Brighton Beach 2012, LLC v. TD Bank, N.A.

Opinion

Brighton Beach 2012, LLC v TD Bank, N.A.

2026 NY Slip Op 04738

July 29, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Brighton Beach 2012, LLC, appellant,

v

TD Bank, N.A., respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 29, 2026

2025-01473, (Index No. 518962/24)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson

Paul Wooten

Janice A. Taylor, JJ.

Richard J. Soleymanzadeh, P.C., Merrick, NY, for appellant.

Sherman Atlas Sylvester & Stamelman LLP, New York, NY (Anthony C. Valenziano of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated December 16, 2024. The order granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, alleging, among other things, that the defendant was negligent in filing a satisfaction of mortgage, and as a result, the plaintiff was prevented from refinancing the mortgage with more favorable terms. The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the basis of a release contained in the parties' loan modification and reaffirmation agreement dated October 18, 2022 (hereinafter the release). In an order dated December 16, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion. The plaintiff appeals.

"'Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release'" (Wei Qiang Huang v Llerena-Salazar, 222 AD3d 1033, 1033, quoting Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v America Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 NY3d 269, 276; see Miller v Brunner, 215 AD3d 952, 953; Sacchetti-Virga v Bonilla, 158 AD3d 783, 784). "A valid general release will apply not only to known claims, but may encompass unknown claims . . . if the parties so intend and the agreement is fairly and knowingly made" (Miller v Brunner, 164 AD3d 1228, 1231 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Collins-Genova v Louros, 204 AD3d 748, 750). "Although a defendant has the initial burden of establishing that it has been released from any claims, a signed release shifts the burden of going forward . . . to the plaintiff to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release" (Prete v Tamares Dev. 1, LLC, 219 AD3d 1537, 1537-1538 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]).

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the terms of the release clearly and unambiguously encompass this action (see Miller v Brunner, 215 AD3d at 953; Carew v Baker, 175 AD3d 1379, 1381). Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show that there had been economic duress, mutual mistake, or some other fact sufficient to void the release (see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v Am�rica Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 NY3d at 276; Miller v Brunner, 215 AD3d at 953; ECI Fin. [*2]Corp. v Resurrection Temple of Our Lord, Inc., 213 AD3d 735, 737). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the release (see CPLR 3211[a][5]; Miller v Brunner, 215 AD3d at 953).

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.

IANNACCI, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WOOTEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court