NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 15 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIMSTONE NATURAL RESOURCES No. 22-35187 CO., an Oregon Corporation; ROBERT STUMBO; JOHN WEST, D.C. No. 1:18-cv-01740-CL
Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
DAVID HAIGHT, individually and in his official capacity,
Defendant-Appellee,
STEPHEN WETMORE, individually and in his official capacity; DOUGLAS THACKERY, individually and in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY, a government agency; PETER DAUGHERTY, State Forester, Oregon Department of Forestry, in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; RICHARD WHITMAN, Director of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE, a government agency; CURT MELCHER, Director of the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. OF STATE LANDS; LAUREN BROWN; VICKI WALKER,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DOES, 1-10, individually and/or in their official capacities,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Mark D. Clarke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2023 Portland, Oregon
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FORREST and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Brimstone Natural Resources, Co.1 sued the Oregon Department of
Forestry (ODF) and multiple state officials and employees (Defendants) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations related to the denial of Brimstone’s
application for a Plan for Alternate Practice (PFAP) permit that Brimstone needed
to mine for gold on its property. After a series of dismissals and pleading
amendments, the district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1 Individual Plaintiffs John West and Robert Stumbo co-own Brimstone. We refer to Plaintiffs collectively as Brimstone.
2 1. Claim Preclusion. We review de novo whether claim or issue
preclusion applies, see Bahra v. County of San Bernadino, 945 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th
Cir. 2019), but we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to apply
preclusion, see SEC v. Stein, 906 F.3d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 2018). We apply state
preclusion rules. White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). Under
Oregon law, claim preclusion applies to administrative proceedings, Drews v. EBI
Companies, 310 Or. 134, 142 (1990), and prevents a party from pursuing further
litigation on a claim “on any ground or theory of relief that the party could have
litigated in the first instance,” Bloomfield v. Weakland, 339 Or. 504, 511 (2005)
(emphasis added).
The essence of Brimstone’s procedural-due-process and equal-protection
claims is that, despite promptly following ODF’s directions as to what was needed
for a PFAP application, which Brimstone submitted in November 2014, “the
requirements were continually added to, changed, or the process was stuck in
review.” But as the district court explained, ODF denied Brimstone’s PFAP
application in March 2015. The Defendants’ denial was reasoned and triggered
Brimstone’s right to appeal to an administrative law judge. See Or. Rev. Stat. (ORS)
§ 527.700(1); Or. Admin. Rules (OAR) 629-672-0200, 137-003-0675. Indeed, the
denial notified Brimstone of its right to appeal. If Brimstone was still dissatisfied
after an administrative hearing, it could have petitioned for judicial review in the
3 Oregon Court of Appeals. See ORS §§ 183.480, .482. Because Brimstone chose not
to challenge the 2015 PFAP denial through state administrative or judicial review,
the district court did not err in determining that Brimstone’s procedural-due-process
and equal-protection claims are precluded.2 See Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 632
(9th Cir. 1988) (“If an adequate opportunity for review is available, a losing party
cannot obstruct the preclusive use of the state administrative decision simply by
foregoing [the] right to appeal.” (citation omitted)); see also Holcombe v. Hosmer,
477 F.3d 1094, 1098–1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (precluding the plaintiff from bringing
§ 1983 claim in federal court that could have been raised in a prior state
administrative proceeding or on judicial review).
2. Procedural-Due-Process & Equal-Protection Claims. Even if these
claims are not precluded, they fail on their merits. Brimstone cannot state a claim
for procedural due process because it cannot show that it was deprived of a
constitutionally protected property interest where ODF has discretion to grant PFAP
change-of-use permits. See OAR 629-605-0100(2)(d) (providing that the State
Forester “may approve a plan for an alternate practice” if he “determines that the
2 Brimstone argues that these claims cannot be precluded by the 2015 PFAP denial because the conduct at issue occurred after the denial. We reject this argument because the record shows that the bulk of Brimstone’s allegations relate to pre-denial conduct. Moreover, had Brimstone sought review of the 2015 PFAP denial and asserted its due-process and equal-protection claims at that time, it is likely that any later alleged misconduct would not have occurred.
4 alternate practice is necessary . . . to accomplish a land use change” (emphasis
added)); Gerhart v. Lake Cnty., Mont., 637 F.3d 1013, 1019–21 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[S]tate law creates a [protected property interest] when it imposes significant
limitations on the discretion of the decision maker.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). And Brimstone’s “class of one” equal-protection claim fails
because Brimstone has not sufficiently alleged that it was “intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated” seeking a PFAP in order to mine.
Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). Brimstone
alleged that other landowners were granted PFAPs without difficulty and that there
are other mining operations nearby, but it failed to allege whether those PFAPs were
for mining or whether the mining operations obtained PFAPs.
3. Remaining Constitutional Claims. Finally, the district court did not err
in dismissing Brimstone’s remaining preemption, vagueness, and takings claims for
failure to state a claim. Brimstone’s claim that the Oregon Forestry Practice Act
(OFPA) is preempted by federal mining law fails because the OFPA has a clear
environmental purpose and does not regulate mining or directly prohibit Brimstone
from mining on its property.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 15 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIMSTONE NATURAL RESOURCES No. 22-35187 CO., an Oregon Corporation; ROBERT STUMBO; JOHN WEST, D.C. No. 1:18-cv-01740-CL
Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
DAVID HAIGHT, individually and in his official capacity,
Defendant-Appellee,
STEPHEN WETMORE, individually and in his official capacity; DOUGLAS THACKERY, individually and in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY, a government agency; PETER DAUGHERTY, State Forester, Oregon Department of Forestry, in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; RICHARD WHITMAN, Director of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE, a government agency; CURT MELCHER, Director of the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, in his official capacity; OREGON DEPARTMENT
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. OF STATE LANDS; LAUREN BROWN; VICKI WALKER,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DOES, 1-10, individually and/or in their official capacities,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Mark D. Clarke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2023 Portland, Oregon
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FORREST and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Brimstone Natural Resources, Co.1 sued the Oregon Department of
Forestry (ODF) and multiple state officials and employees (Defendants) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations related to the denial of Brimstone’s
application for a Plan for Alternate Practice (PFAP) permit that Brimstone needed
to mine for gold on its property. After a series of dismissals and pleading
amendments, the district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1 Individual Plaintiffs John West and Robert Stumbo co-own Brimstone. We refer to Plaintiffs collectively as Brimstone.
2 1. Claim Preclusion. We review de novo whether claim or issue
preclusion applies, see Bahra v. County of San Bernadino, 945 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th
Cir. 2019), but we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to apply
preclusion, see SEC v. Stein, 906 F.3d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 2018). We apply state
preclusion rules. White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). Under
Oregon law, claim preclusion applies to administrative proceedings, Drews v. EBI
Companies, 310 Or. 134, 142 (1990), and prevents a party from pursuing further
litigation on a claim “on any ground or theory of relief that the party could have
litigated in the first instance,” Bloomfield v. Weakland, 339 Or. 504, 511 (2005)
(emphasis added).
The essence of Brimstone’s procedural-due-process and equal-protection
claims is that, despite promptly following ODF’s directions as to what was needed
for a PFAP application, which Brimstone submitted in November 2014, “the
requirements were continually added to, changed, or the process was stuck in
review.” But as the district court explained, ODF denied Brimstone’s PFAP
application in March 2015. The Defendants’ denial was reasoned and triggered
Brimstone’s right to appeal to an administrative law judge. See Or. Rev. Stat. (ORS)
§ 527.700(1); Or. Admin. Rules (OAR) 629-672-0200, 137-003-0675. Indeed, the
denial notified Brimstone of its right to appeal. If Brimstone was still dissatisfied
after an administrative hearing, it could have petitioned for judicial review in the
3 Oregon Court of Appeals. See ORS §§ 183.480, .482. Because Brimstone chose not
to challenge the 2015 PFAP denial through state administrative or judicial review,
the district court did not err in determining that Brimstone’s procedural-due-process
and equal-protection claims are precluded.2 See Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 632
(9th Cir. 1988) (“If an adequate opportunity for review is available, a losing party
cannot obstruct the preclusive use of the state administrative decision simply by
foregoing [the] right to appeal.” (citation omitted)); see also Holcombe v. Hosmer,
477 F.3d 1094, 1098–1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (precluding the plaintiff from bringing
§ 1983 claim in federal court that could have been raised in a prior state
administrative proceeding or on judicial review).
2. Procedural-Due-Process & Equal-Protection Claims. Even if these
claims are not precluded, they fail on their merits. Brimstone cannot state a claim
for procedural due process because it cannot show that it was deprived of a
constitutionally protected property interest where ODF has discretion to grant PFAP
change-of-use permits. See OAR 629-605-0100(2)(d) (providing that the State
Forester “may approve a plan for an alternate practice” if he “determines that the
2 Brimstone argues that these claims cannot be precluded by the 2015 PFAP denial because the conduct at issue occurred after the denial. We reject this argument because the record shows that the bulk of Brimstone’s allegations relate to pre-denial conduct. Moreover, had Brimstone sought review of the 2015 PFAP denial and asserted its due-process and equal-protection claims at that time, it is likely that any later alleged misconduct would not have occurred.
4 alternate practice is necessary . . . to accomplish a land use change” (emphasis
added)); Gerhart v. Lake Cnty., Mont., 637 F.3d 1013, 1019–21 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[S]tate law creates a [protected property interest] when it imposes significant
limitations on the discretion of the decision maker.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). And Brimstone’s “class of one” equal-protection claim fails
because Brimstone has not sufficiently alleged that it was “intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated” seeking a PFAP in order to mine.
Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). Brimstone
alleged that other landowners were granted PFAPs without difficulty and that there
are other mining operations nearby, but it failed to allege whether those PFAPs were
for mining or whether the mining operations obtained PFAPs.
3. Remaining Constitutional Claims. Finally, the district court did not err
in dismissing Brimstone’s remaining preemption, vagueness, and takings claims for
failure to state a claim. Brimstone’s claim that the Oregon Forestry Practice Act
(OFPA) is preempted by federal mining law fails because the OFPA has a clear
environmental purpose and does not regulate mining or directly prohibit Brimstone
from mining on its property. See ORS § 527.630; Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 588–89 (1987) (explaining that the Mining Act does not
preempt reasonable state environmental regulations); Bohmker v. Oregon, 903 F.3d
1029, 1038–41, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Oregon’s regulation that
5 prohibited a particular mining technique was a reasonable environmental regulation
and not preempted). Moreover, where the OFPA clearly applies to Brimstone and its
activities, Brimstone’s vagueness challenge fails. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
756 (1974); Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 377 (9th Cir. 2019).
Brimstone’s Fifth Amendment takings claim also fails because Brimstone
failed to sufficiently allege that Defendants directly appropriated Brimstone’s
property, as required to establish a physical taking, or deprived Brimstone of all
economic use of its land, as required to establish a regulatory taking. See Bridge
Aina Le‘a, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610, 625–26 (9th Cir. 2020); see
also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (holding
that the denial of “the ability to exploit a property interest” believed to be available
for development does not constitute a taking).3
AFFIRMED.
3 Brimstone forfeited any argument that Defendants’ PFAP denial was a regulatory taking under the Penn Central balancing test by not raising this issue on appeal. See Bridge Aina Le‘a, 950 F.3d at 626 (explaining that regulations that “place[] limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use” are evaluated under the Penn Central framework (citation omitted)); Cal. Pac. Bank v. FDIC, 885 F.3d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “[i]nadequately briefed and perfunctory arguments” and arguments not supported by citations to the record or legal authorities are deemed forfeited).