Brighton Manuf'g Co. v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia

U.S. Circuit Court

Brighton Manuf'g Co. v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia

33 F. 234, 1887 U.S. App. LEXIS 2924

DecidedJuly 25, 1887

StatusPublished

This text of 33 F. 234 (Brighton Manuf'g Co. v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brighton Manuf'g Co. v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 33 F. 234, 1887 U.S. App. LEXIS 2924 (uscirct 1887).

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Opinion

Blodgett, J.

This is a suit upon a policy by the defendant upon the same property as that covered by the policy in the preceding case; and the facts in the cases are essentially the same. The defenses set up are: (1) That the risk was increased by a change in the occupation of the building, with the knowledge of the assured; (2) that the building was allowed by the plaintiff to become vacant and unoccupied; (3) that, being a manufacturing establishment, it ceased to be operated.

I have sufficiently considered the first two objections in the former case; and will only say in regard to the third and last, that I do not think, under the facts in this case, the factory can be said not to have been operated during the time manufacturing was suspended for eight days preceding the ñre; hut, if I am wrong in my view as to the meaning and force of the term “ceased to be operated,” the plaintiffs certainly had the right to stop temporarily for repairs. There will therefore be a finding for the plaintiff.

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Blodgett, J.

This is a suit upon a policy by the defendant upon the same property as that covered by the policy in the preceding case; and the facts in the cases are essentially the same. The defenses set up are: (1) That the risk was increased by a change in the occupation of the building, with the knowledge of the assured; (2) that the building was allowed by the plaintiff to become vacant and unoccupied; (3) that, being a manufacturing establishment, it ceased to be operated.

I have sufficiently considered the first two objections in the former case; and will only say in regard to the third and last, that I do not think, under the facts in this case, the factory can be said not to have been operated during the time manufacturing was suspended for eight days preceding the ñre; hut, if I am wrong in my view as to the meaning and force of the term “ceased to be operated,” the plaintiffs certainly had the right to stop temporarily for repairs. There will therefore be a finding for the plaintiff.

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Bluebook (online)

33 F. 234, 1887 U.S. App. LEXIS 2924, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brighton-manufg-co-v-fire-assn-of-philadelphia-uscirct-1887.