Brigette Bodie-Jernigan v. School Board of Broward County, Florida

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: September 26, 2025
• Docket: 24-12593
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12593 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

BRIGETTE I. BODIE-JERNIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-60745-AHS ____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Brigette Bodie-Jernigan worked as a teacher for the School Board of Broward County. She sued the School Board, alleging dis- crimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 2 of 10

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Act. She appeals the district court’s dismissal of her second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. After careful con- sideration, we affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In August 2007, Bodie-Jernigan began working as a teacher 1 at the Dillard 6-12 School in Broward County. Her responsibilities included maintaining discipline in the classroom and creating a pos- itive and engaging learning environment for her students. Bodie- Jernigan suffers from several medical conditions, including reduced kidney function, prior cardiac surgery, and prediabetes. In early 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the School Board moved all classes online. Soon after, Bodie-Jernigan’s treating physician recommended that she work remotely until the COVID-19 pandemic was resolved. In September 2020, the Broward Teachers Union and the School Board met to create a memorandum of understanding to guide the School Board’s response to the pandemic. The memo- randum stated that the School Board would “strive to provide the choice of remote work assignments to the highest possible number of requesting employees.” But the memo also specified that “[e]li- gibility for a work from home remote extended assignment [would be based] on the function of the job and the needs of the

1 We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Bodie-Jernigan’s favor. Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 97 F. 4th 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 2024). USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 3 of 10

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worksite[,]” and that an “employee must be able to perform the essential functions of the employee’s job through digital platforms without commuting to the office [and/or] a centralized location.” When the School Board began to resume in-person classes in Oc- tober 2020, Bodie-Jernigan requested an accommodation to work remotely until the pandemic “was resolved.” The School Board in- itially granted her request and allowed her to work remotely from October 2020 through January 2021. In January 2021, an arbitrator issued a judgment in a dispute between the Broward Teachers Union and the School Board stating that the School Board “may require teachers to return to their class- rooms to meet operational needs based on the number of students who intended to return to school.” After the arbitrator’s decision, Bodie-Jernigan received a notification from the School Board that her remote work allowance would expire later that month. The School Board expected her to report for work in person when the allowance expired. Bodie-Jernigan tried to meet with her school’s principal about extending her virtual accommodations, but the principal refused to discuss the prospect of granting her an exten- sion. In February 2021, because of her health concerns, Bodie-Jer- nigan decided to take an unpaid personal leave of absence rather than return to work in person. She remained on unpaid leave until August 2022, when the 2022–2023 school year began. During that time, the School Board designated her as an inactive employee, meaning she was not eligible for bonuses or other job benefits. USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 4 of 10

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY In April 2022, Bodie-Jernigan sued the School Board. She brought two claims. First, she alleged that the School Board dis- criminated against her under the Act by refusing to grant her a re- mote-work accommodation. Second, she claimed that the School Board retaliated against her in violation of the Act by “forc[ing]” her to take unpaid leave after it denied her requested accommoda- tion. The School Board moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Bodie-Jernigan responded with an amended complaint. The School Board then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district court granted the motion—dismissing Bodie-Jernigan’s amended complaint without prejudice. Bodie-Jernigan filed a sec- ond amended complaint containing more detailed allegations. The School Board again moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion—this time dismissing Bodie-Jernigan’s suit with preju- dice. Bodie-Jernigan appeals the dismissal. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Boyle v. City of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2017). DISCUSSION To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 5 of 10

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U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Bodie-Jernigan contends that the district court erred by de- termining that her second amended complaint failed to state either a discrimination claim or a retaliation claim under the Act. We ad- dress each of her arguments in turn. Discrimination Bodie-Jernigan argues that the district court erred because she properly pleaded she was discriminated against under the Act. We disagree. The Act prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job ap- plication procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of em- ployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination includes an employer’s failure to reasonably accom- modate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To state a discrimination claim under the Act, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she has a disability; (2) she is a qualified indi- vidual; and (3) she was subjected to unlawful discrimination be- cause of her disability. Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2007). USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 6 of 10

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Bodie-Jernigan’s claim fails at the second required element; she did not plausibly allege that she was a “qualified individual” un- der the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Under the Act, a qualified indi- vidual is someone who can perform the essential functions of her job with (or without) reasonable accommodation. Id. Essential functions “are the fundamental job duties of a position that an in- dividual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Beasley v. O’Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 760 (11th Cir. 2023). The Act does not require an employer to eliminate an essential function of an employee’s job, and an employer has some say regarding what functions are essential. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ADA does not require the em- ployer to eliminate an essential function of the plaintiff’s job.”) (cleaned up)); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (“[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essen- tial.”). Reasonable accommodations are modifications or adjust- ments to a work environment that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of their position. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256. Bodie-Jernigan pleaded that she could perform her job’s es- sential functions remotely. But she failed to plead any facts explain- ing how she could have maintained discipline or fostered an active learning environment—two of her essential functions—for her in- person class while teaching remotely. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (“[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of ac- tion, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Pleading that she could perform her essential teaching tasks USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 7 of 10

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remotely, without more, is conclusory, and not enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Because Bodie-Jernigan did not plausibly al- lege that she could perform the essential functions of her role re- motely, she did not plausibly allege that her requested accommo- dation rendered her a “qualified individual” under the Act. See Marquez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 69 F.4th 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[A] complaint that lacks plausible allegations, after removing le- gal conclusions, must be dismissed.”); see also Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory Sch., 85 F.4th 670, 676 (1st Cir. 2023) (holding that a K– 12 English teacher was not qualified under the Act because her physical absence rendered her unable to fulfill essential instruc- tional duties); Smithson v. Austin, 86 F.4th 815, 821 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding that a teacher was not qualified under the Act if she could only attend in-person learning for a quarter of the designated school day). Because Bodie-Jernigan did not plead sufficient facts show- ing that she could maintain discipline or effectively teach online— two essential functions of her job—we agree with the district court that she failed to state a discrimination claim under the Act. Retaliation Bodie-Jernigan next contends that she properly pleaded a re- taliation claim under the Act. Again, we disagree. The Act prohibits retaliation against individuals who oppose any act made unlawful by the Act or who make a charge under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 8 of 10

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(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998). Bodie-Jernigan clears the first element through her re- quest for a reasonable accommodation. See Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The first element may be met by a request for a reasonable accommodation.”). But her claim fails at the second required element: she did not plead an adverse employ- ment action. To plead an adverse employment action, “the complaint must allege facts showing the employer took an action that was ‘materially adverse,’ that is, one that caused injury or harm that would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in the pro- tected activity.” Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006)). Bodie-Jernigan alleges “she suffered an adverse employment action[] by being compelled, involuntarily, to take an extended unpaid leave of absence.” But her other allegations refute this claim. She pleaded that because “[t]he School Board Panel de- nied her request for a reasonable accommodation” she was re- quired “to return to the workplace.” Rather than doing so, she chose to take a “personal unpaid leave of absence” because she was concerned about the prevalence of COVID-19. In other words, Bodie-Jernigan pleaded that the School Board wanted her to return to work, but she was only willing to do so if it granted her accom- modation request. USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 9 of 10

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To the extent that Bodie-Jernigan contends the School Board’s denial of her accommodation request was itself an adverse employment action, that argument also falls flat. As the Third Cir- cuit recently explained, “the approval or denial of any accommo- dation request” is “an anticipated part of the process.” Smith v. City of Atl. City, 138 F.4th 759, 775 (3d Cir. 2025). Accordingly, anyone requesting an accommodation “does so knowing of the potential for denial. In other words, the potential for denial does not dis- suade employees from seeking an accommodation,” and “the real- ization of that known potential does not transform the denial into a dissuasive action.” Id. at 775–76. Put another way, the denial of an accommodation request is not an “injury” that “would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in the protected activity” of requesting an accommodation. Ounjian, 89 F.4th at 858. To hold otherwise would render the adverse employment action element of a retaliation claim superfluous. Smith, 138 F.4th at 776. Every “failure to accommodate claim would automatically end in an ad- verse employment action for the purposes of a retaliation claim.” Id.; see also Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 1997) (refusing to address plaintiff’s retaliation claims based on a failure to accommodate her disabilities); Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). In short, because Bodie-Jernigan failed to allege an adverse employment action, the district court did not err by dismissing her retaliation claim. Harper, 139 F.3d at 1388. USCA11 Case: 24-12593 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2025 Page: 10 of 10

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CONCLUSION Because Bodie-Jernigan failed to state either a discrimination or retaliation claim under the Act, we affirm the district court’s dis- missal of her second amended complaint. AFFIRMED.