Brighthaupt v. District of Columbia

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 2, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 2013-1294
StatusPublished

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Brighthaupt v. District of Columbia, (D.D.C. 2014).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LAKESIA BRIGHTHAUPT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 13-1294 (JMF)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case was referred to me for all purposes. Currently pending and ready for resolution

are 1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#14], and 2) Defendant’s Opposition to

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [#16].

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in this case are 1) Lakesia Brighthaupt and her child, J.B.; 2) Monica Browne and

her child, M.Y.; and 3) Ja’Quelle Yeager and her child, J.Y. Complaint [#1] ¶¶ 2-4. The

defendant is the District of Columbia, which operates the District of Columbia Public Schools

system (“DCPS”). [#1] ¶ 5. In this action, plaintiffs seek an award of attorney’s fees under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (“IDEA”). 1

On December 11, 2012, an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA was held as

to J.B. [#1] ¶ 8. On December 28, 2012, the Hearing Officer (“HO”) issued a determination

finding that Lakesia Brighthaupt and J.B. were prevailing parties. Id. On June 20, 2013, plaintiffs

submitted a fee petition for $31,276. [#1] ¶ 9. The parties engaged in settlement discussions but

1 All references to the United States Code or the District of Columbia Code are to the electronic versions that appear in Westlaw or Lexis. were unable to agree on an amount. [#1] ¶ 10. On August 27, 2013, plaintiffs filed the current

complaint seeking the full amount originally claimed. [#1] ¶ 11.

On April 15, 2013, an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA was held as to

M.Y. [#1] ¶ 12. That same day, the HO issued a determination finding that Monica Browne and

M.Y. were prevailing parties. Id. On June 20, 2013, plaintiffs submitted a fee petition for

$24,664. [#1] ¶ 13. The parties engaged in settlement discussions but were unable to agree on an

amount. [#1] ¶ 14. On August 27, 2013, plaintiffs filed the current complaint seeking the full

amount originally claimed. [#1] ¶ 15.

On April 3, 2013, an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA was held as to

J.Y. [#1] ¶ 16. On April 4, 2013, the HO issued a determination finding that Ja’Quelle Yeager

and J.Y. were prevailing parties. Id. On June 23, 2013, plaintiffs submitted a fee petition for

$31,707. [#1] ¶ 17. The parties engaged in settlement discussions but were unable to agree on an

amount. [#1] ¶ 18. On August 27, 2013, plaintiffs filed the current complaint seeking the full

amount originally claimed. [#1] ¶ 19.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which states that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

II. Applicable Law

2 Pursuant to the IDEA, the Court “in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as

part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(3)(B). The statute further provides that “[f]ees . . . shall be based on rates prevailing in

the community in which the action or proceedings arose for the kind and quality of services

furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C).

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the

amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied

by a reasonable hourly rate” in order to arrive at the total or “lodestar” amount. Hensely v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). In the District of Columbia Circuit, “a fee applicant's

burden in establishing a reasonable hourly rate entails a showing of at least three elements: the

attorneys’ billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing

market rates in the relevant community.” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107

(D.C. Cir. 1995).

III. Analysis

A. Plaintiffs were Prevailing Parties

Defendant does not contest plaintiffs’ status as prevailing parties in this matter. See

generally [#16]. Thus, the only issue before the Court is whether the fees plaintiffs seek are

reasonable.

B. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Fees

1. Houck’s Billing Practices

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Carolyn Houck, seeks an hourly rate of $435. [#14-13] at 2.

3 According to Houck, her hourly rates are slightly lower than those provided by the Laffey2 matrix,

which indicates that an hourly rate of $445 is appropriate for an attorney with her experience

practicing in 2012-2013. Id.

2. Houck’s Skill, Experience, and Reputation

Houck was admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland in 1997 and the Bar of the District

of Columbia in 1998. [#14-13] at 2. She has specialized exclusively in special education law

since 1997, representing “hundreds of clients in more than 1600 due process hearings or settlement

agreements.” Id.

3. Prevailing Market Rates

Although use of the Laffey matrix to determine reasonable hourly rates in IDEA cases is

not automatic, several judges of this Court have relied on it as an appropriate starting point for

determining rates of reimbursement for attorneys who challenge the decisions of the DCPS.

Where the issues are complex, the full Laffey rate has been awarded by some members of this

Court. 3 See A.S. v. Dist. of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 2d 40, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding Laffey

rates upon finding that the hearing lasted four days, there were 105 proposed exhibits, there were

ten witnesses, and the hearing officer’s determination was 28 pages long); Bucher v. Dist. of

Columbia, 777 F. Supp. 2d 69, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (awarding Laffey rates upon finding that the

hearing lasted four days, there were 42 proposed exhibits, and there were twenty one proposed

witnesses); Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 696 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that an

IDEA administrative proceeding that requires expert testimony is sufficiently complex to warrant

application of the Laffey matrix).

2 Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 764 F.2d 4 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985).

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