Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Quick Action Ignition Co.

93 F.2d 207, 35 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 2764
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 4, 1937
DocketNo. 6271
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 93 F.2d 207 (Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Quick Action Ignition Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Quick Action Ignition Co., 93 F.2d 207, 35 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 2764 (7th Cir. 1937).

Opinion

LINDLEY, District Judge.

Sought to be reversed is a decree finding valid and infringed claims 7 and 8 of patent No. 1,275,294 and claim 3 of patent No. 1,338,151, both assigned to appellee by the inventor Oglesby. The first is for "a combined internal combustion engine and magneto,” and the second, “detachable magneto-armature heads and core.” The claims appear in the footnote.1

Oglesby’s device of patent No. 1,275,-294, had to do with a magneto attached to and combined with an internal combustion engine. The application was dated January 5, 1917, and the grant, August 13, 1918. The suit included claims 1 to 6 of the first patent, as well as claims 7 and 8, but the District Court refused to grant relief upon all except 7 and 8. Appellant insists that the patent is anticipated by prior patents and uses, and that, in view of the existing prior art, only mechanical skill was involved in devising the combination claimed.

Claims 7 and 8 of patent No. 1,275,294 describe a combination of the prior art flywheel magneto applied to the well known crankcase of an internal combustion engine (Múeller 1,147,038), centered and mounted upon the front of the crankshaft of such case. Flywheel magnetos were old, but appellee claims that Oglesby achieved more efficient operation at low speed and greater ease of assembling. Specifically it relies upon the combination of a crankcase wherein the rotating shaft carries a removable end plate, which also serves as a bearing for the shaft, an armature on the plate, a circuit breaker and condenser “placed adjacent thereto” or “supported on the crankcase end plate, adjacent the path of travel” of a field magnet, adapted to pass by the armature, and a cam carried by the shaft for operating the circuit breaker to produce periodic currents of an undirectional character in the armature coil as the shaft is revolved. This, it says, is a combination both novel and useful, constituting a product of inventive genius.

Claims 7 and 8 differ from claims 1 and 6, upon which the court refused to grant relief, only by adding the circuit breaker and operating it by means of a cam carried by the shaft, and a careful analysis of the evidence convinces us that the claim for distinction between Oglesby and the prior art must lie chiefly in the alleged addition of this element. Mueller, in patent No. 1,-[209]*209147,038, built a unitary compact fly-wheel magneto mounted upon the crankshaft, but he did not provide that the plate upon which the magneto was mounted should be utilized also as the end plate of the crqnk case. He recognized that the generator type flywheel magneto for internal combustion engines was old in the'art and alleged that he was endeavoring to simplify the structure, reduce the cost of construction, and more fully to expose the timer mechanism and electrical connections, whereby repairs and readjustments might be facilitated. He placed the magneto at the end of the crankshaft, but he did not, as Oglesby did, substitute for the conventional crankcase end plate, the outer surface of the magneto container. He specified that, in his combination there should be used “a circuit interrupter,” but he did not use the specific construction or location of Oglesby. We are convinced that all that Oglesby did was to take Mueller’s crankcase and mount it on the crankcase so as to obviate the use of the conventional end plate by substituting in lieu thereof the old mounting plate of flywheel magnetos, such as Mueller, and relocate the circuit breaker. Apparently all that a skilled mechanic dealing in the art, with Mueller before him, needed to do, in applying the flywheel magneto of Mueller to the conventional internal combustion engine crankshaft, was to make these changes. The elements of both magnetos are the same, and the results obtained are identical.

Nor was Mueller the first to mount his magneto upon the end of the crankcase. Podlesak, 948,483, application filed 1901, mounted a magneto in the flywheel of the engine at the head of the crankcase and provided a make and break ignition mechanism accomplishing the interruption to the current by the use of a cam oscillated and retained in any desired position of adjustment. This make and break connection, he said, might “be of any well known and suitable construction.”

Oglesby was delving in an active and rather crowded art, and the question arises, Did he make a combination, similar to those which existed previously, performing the same functions that those .performed, of such greater facility, ease, and simplicity as to constitute invention? Is what he did anything more than what would have occurred to any ordinary skilled engineer with the prior art before him?. .We think not.

We think that the most that can be said is that he gave a somewhat different form to a familiar combination, using the same elements, without achieving from them any new functions and without accomplishing any new result; that he merely carried forward the original thought by eliminating one plate on the end of a crankshaft and by a slightly different location of the recognized essential circuit breaker. These two changes it seems to us did not involve invention. They were rather a mechanical readaptation of familiar devices.

We have not mentioned the prior uses. The testimony of both parties as to the dates of conception of respective devices is based largely upon oral testimony as to what occurred more than 15 years before without substantiating documentary evidence. Oglesby testified originally that his date of conception was in 1917. He subsequently changed his story and offered the testimony of other witnesses, depending entirely upon their personal recollection, to carry his date back to early 1915. Appellant produced rather convincing testimony of a prior use of what, to our thinking, constitutes an anticipatory device by Evinrude, but again the testimony is almost wholly dependent upon the parol testimony of witnesses as to personal recollection of long past events. If Evinrude was first, as we are inclined to believe, for it was certain that his device was conceived in the fall of 1914 and the very first of 1915, his teachings were clearly anticipatory of everything that Oglesby did. The location of the circuit breaker was not the same, but with the recognition of the essential presence of a circuit breaker, its location again was a matter of the exercise of mere mechanical skill. However, in reaching our conclusion we have not grounded it upon the alleged prior uses. It is not necessary to do so in view of our conclusions as to the effect of the prior art in the way of prior patents.

Courts are loathe to ground final decisions as to priority upon the parol testimony of witnesses, many of whom are related by consanguinity or other ties, as to events having to do with the precise and detailed construction of a specific electrical combination some twenty years ago. Consequently we have preferred to base our [210]*210conclusion upon the documentary evidence rather than upon the parol testimony.

In patent No. 1,338,151, Oglesby claimed that he had created an improvement in a magneto core structure which included duplicate laminae groupings adapted to be interlaced so as to permit prewinding of the coil apart from the core assembly and the duplicate laminae groupings then assembled with the coil and, when assembled, forming a winding space in which the coil is received, which space is “between and beneath the heads.” The claim includes the word “beneath.” In our opinion it was inadvertently included and should be given no effect.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ranco, Inc. v. Gwynn
128 F.2d 437 (Sixth Circuit, 1942)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
93 F.2d 207, 35 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 2764, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/briggs-stratton-corp-v-quick-action-ignition-co-ca7-1937.