Bright v. Mao

2025 Ohio 5545

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 2025-CA-46
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Bright v. Mao, 2025-Ohio-5545.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

FOREST M. BRIGHT : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-46 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2022 DR 0115 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- JU MAO : Domestic Relations) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on December 12, 2025, the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-46

JU MAO, Appellant, Pro Se DAVID S. PETERSON, Attorney for Appellee

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Ju Mao appeals pro se from the trial court’s entries (1) clarifying the parties’

parenting-time schedule and denying her make-up parenting time and (2) overruling of her

Civ.R. 60(A) and (B) motion to vacate the clarifying entry.

{¶ 2} Mao alleges a due process violation based on the clerk of court’s handling of

two related motions for make-up parenting time. She also contends the trial court erred in

treating a motion for make-up parenting time as a motion seeking clarification of parenting-

time orders. She next challenges the trial court’s overruling of her Civ.R. 60(A) and (B)

motion to vacate its clarifying entry. Finally, she argues that the trial court’s refusal to award

her compensatory parenting time violated her substantive due process rights.

{¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, we find Mao’s arguments to be unpersuasive

and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Background

{¶ 4} Mao married plaintiff-appellee, Forest Bright, in 2013, and they had one child

together. In July 2018, Bright filed a complaint for legal separation under another case

number. Bright later filed a June 2022 complaint for divorce in the above-captioned case,

and the legal-separation proceeding merged into it. The trial court then entered a final

judgment and divorce decree on June 30, 2025. Among other things, the divorce decree

awarded Bright legal custody of the parties’ child and granted Mao parenting time.

Approximately two months after finalization of the divorce, Mao filed a motion for make-up

2 parenting time. She argued that Bright improperly had denied her mid-week parenting time

during the school year for the past three years and eight months. Shortly thereafter, Mao

filed a nearly identical motion to compel make-up parenting time. Again, she argued that

Bright had deprived her of court-ordered mid-week parenting time for three years and eight

months.

{¶ 5} The trial court resolved Mao’s first motion for make-up parenting time in a

September 9, 2025 judgment entry. It noted that the dispute involved whether she was

entitled to mid-week parenting time every Wednesday or every other Wednesday during the

school year. For context, the trial court examined parenting-time language in the parties’

earlier separation agreement, an interim order issued prior to the divorce decree, and the

divorce decree itself. After reviewing those documents, the trial court clarified that Mao was

entitled to mid-week parenting time every Wednesday. Despite finding her interpretation of

the relevant parenting-time language correct, it denied her request for compensatory

parenting time, concluding “that there is no means nor necessity for any ‘make-up’ parenting

time.” Following the trial court’s ruling, Mao filed a Civ.R. 60(A) and (B) motion to vacate the

trial court’s September 9, 2025 entry clarifying her mid-week parenting time. The trial court

overruled the motion to vacate on September 22, 2025. Mao timely appealed, advancing

four assignments of error.

II. Analysis

{¶ 6} The first assignment of error states:

The trial court erred and violated Appellant’s due process rights where the

Clerk blocked, delayed, and withheld Appellant’s complete August 29, 2025

Motion to Compel for eleven (11) days, refusing to docket it until September 9,

2025 at 7:56 a.m.—after the court had already ruled that same morning.

3 Instead, on September 3, 2025, the Clerk misfiled the rejected and

incomplete August 28 draft motion in place of the operative August 29

submission.

{¶ 7} Mao contends the clerk of court failed to comply with Civ.R. 3(E) and

Civ.R. 5(D)(3) by refusing for 11 days to docket the motion to compel make-up parenting

time referenced above. She contends the trial court violated her due process rights by not

docketing the motion to compel until 7:56 a.m. on September 9, 2025, shortly after the trial

court had ruled on her earlier motion for make-up parenting time.

{¶ 8} Upon review, we find Mao’s argument to be unpersuasive. As explained above,

she presented two motions addressing make-up parenting time. The first motion was dated

August 28, 2025 but was not docketed until September 3, 2025. The second motion was

dated August 29, 2025 but was not docketed until September 9, 2025. The motions were

substantially similar, and both sought compensatory parenting time based on Bright’s denial

of parenting time every other Wednesday during the school year. The only real difference

between the two motions was that the one docketed on September 3, 2025 failed to include

as an exhibit a copy of the parenting-time provision in the divorce decree. The motion

docketed on September 9, 2025 included this provision as an exhibit.

{¶ 9} As for Mao’s argument on appeal, we note that the Civil Rules she cites do not

apply. The first rule, Civ.R. 3(E), addresses venue when there is no proper forum in Ohio.

The second rule, Civ.R. 5(D)(3), does not even exist. In any event, we see no due process

violation arising from the clerk’s handling of Mao’s two motions. The delay she cites appears

to have involved submission and approval of an affidavit of indigency. Regardless of the

propriety or cause of the delay (matters we need not address), Mao’s August 28, 2025

motion ultimately was docketed on September 3, 2025, and her August 29, 2025 motion was

4 docketed on September 9, 2025. Contrary to Mao’s argument, the second motion was

docketed approximately one hour before the docketing of the trial court’s September 9, 2025

entry resolving her first motion. For present purposes, though, her argument on this point is

immaterial.

{¶ 10} Although Mao characterizes her first motion as “incomplete” and a “draft,” she

presented it to the clerk for filing, and she has appealed from the trial court’s disposition of

it. We note too that the first motion for make-up parenting time was nearly identical to her

subsequent motion to compel make-up parenting time. The only real difference was that the

second motion included a copy of pertinent language from the divorce decree. In its

September 9, 2025 judgment entry resolving the first motion, the trial court quoted and

considered this language from the divorce decree despite Mao’s failure to include it as an

exhibit. For the foregoing reasons, we fail to see how Mao’s due process rights were violated

by the trial court resolving her August 28, 2025 motion that was docketed on September 3,

2025. The first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 11} The second assignment of error states:

The trial court erred in reframing Appellant’s Motion to Compel Make-Up

Parenting Time as a matter of “interpretation” of parenting schedules, rather

than enforcing existing orders, and thereby denied her enforcement relief.

{¶ 12} Mao contends the trial court’s judgment entry improperly recharacterized her

motion as involving a matter of parenting-time “interpretation” rather than seeking

enforcement and an allowance of make-up parenting time.

{¶ 13} Once again, we find Mao’s argument to be unpersuasive. Both of her motions

sought make-up parenting time based on Bright’s failure to provide her with parenting time

every other Wednesday during the school year. The record reveals that the parties

5 disagreed about whether mid-week parenting time was to occur every week or every other

week. To resolve the dispute, the trial court began by examining pertinent language in the

divorce decree and prior orders. For the parties’ benefit, it clarified that Mao in fact was

entitled to mid-week parenting time every Wednesday. The trial court then turned to her

request for make-up parenting time and found no “necessity” for compensatory parenting

time. We see nothing improper about the trial court interpreting the applicable parenting-

time language before ruling on Mao’s request. The second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 14} The third assignment of error states:

The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s September 18, 2025

Motion to Vacate, improperly attributing to Appellant the Clerk’s eleven-day

blocking, delaying, and withholding of her August 29, 2025 Motion to

Compel, and the Clerk’s misfiling of the rejected and incomplete August

28 draft motion in its place, contrary to Civ.R. 60(A) and 60(B).

{¶ 15} Mao next challenges the trial court’s overruling of her Civ.R. 60(A) and (B)

motion to vacate its September 9, 2025 entry resolving her September 3, 2025 motion for

make-up parenting time. The motion to vacate was predicated on the clerk’s alleged

“blocking,” “delaying,” and “withholding” of Mao’s August 29, 2025 motion and its “misfiling”

and subsequent ruling on her August 28, 2025 motion, which she characterized as “the

wrong motion.”

{¶ 16} As noted above, both of Mao’s motions were docketed before the trial court

ruled on the August 28, 2025 motion. The two motions also were substantially similar, raising

the same issue and legal argument. Under these circumstances, and notwithstanding Mao’s

complaints about the docketing process, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

no basis for relief under Civ.R. 60(A) or (B). The third assignment of error is overruled.

6 {¶ 17} The fourth assignment of error states:

The trial court’s refusal to grant make-up parenting time, despite

acknowledging Appellant’s weekly Wednesday right, infringed on her

fundamental parental liberty interest guaranteed under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court

in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745 (1982).

{¶ 18} Mao’s final assignment of error challenges the trial court’s failure to grant her

make-up parenting time despite agreeing that she was entitled to parenting time every

Wednesday during the school year. She asserted below that Bright had denied her parenting

time every other Wednesday for the previous three years and eight months. She contends

the trial court’s failure to compensate for this missed parenting time violated her substantive

due process rights.

{¶ 19} Upon review, we see no due process violation. With one exception, Mao’s

motion for make-up parenting time addressed missed parenting time that occurred prior to

the June 30, 2025 final judgment entry and divorce decree. Any pre-decree issues should

have been raised and resolved before the trial court filed its divorce decree and allocated

parental rights and responsibilities by designating Bright the residential parent and awarding

Mao parenting time. Specifically, if Bright deprived Mao of interim parenting time for years,

she should have obtained compensatory parenting time prior to finalization of the divorce.

“Decrees allocating parental rights and responsibilities are final orders. Like any other final

order, the doctrine of res judicata applies to merge any subsequent related grounds for relief

into the decree and the relief granted. That rule ordinarily bars further claims for relief on

those grounds, depriving the court that issued the order of jurisdiction to modify it.” Averill v.

7 Bradley, 2001 WL 1597881, *3 (2d Dist. Dec. 14, 2001). Here the divorce decree lacks any

provision awarding Mao make-up time for missed parenting time prior to the filing of the

decree, and she cannot obtain that relief now.

{¶ 20} The trial court did possess continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the

divorce decree or to modify it based on post-decree events. Id. But Mao’s motion sought

compensatory parenting time for only one instance of post-decree missed time. The June

30, 2025 divorce decree granted her Wednesday parenting time during the school year.

Midweek parenting time did not apply during the summer, when the parties instead

alternated full weeks of parenting time. Mao’s motion for make-up parenting time asserted

that Bright had failed to provide her with parenting time on Wednesday August 27, 2025,

which apparently was the first week of the new school year.

{¶ 21} We have recognized that trial courts enjoy “broad discretion” in awarding

make-up parenting time. In re Wolfe, 2001 WL 128884, *4 (2d Dist. Feb. 16, 2001). Even

when a party interferes with parenting time contemptuously, granting make-up time remains

within a trial court’s discretion. Huff v. Huff, 1995 WL 600012, *3 (2d Dist. Oct. 13, 1995).

Here, of course, the trial court made no finding of contempt in connection with Mao’s motion.

Instead, it appears to have attributed Bright’s actions to a genuine disagreement over

interpretation of parenting-time language in the divorce decree. Even if the trial court had

discretion to award Mao compensatory parenting time for one missed Wednesday, we see

no abuse of discretion in its finding of no “necessity” for make-up time. We also are

unconvinced that the trial court’s failure to remedy one missed Wednesday rose to the level

of an actionable substantive due process violation. The fourth assignment of error is

overruled.

8 III. Conclusion

{¶ 22} The judgment of the Greene County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

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HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.