BRIGHT-JACOBS v. Barnhart

386 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28998, 2004 WL 3517337
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedOctober 5, 2004
Docket1:03-cr-00029
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 386 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (BRIGHT-JACOBS v. Barnhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BRIGHT-JACOBS v. Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28998, 2004 WL 3517337 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

Opinion

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S FINAL ORDER

FELDMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is an action to review the determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) that Brenda Brigh1>Jacobs is not entitled to a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (DIB) and/or supplemental security income (SSI) under §§ 216(i), 223(a), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4160), 423(a), and 1382.

PART ONE HISTORY OF THE CASE

On December 29, 1993, claimant filed an application for disability benefits, alleging she had been disabled since January 15, 1993, apparently due to back surgery and nerve damage and pain. Tr. 46, 117, 121-126, 139, 149, 481. The claim was denied initially on March 26, 1994, and on reconsideration on July 28, 1994. Tr. 129-30, 137-38. On November 6, 1995, a de novo hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Robert L. O’Steen, who received testimony from the claimant and Vocational Expert (VE) Vivian Hanna. (Tr. 59-116).

In addition to the foregoing, on January 3, 1994, the claimant also filed an application for supplemental security income benefits (SSI), alleging that she had been disabled since January 15, 1993, due to back problems, hiatal hernia. Tr. 139-142, 149. The SSI application was denied initially on March 26, 1994, and on reconsideration, on July 28, 1994. Tr. 143-44, 146-47, 149-51. After the foregoing November 6, 1995 de novo hearing (Tr. 59-116), ALJ O’Steen determined in his June 28, 1996 opinion that since the claimant was able to perform her past jobs, she was not disabled, and not eligible for wage earner’s or SSI benefits. Tr. 46-54. The claimant’s request for review by the Appeals Council was denied on September 12, 1997. Tr. 3-4. A timely appeal to this Court followed.

The ease was docketed as Bright v. Apfel, Civil Action No. 1:97-CV-3509-JEC (NDGa.). On February 24, 1999, Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill issued a Report and Recommendation that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed (Tr. 660-678), which Report and Recommendation was, on April 9, 1999, adopted as the District Court’s Order. Tr. 642.

On April 4, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District *1299 Court’s decision of April 9, 1999, and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Specifically, that Court found that the ALJ denied the claimant a full and fair hearing: (1) by failing to consider all of the claimant’s impairments, and (2) by failing to specify the weight he attached to the various medical reports. Tr. 630-38, 679-83. See Bright v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 600, 2000 WL 432431 (11th Cir.2000) (per curium) (not published). Thereafter, the District Court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Tr. 627-629.

On November 18, 2000, the Appeals Council remanded the case to an ALJ for further proceedings. Tr. 636-638.

In the meantime, on October 31, 1997, the claimant filed a second application for SSI benefits, alleging that she was disabled by virtue of disorders of her back— discogenic degenerative, and an affective disorder since April 2, 1994. Tr. 641, 703-06. The application was denied initially on January 28, 1998, and on reconsideration on March 17, 1998. Tr. 641, 646-47, 652-53. As shown hereafter, de novo hearings were held before ALJ James E. Deen, Jr. on January 25, 1999 (Tr. 531-584) and May 14, 2001 (Tr. 535-626) to consider the new application and the remand, and ALJ Deen issued a 49-page partially favorable decision finding that the claimant was disabled and entitled to SSI benefits from September 1, 1997 through October 31, 1999, but not before or after, as she was not disabled before September 1, 1997, and her disability had ceased as of November 1, 1999. Tr. 477-529. In due course, the claimant exhausted her administrative remedies and again appealed the decision to this Court. See Bright-Jacobs v. Barnhart, Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-02 (NDGa.).

As previously noted, the Eleventh Circuit and the District Court remanded the case to the Commissioner, who remanded it to a new ALJ, James E. Deen, Jr. On January 25, 1999, the new ALJ, James E. Deen, held his first hearing on the new application and the remanded decision, and received testimony from the claimant and a new VE, Dr. Phillip Wierson, PhD. Tr. 531-584. He held a second hearing on May 14, 2001, and again heard testimony from the claimant and a third VE, Alice Gardner. Tr. 585-626. Although the claimant’s husband was present as an observer at Deen’s second hearing, he was not called to testify. Tr. 585.

On October 11, 2002, the ALJ issued his 49-page partially favorable decision, finding that the claimant was disabled from September 1, 1997 until October 31, 1999, but not thereafter. Tr. 477-529.

In due course, the claimant appealed that decision to the Appeals Council, which apparently declined further review. 1 Tr. _The claimant then appealed the new partially favorable decision to this Court. [Doc. 1].

PART TWO THE ISSUES

1. Whether the Commissioner’s decision that the claimant can perform his/her past relevant work is supported by substantial evidence;

2. Whether the ALJ denied the claimant a full and fair hearing—

a. whether the ALJ properly determined that the claimant was not enti- *1300 tied to benefits before September 1, 1997 because her disability was caused in part by alcoholism; and
b. whether the ALJ properly determined that the claimant’s disability ended on October 31,1999.

PART THREE THE STANDARD FOR REVIEW

The claimant bears the initial burden of proving that he is disabled, which burden is met when he proves that he suffers from a severe impairment that renders him unable to pursue his customary employment. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant can, nevertheless, perform other types of substantial gainful activity. Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727 (11th Cir.1982). In determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner is required to consider:

(1) Objective medical facts or clinical findings;
(2) Diagnosis of examining physicians;
(3) Subjective evidence of pain and disability as testified to by the claimant and corroborated by his wife of other members of his family, his neighbors and others who have observed him; and
(4) The claimant’s age, education and work history....

DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1972);

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Haynes v. Saul
N.D. Georgia, 2020
Ramcharran v. Saul
N.D. Georgia, 2020
Rease v. Barnhart
422 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (N.D. Georgia, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
386 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28998, 2004 WL 3517337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bright-jacobs-v-barnhart-gand-2004.