” After testatrix’s death Frank L. Campbell was appointed guardian of Frank Fox in a proceeding initiated by F. W. Steffey. The first cousins, who, except her brother, were her nearest relatives, concluded that an appeal from the probate should be taken for lack of testamentary capacity, fraud and undue influence in procuring the will, but Mr. Campbell, the guardian of the incompetent, declined to proceed. They then applied to the common pleas, whose ward the incompetent was, for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, to take the appeal. The court appointed William A. H. Brindle guardian ad litem and authorized him to appeal. He was also appointed “guardian and trustee ad litem of Frank Fox” by the orphans’ court. F. W. Steffey and Mildred Watts Zook were permitted to intervene in the proceedings and petitioned both courts “to vacate the various decrees that had been made appointing William A. H. Brindle guardian ad litem and authorizing him to proceed with the appeal and praying the Court to strike the appeal from the probate of the will of Anna Fox Brindle, deceased, from the record.”

The parties, with the approval of the court, agreed that these proceedings should be heard together. The court received the evidence, revoked the appointments *57 of the guardian ad litem and the grant of authority to appeal from the probate and struck the appeal from the record. The present appeals complain of those orders.

In his opinion written in support of those conclusions, the learned judge said, “the only question now before the Court is whether the appointment of the guardian ad litem should be revoked, the decree authorizing him to take an appeal from the probate of the will of Anna Fox Brindle vacated, and the appeal so taken by him stricken from the record.” In our judgment, that was not the only question.

The evidence on the appeal from the probate clearly shows a substantial dispute upon matter of fact. The statute provides what shall be done in such circumstances. The Orphans’ Court Act of 1917, P. L. 363, section 21(b), 20 PS 2582, provides:' “Whenever a dispute upon a matter of fact arises before any orphans’ court, on appeal from any register of wills . . . the said court shall, at the request of either party, direct a precept for an issue to the court of common pleas of the county for the trial thereof . . .”

The learned judge, in the course of his decision, did not discuss this phase of the proceedings, an omission probably explainable on the theory that, after he had concluded to vacate the order allowing the guardian ad litem to appeal, there could be no trial of an issue devisavit vel non. He referred to the fact that the incompetent was the ward of the court and that it was the duty of the court to decide what should be best for the ward; that as the will gave the entire net income to the ward with the right in the trustee to use the principal, the ward had substantially all that he could have if the appeal succeeded and the will was set aside and he inherited under the intestate law.

There is no doubt of the power of the common pleas, in a proper case, to determine what appears best for the ward: Harris Estate, 351 Pa. 368, 41 A. 2d 715. But before that question is reached on this record, a funda *58 mental and more important question must be decided. The evidence shows a prima facie case of lack of testamentary capacity, fraud and undue influence in obtaining the will. The statute provides what shall be done in such case. The ward is not the only party concerned; the next of kin and those who may claim under them have rights under the intestate law. If this will is set aside, as it may be, the basis of the comparison made by the learned judge falls. It falls because there has been no testamentary disposition, the property having passed pursuant to the intestate law. It is this possibility which distinguishes this case from the Harris case relied on by the learned judge; in that case, when the comparison was made, there was a valid will; the elements of thé comparison were lawfully established. In the present case, if the contestants succeed, there is no will; there is only a fraudulent transaction. The learned judge erred in assuming that, in passing on the ward’s right to appeal, it was immaterial whether a fraud had been perpetrated on the register of wills and on the parties contesting the probate. We think that if the register was fraudulently induced to admit to probate an instrument which was not a will and therefore not entitled to probate, it became the duty of the court, and of all parties to the proceeding, to see that the rights of the parties lawfully succeeding to a decedent’s property are respected. A court should not accept the contents of a void instrument as a measure of the exercise of judicial discretion by giving it the effect that would be given to a valid instrument.

On the evidence received it was the duty of the court, pursuant to the statute, to direct a precept to the common pleas for the trial of the issue devisavit vel non. The evidence would support a finding that Steffey stood in a confidential relation to Mrs. Brindle, and, in consequence of that relation, now has the burden of showing that his conduct in and about the preparation and the execution of the will, giving him large benefits, was free from *59 fraud and the exercise of undue influence: see Dichter Will, 354 Pa. 444, at p. 452, 47 A. 2d 691; Stewart Will, 354 Pa. 288, 292, 296, 47 A. 2d 204; Ringer v. Finfrock, 340 Pa. 458, 461, 17 A. 2d 348. Mr. Steffey testified that he was “very intimately acquainted with Mrs. Annie Fox Brindle and family”; that he managed “part” of Mrs. Brindle’s property; drew checks for her; carried checks for her rent to her landlord; delivered her testamentary instructions to the scrivener, who was also his own attorney as well as attorney for the bank; received from him the will; dated it before taking it to Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
60 A.2d 1, 360 Pa. 53, 1948 Pa. LEXIS 467, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brindle-will-pa-1948.