Briggs v. SMG Food & Beverage, LLC

2020 IL App (1st) 191723-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 27, 2020
• Docket: 1-19-1723
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (1st) 191723-U No. 1-19-1723 April 27, 2020

First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ MICHAEL BRIGGS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 18 L 012432 ) SMG FOOD & BEVERAGE, LLC, SHAUN BEARD, ) Honorable STEVEN TAMBORELLO and MELITA MOORE, ) Daniel Kubasiak, ) Judge Presiding. Defendants-Appellees. )

JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Hyman and Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The discovery rule for defamation cases allows a plaintiff to file his complaint within one year after he discovered that he suffered a wrongfully caused injury. The limitations period does not start if assurances and circumstances lead the plaintiff not to inquire further to find out whether an injury had a wrongful cause. April 27, 2020

¶2 Michael Briggs filed a complaint in November 2018, alleging that Shaun Beard and others

defamed him in 2015. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint

as untimely. On appeal, Briggs argues that he has alleged facts that could support a finding that

before November 25, 2017, he neither knew nor should have known that wrongful conduct had

caused him to suffer an injury. We agree. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for

further proceedings on the complaint.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Because the circuit court dismissed the cause of action on the pleadings, we must assume

the truth of the factual assertions of the complaint. Falk v. Martel, 210 Ill. App. 3d 557, 560-61

(1991). Accordingly, we base our statement of facts on the complaint and supporting documents.

See Triangle Sign Co. v. Weber, Cohn & Riley, 149 Ill. App. 3d 839, 843 (1986).

¶5 Beard, an officer of SMG Food & Beverage LLC, agreed to meet with union

representatives on August 22, 2015. They scheduled the meeting to take place in a conference

room at McCormick Place. Beard asked Steven Tamborello, an officer of SMG, and Melita

Moore, Human Resources Director for SMG, and others to attend the meeting. The meeting took

place at the scheduled time but in a different building.

¶6 Briggs, who worked as a bell captain for SMG, received no invitation to the meeting, and

he did not attend it. When Briggs came to work on September 18, 2015, he found that his ID card

did not give him the access to do his job. Before 6 a.m., Briggs emailed Moore to tell her, “I am

not able to get into rooms. I cannot do my job properly if *** my card doesn’t work.” Moore

responded, “Your ID badge has been activated. What rooms are you having problems getting

into?” A few minutes later Lynn Doyle, another employee of SMG, emailed Briggs: “Michael,

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what doors can’t you swipe into? I’ve never had a complaint from Calvin which is why I told them

to give you the same access. Please let me know if you are having issues.” Briggs wrote back,

“My card does not work anywhere. I have tried pantrys, rooms that are not lock out.” Doyle wrote,

“I just talked to security…. She was out of the office and didn’t get my email. She is giving you

access now. Wait 5 minutes and try it. If it still doesn’t work, please let me know.” At 2 p.m. on

September 18, 2015, less than 9 hours after Briggs discovered the problem, he wrote to Doyle, “It

works again, thank you.”

¶7 On November 25, 2017, one of the persons who attended the meeting on August 22, 2015,

told Briggs that when the meeting attendees arrived at the original meeting site, Beard announced,

“We have to move the meeting because Michael Briggs is threatening the building because he is a

terrorist.”

¶8 On November 15, 2018, Briggs sued Beard, SMG, Tamborello, and Moore for defamation.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely. The circuit court held that Briggs

“should have learned of his duty to investigate his injury” when his ID card did not work on

September 18, 2015. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint under

section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2018). Briggs

now appeals.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619(a)(5). Raintree

Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 254 (2004). "The statute of limitations to

file a defamation claim is one year. See 735 ILCS 5/13–201 (West 2004). *** Under the discovery

rule, the limitations period would not begin to run until such time a person knows, or reasonably

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should have known, of his or her injury and that such injury was wrongfully caused." Peal v. Lee,

403 Ill. App. 3d 197, 207 (2010).

¶ 11 Henderson Square Condominium Ass'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, is

instructive to our analysis. This case is similar to cases discussed in Henderson Square. Our

supreme court noted:

"In Graham [County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc.,

109 Ill. 2d 143 (1985)], the plaintiff knew of moisture problems in its building,

which was constructed by the defendant eight years before the plaintiff's complaint

was filed in 1982 for faulty construction. The architect had provided reasons for the

moisture problems that were not actionable ***. This court reversed the trial court's

order that dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action. In so doing, this court observed

*** 'It is possible that the suggestions of the architect and the resulting repairs were

adequate to keep a reasonable person from investigating further.' Id. at 154.

In Fox [Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox, 90 Ill. App. 3d 537 (1980)], the

plaintiffs sued their architect for the faulty construction of a school. Plaintiffs

noticed cracks and defects in the building more than five years before their

complaint was filed. *** Sometime later, the plaintiffs obtained a report that

indicated the cracks were caused by a design defect involving the lack of expansion

joints. *** [T]he statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date of the

discovery of the design defect, rather than the date when the plaintiffs knew of the

cracks in the building.

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*** [I]t is possible that the minor repairs in the present case, coupled with the

limited nature of the water infiltration experienced, was enough to reasonably delay

plaintiffs' *** discover[y of] the latent defects. We conclude that the date when

plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known that an injury occurred and that

it was wrongfully caused was a question of fact not to be decided on a motion to

dismiss under the circumstances of the present case." Henderson Square, 2015 IL

118139, ¶¶ 57-59.

¶ 12 Here, the assurances Briggs received from Moore and Doyle that his ID card should give

him access to the rooms, along with the restoration of full access less than nine hours after he

discovered the problem, was "adequate to keep a reasonable person from investigating further."

Graham, 109 Ill. 2d at 154. The facts alleged in the complaint and the supporting exhibits suffice

to raise an issue of fact as to when Briggs should have known that wrongful conduct caused his ID

card to malfunction on September 18, 2015. We reverse the order dismissing Briggs's complaint

and remand for further proceedings in accord with this order.

¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 14 Briggs alleged facts that could support a finding that before November 25, 2017, he neither

knew nor should have known that wrongful conduct caused him to suffer an injury. Therefore, he

has adequately stated a timely cause of action for defamation. We reverse the circuit court's

judgment and remand for further proceedings on the complaint.

¶ 15 Reversed and remanded.

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