Bright v. Mao

2026 Ohio 286

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-32
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Bright v. Mao, 2026-Ohio-286.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

FOREST M. BRIGHT : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-32 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2022 DR 0115 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- JU MAO : Domestic Relations) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on January 30, 2026, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-32

JU MAO, Appellant, Pro se DAVID S. PETERSON, Attorney for Appellee

LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Ju Mao appeals from a judgment entry and decree of

divorce of the Common Pleas Court of Greene County, Domestic Relations Division. For

the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 2013, Mao married plaintiff-appellee Forest M. Bright in China. One child, a

son, was born in November 2013 as issue of their marriage. In July 2018, the parties

separated and Bright filed a complaint for legal separation in Greene C.P. No. 2018 DR

0167. The parties, represented by separate counsel, appeared in open court on June 13,

2019, and affirmed their intent to enter into a separation agreement. The written separation

agreement was signed by both parties. On July 12, 2019, the trial court entered a final

judgment entry and decree of legal separation granting the parties a legal separation on the

grounds of incompatibility. The separation agreement was approved, adopted, and

incorporated into the July 12, 2019 order. Bright was designated the legal custodian and

residential parent of the minor child. Mao was granted parenting time in excess of the

Greene County standard parenting time order. She was not required to pay any child

support due to the extended parenting time she received. The separation agreement

divided the parties’ assets and liabilities, and the parties agreed to waive any right to spousal

support. The separation agreement declared that spousal support could not be modified

under any circumstance. Neither party filed an appeal from the July 12, 2019 judgment.

2 {¶ 3} In June 2022, Bright filed a complaint for divorce in Greene C.P. No. 2022 DR

0115. In his complaint, Bright requested that he be designated the temporary and

permanent custodian of the parties’ minor child, that Mao pay child support, and that the

court adopt the 2019 separation agreement “with respect to the payment of spousal support

and division of assets and liabilities.”

{¶ 4} Mao filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce. In her counterclaim, Mao

sought temporary and permanent custody of the parties’ minor child, or in the alternative, an

order for shared parenting “plus additional parenting time over and above parenting time

listed in the Separation Agreement.” Mao further requested an order “adopting and

approving the parties’ Separation Agreement with respect to the division of assets and

liabilities.” Mao requested child support but did not request spousal support.

{¶ 5} The contentious matter proceeded with numerous motions and hearings. The

various motions and hearings relevant to this appeal will be addressed below. Although

Mao was initially represented by counsel, she proceeded to represent herself during the

majority of the case.

{¶ 6} While the divorce case was pending, Mao filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking to enforce Bright’s contractual

obligation, as her immigration sponsor, to provide a level of financial support in the amount

of 125% of the applicable Federal Poverty Guideline. The suit was based on Bright having

signed a Form I-864 Affidavit of Support of Mao’s petition to become a permanent resident

of the United States. On December 9, 2022, the district court issued a decision ordering

Bright to make monthly financial payments to Mao in the amount of 125% of the Federal

Poverty Guideline for a household of one ($1,416.00 at that time), minus her income for the

immediately prior month. Mao v. Bright, 645 F.Supp.3d 805, 815 (S.D.Ohio 2022).

3 {¶ 7} On March 27, 2023, Mao filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion in the divorce case to set

aside the 2019 separation agreement. Mao separately filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion in Case

No. 2018 DR 0167 to set aside the July 12, 2019 judgment. The trial court overruled her

motion in Case No. 2018 DR 0167.1 Mao appealed the trial court’s decision in Case No.

2018 DR 0167, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution.

{¶ 8} On December 11, 2024, the trial court ordered that Case No. 2018 DR 0167 be

merged into 2022 DR 0115 for judicial economy solely as to all further parenting matters

involving parental rights and responsibilities of the minor child. The court stated that the

other issues previously addressed in the separation agreement (separation of assets and

liabilities and spousal support) were unaffected by the order and were res judicata.

{¶ 9} On January 21, 2025, Mao filed a motion for shared parenting as well as a

proposed shared parenting plan. A final contested hearing on the divorce was held on

February 18, 2025.

{¶ 10} On June 30, 2025, the trial court issued a final judgment and divorce decree

along with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bright was designated the residential

parent and legal custodian of the minor child, and Mao was granted extended parenting

time. Mao was ordered to pay child support in the sum of $124.56 per month and cash

medical support in the sum of $11.34 per month, plus a 2 percent processing charge. The

divorce decree incorporated the portion of the separation agreement that had divided the

parties’ assets and liabilities. The trial court did not order either party to pay spousal

support as the parties had waived any spousal support as designated in the separation

agreement, and the parties’ waiver was not subject to modification. Mao timely appealed.

1. Although the 2018 DR 0167 case is not in our record, the trial court, which was handling both cases, stated in Case No. 2022 DR 0115 that these events occurred.

4 II. First Assignment of Error

{¶ 11} The first assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT IS VOID AB INITIO AS IT IS

FOUNDED UPON PRIOR ORDERS OBTAINED THROUGH EXTRINSIC

FRAUD, JUDICIAL COERCION, AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH

FEDERAL LAW, THEREBY VIOLATING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(DUE PROCESS) AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION.

{¶ 12} According to Mao, the trial court’s judgment entry and decree of divorce that

adopted the terms of the separation agreement is void ab initio because it was based on the

void July 12, 2019 judgment. We disagree.

{¶ 13} To the extent Mao argues that the July 12, 2019 judgment is void, that issue

is precluded by res judicata. “Res judicata ensures the finality of decisions.” Brown v.

Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). Res judicata “bars a party from relitigating the same

issue or claim that has already been decided in a final, appealable order or a valid, final

judgment in a prior proceeding and could have been raised on appeal in that prior

proceeding.” AJZ's Hauling, L.L.C. v. TruNorth Warranty Programs of N. Am., 2023-Ohio-

3097, ¶ 15. “The doctrine of res judicata involves both claim preclusion (historically called

estoppel by judgment in Ohio) and issue preclusion (traditionally known as collateral

estoppel).” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381 (1995).

{¶ 14} “Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) prevents parties or their privies from

relitigating facts and issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior suit.”

Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183 (1994). “Collateral estoppel applies when the

fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon

5 and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom

collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action.” Id.,

citing Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108 (1969), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 15} Mao filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion in Case No. 2018 DR 0167 arguing that the

July 12, 2019 judgment adopting the separation agreement was void on the basis of duress,

coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud. The trial court overruled the motion. Mao

appealed to this court but failed to prosecute the appeal. Therefore, we dismissed her

appeal. She now raises the same allegations that she raised in the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, as

well as allegations that she could have raised in the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, to support her

contention that the July 12, 2019 judgment was void. Res judicata precludes her from

relitigating this issue.

{¶ 16} We also note that the divorce decree was not entirely based on the July 12,

2019 judgment. “During a divorce proceeding, if one or both parties submit a separation

agreement to the trial court that was voluntarily entered into, R.C. 3105.10(B)(2) allows the

court discretion to choose one of several options.” Robinson v. Robinson, 1999 WL

1082656, *5 (2d Dist. Dec. 3, 1999). The trial court may: 1) adopt and incorporate the

agreement so that it becomes part of the divorce decree; 2) reject some of the terms of the

separation agreement and make an independent ruling on those issues; or 3) reject the

entire separation agreement and make its own findings regarding the issues set forth in the

complaint. Bourque v. Bourque, 34 Ohio App.3d 284, 287 (12th Dist. 1986).

{¶ 17} Here, a final contested divorce hearing was held on February 18, 2025. On

June 30, 2025, the trial court issued the final divorce decree. The trial court adopted and

incorporated into the divorce decree the terms of the separation agreement as they related

to the division of the parties’ assets and liabilities. Both parties requested in their respective

6 pleadings that the trial court do this. “Under the invited error doctrine, ‘a party will not be

permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.’” State v. Bey,

85 Ohio St.3d 487, 493 (1999), quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,

28 Ohio St.3d 20 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus. Therefore, Mao cannot now claim

any error in the trial court’s adoption of the division of the parties’ assets and liabilities that

was previously agreed to by the parties.

{¶ 18} The trial court also adopted the terms of the separation agreement related to

the issue of spousal support. The July 12, 2019 judgment on the parties’ separation set

forth that neither party was required to pay spousal support and that the parties waived any

spousal support. Bright’s complaint for divorce requested the adoption of the July 12, 2019

judgment as it related to the issue of spousal support. Mao’s counterclaim did not request

spousal support. Nevertheless, on July 3, 2024, Mao filed a motion seeking temporary

spousal support for three years. The trial court declined to order spousal support because

the terms of the separation agreement, which were adopted in the July 12, 2019 judgment,

explicitly provided that the parties waived the right for either party to acquire spousal support

and that the waiver of spousal support “shall not be modifiable under any circumstances.”

{¶ 19} While Mao claims she did not consent to the waiver of spousal support in the

July 12, 2019 judgment, she did not file an appeal from the July 12, 2019 judgment and did

not pursue an appeal of the denial of her Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Therefore, res judicata

precludes her from relitigating this issue. Moreover, Mao’s allegation that the waiver of

spousal support was in conflict with the federal I-864 Affidavit of Support is erroneous. As

the federal court stated, “[Bright’s] financial obligations as [Mao’s] immigration sponsor

under federal law exist completely independent of any obligations to pay spousal support

under state divorce laws.” Mao, 645 F.Supp.3d at 810-811.

7 {¶ 20} Contrary to Mao’s argument, the trial court did not adopt the rest of the 2019

separation agreement in its entirety and therefore was free to make its own independent

rulings on the remaining issues, namely, the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities

and child support, which it did. We cannot conclude on this record that the trial court’s

adoption of portions of the 2019 separation agreement into the final judgment entry and

decree of divorce rendered the judgment void.

{¶ 21} Mao also challenges two orders issued in Case No. 2018 DR 0167—a 2018

emergency temporary custody order and a January 3, 2022 contempt order that imposed

sanctions. Notably, the 2018 emergency temporary custody order was interlocutory in

nature and merged into the July 12, 2019 judgment. Any arguments related to that order

are moot. In re J.L.R., 2009-Ohio-5812, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.). Likewise, a contempt order is a

final, appealable order. Docks Venture, L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 2014-Ohio-

4254, ¶ 21. Mao should have filed an appeal within 30 days of the order, but she did not.

These issues are not properly before this court and will not be considered.

{¶ 22} Mao’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Second Assignment of Error

{¶ 23} Mao’s second assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED STRUCTURAL ERROR BY

DELIBERATELY PREVENTING THE CREATION OF A VERBATIM RECORD

OF THE FINAL HEARING AND ENGAGING IN COORDINATED JUDICIAL

OBSTRUCTION TO BLOCK APPELLATE REVIEW, THEREBY DEPRIVING

APPELLANT OF HER FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS AND A MEANINGFUL APPEAL.

8 {¶ 24} The trial court granted the parties a divorce in a June 30, 2025 final judgment

entry and decree of divorce. Mao filed a timely notice of appeal on July 30, 2025. The civil

docket statement indicated that the record would include the “SUMMARY OF DOCKET AND

JOURNAL ENTRIES ONLY (No transcript, App. R 9 (C) statement, or agreed statement will

be filed).” The notice also included a statement that “[a]ppellant has no access to any

transcript or App.R. 9(C) substitute, as the trial court barred recording. No public record

exists.” Despite a final contested divorce hearing having been held on February 18, 2025,

no praecipes were filed seeking a transcript.

{¶ 25} An App.R. 11(B) notification was filed on August 20, 2025. No transcript or

App.R. 9(C) statement was filed.

{¶ 26} Mao argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for a transcript at

the State’s expense. Mao’s allegations are not part of the record on appeal, so we are

unable to address their merits.

{¶ 27} Mao’s July 30, 2025 notice of appeal was taken from the trial court’s June 30,

2025 final judgment entry and decree of divorce. But in this assignment of error, Mao seeks

to challenge an order of the trial court allegedly issued on October 8, 2025. “We may not

consider acts that occurred or issues that arose after a notice of appeal was filed.” Fifth

Third Bank v. Fin. S. Office Partners, Ltd., 2010 WL 4703409, *3 (2d Dist. Nov. 19, 2010),

citing In re Beck, 2002-Ohio-3460, ¶ 21 (7th Dist.).

{¶ 28} Nevertheless, “due process does not require that an indigent civil litigant be

provided with a trial transcript at state’s expense for purposes of appeal.” Matyaszek v.

Howell, 1987 WL 7890, *2 (8th Dist. Mar. 12, 1987). “Civil due process requires only notice

and an opportunity to be heard, not provision of transcripts in civil proceedings.” Jones v.

Jones, 1996 WL 715441, *5 (2d Dist. Dec. 13, 1996). “Instead, provision of transcripts to

9 indigent parties is limited to criminal cases, termination of parental rights, and defense of

paternity cases.” Id. Mao appeals from an order granting a divorce; that proceeding did

not concern any of those situations. Bright was granted legal custody of the parties’ minor

child and designated the residential parent and legal custodian, which is not the same as an

involuntary termination of Mao’s parental rights by the State. Notably, the State is not a

party to this divorce case. Mao retains certain parental rights and responsibilities and was

granted extensive parenting time. Mao has not shown that she has a right to a transcript of

the final divorce hearing at the State's expense.

{¶ 29} Mao’s second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 30} Having overruled Mao’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

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TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.