Brindisi v. Board of Trustees

170 So. 3d 1010, 2014 La.App. 1 Cir. 1167, 2015 La. App. LEXIS 825, 2015 WL 1874806
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 24, 2015
DocketNo. 2014 CA 1167
StatusPublished

This text of 170 So. 3d 1010 (Brindisi v. Board of Trustees) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brindisi v. Board of Trustees, 170 So. 3d 1010, 2014 La.App. 1 Cir. 1167, 2015 La. App. LEXIS 825, 2015 WL 1874806 (La. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

McDonald, j.

12This is an appeal from a judgment finding that plaintiff is not eligible to draw his Louisiana District Attorney Retirement System (LADARS) retirement benefit while he is an employee of the State of Louisiana participating in the Louisiana State Employees Retirement System (LASERS) Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 19, 2013, the plaintiff, Frank A. Brindisi, filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment, naming as defendant the Board of Trustees of LA-DARS. Mr. Brindisi asserted he had been an assistant district attorney and was a member of LADARS and paid into that retirement system for 15 years; and further, he had been employed by the State as an assistant attorney general and he had paid into LASERS for over 10 years. Mr. Brindisi maintained that by reciprocal agreement pursuant to La. R.S. 11:142, those terms of service cumulated to 25 years of service.

[1012]*1012Mr. Brindisi asserted that he had reached the age of 55 and was eligible to retire as he had withdrawn from service with LADARS and had fulfilled all of the requirements for retirement under La. R.S. 11:1633. Mr. Brindisi maintained that he was participating in DROP through LASERS, thus he was not considered to be contributing to a retirement system and was entitled to receive payment of his earned and accrued retirement benefits from LADARS.

Mr. Brindisi asserted that the Board of Trustees of LADARS had refused to pay him retirement benefits, despite amicable demand. Mr. Brindisi prayed for judgment in his favor, and against LADARS, declaring him eligible to retire from LA-DARS as of his date of enrollment in DROP. Further, he prayed for a writ of mandamus ordering LADARS to pay him his retirement benefit.

The Board of Trustees of LADARS filed an answer denying that Mr. RBrindisi was eligible to retire and denying that Mr. Brindisi had fulfilled all of the requirements for retirement under La. R.S. 11:1633. The Board of Trustees filed an objection raising the exception of no cause of action,1 asserting that Mr. Brindisi had signed an application for reciprocal recognition of service in which he stated that he had opted to defer his retirement, and further, the Board of Trustees maintained that persons who participate in DROP remain employed and are not retired, thus Mr. Brindisi had failed to state a cause of action for retirement benefits from LA-DARS. The Board of Trustees maintained that Louisiana law did not permit a state employee to retire from LADARS, but not from LASERS, and the Board of Trustees asked for judgment denying Mr. Brindisi’s claims.

After a trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Board of Trustees and against Mr. Brindi-si, finding that Mr. Brindisi was not eligible to receive a LADARS retirement benefit as he did not have the requisite years of service to fulfill the mandatory legal requirements of both La. R.S. 11:1633 and La. R.S. 11:142(D) and (E). Mr. Brindisi appealed that judgment.

THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE

This court, ex proprio motu, issued a rule to show cause on September 19, 2014, finding that the judgment appeared to lack appropriate decretal language disposing of and dismissing Mr. Brindisi’s claims. Thereafter, on October 22, 2014, the trial court signed a supplemental and amended judgment, decreeing that Mr. Brindisi’s petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus was dismissed with prejudice.

On December 30, 2014, this court maintained the appeal, noting, however, that a final determination on maintaining the appeal was reserved for this panel. After consideration of the supplemental and amended judgment, which dismissed |4Mr. Brindisi’s petition with prejudice, we find that the judgment contains the necessary decretal language disposing of Mr. Brindi-si’s claims, and we maintain the appeal.

THE APPEAL

Mr. Brindisi asserts that the trial court erred in finding that, even though he had earned 25 years of service as an assistant district attorney and an assistant attorney general and had reached age 55 as re[1013]*1013quired under La. R.S. 11:1633 in order to qualify for retirement, La. R.S. 11:142(D) or (E) rendered some portion of those years as “uncreditable,” and he was not qualified to receive his retirement benefits from LADARS.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The facts of this case are not in dispute. • The trial court’s determination that Mr. Brindisi was not eligible to receive a LADARS retirement benefit as he did not have the requisite creditable years of service' to fulfill the mandatory requirements of both LA. R.S. 11:1633 and La. R.S. 11:142(D) and (E) is a legal determination. In a case involving no dispute regarding material facts, but only the determination of a legal issue, a reviewing court must apply the de novo standard of review, under which the trial court’s legal conclusions are not entitled to deference. Toomy v. Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System, 2010-1072 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/25/11) 63 So.3d 198, 201-202, writ denied, 2011-1118 (La.10/2/11), 73 So.3d 383, citing Kevin Associates, L.L.C. v. Crawford, 2003-0211 (La.1/30/04), 865 So.2d 34, 43.

THE LAW AND ANALYSIS

It is presumed that the legislature enacts each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Thus, legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption that the legislature was aware of existing statutes, rules of construction, and judicial decisions interpreting those | .^statutes. It is further presumed that the legislature intends to achieve a consistent body of law. Toomy, 63 So.3d at 202; citing State v. Campbell, 2003-3035 (La.7/6/04), 877 So.2d 112, 117.

Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 11, Subtitle III, Chapter 3 provides for the District Attorneys’ Retirement System. Louisiana Revised Statute 11:1633 provides in pertinent part:

§ 1633. Retirement eligibility; benefits at three and one-half percent

A. Eligibility.
(1) Normal Retirement Eligibility.
Any member retiring under the provisions of this Section who withdraws from service shall be eligible to retire provided that the member has:
(a) Attained age sixty and completed at least ten years of creditable service.
(b) Attained age fifty-five and completed at least twenty-four years of creditable service.
(c) Completed at least thirty years of creditable service, regardless of age.

Mr. Brindisi maintains that he has fulfilled the requirements for drawing a retirement from LADARS because he is 55 years old and has at least twenty-four years of creditable service. However, his twenty-four years of service are reached by combining his LADARS and LASERS years of service, pursuant to a reciprocal recognition of service agreement. Thus, the issue is whether Mr. Brindisi is eligible to draw his .retirement benefits, pursuant to the reciprocal recognition of service agreement, while he is participating in LASERS DROR

Louisiana Revised Statute 11:142 provides for reciprocal recognition of service credit, in pertinent part as follows:

§ 142.

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170 So. 3d 1010, 2014 La.App. 1 Cir. 1167, 2015 La. App. LEXIS 825, 2015 WL 1874806, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brindisi-v-board-of-trustees-lactapp-2015.