In the United States Court of Federal Claims NOT FOR PUBLICATION No. 13-148C (Filed: March 8, 2013)
) BRIDGET ALLEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) )
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Bridget Allen (“Ms. Allen” or “the plaintiff”) filed her pro se complaint against
the United States (“the government” or “the defendant”) on February 27, 2013. 1 The
complaint alleges breach of contract, due process violations, and violations of several
federal civil rights statutes arising from the acts or omissions of the employees, officials,
and judges of the City of Alexandria General District Court (“Alexandria General
1 Ms. Allen applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on February 27, 2013. This application is GRANTED for the purpose of filing the complaint. Court”). 2 Compl. at 1-3. The plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction, a declaration
regarding the Alexandria General Court’s conduct, and damages for emotional and
mental distress. Compl. at 1; ¶ 37.
Before addressing the substance of Ms. Allen’s claims, the court must ascertain
whether it possesses the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear her complaint. See
Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the Federal Circuit
noted in Duncan v. United States, 446 F. App’x (Fed. Cir. 2011), “[t]he Court of Federal
Claims is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. . . . In other words, the Court of
Federal Claims only has the authority (i.e., jurisdiction) to hear certain types of cases.”
Id. at 304-05 (citing Massie v. United States, 226 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). If
the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the entire complaint must be
dismissed. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Although the court will
grant a pro se plaintiff leniency in construing her pleadings, Wilson v. United States, 404
F. App’x 499, 500 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the court cannot overlook the absence of a non-
frivolous claim within the court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 500; Henke v. United States, 60
F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
I. The plaintiff has not identified any contract with the United States entitling her to the payment of money damages
In her complaint, Ms. Allen alleges that the Alexandria General Court denied the
plaintiff’s multiple requests for “subpoenas and subpoenas [duces] tecum” in connection
2 The court is aware that Ms. Allen filed additional actions in the United States Court of Federal Claims on January 4, 2013 (Case No. 13-11C) and February 14, 2013 (Case. No. 13-120).
2 with her state-court lawsuit against the Chief Executive Officer of JP Morgan Chase.
Compl. at 1; ¶¶ 20-24, 27. Specifically, Ms. Allen alleges that she was misled by certain
staff in Clerk’s Office, Compl. ¶¶ 22-27, 33-35, and that the presiding judge erroneously
rejected Ms. Allen’s request for the subpoenas. Compl. ¶¶ 28-35. Although Ms. Allen
does not identify any federal officials or agencies directly involved in the alleged
misconduct, she asserts that, by virtue of the alleged distribution of federal funds to
Alexandria’s courts, the acts of its court employees, officials, and judges must be imputed
to the United States Department of Justice, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Compl. ¶¶ 3a, 5-11, 43. In this
connection, Ms. Allen asserts that this “contractual” relationship is sufficient to invoke
this court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). Compl. ¶¶ 3-8.
This court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction includes “any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a). However, the Tucker Act does not create a substantive right to money damages
against the federal government. Searles v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 801, 803 (2009)
(cases cited therein). Rather, the right to damages must come from some federal
provision, statute, contract, or regulation that gave rise to the claim. Id. In other words,
this court cannot hear Ms. Allen’s case unless she identifies a federal law or contract
entitling her to seek money from the federal government. See Hernandez v. United
States, 93 Fed. Cl. 193, 199 (2010) (dismissing complaint in absence of allegations
3 suggesting privity of contract between federal government and plaintiff). Where, as here,
the plaintiff alleges that a contractual relationship existed as a result of a local
government’s receipt of federal funds, the court does not have jurisdiction unless the
plaintiff alleges privity between the plaintiff and the federal government. See Katz v.
Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (even when local agency acts merely as
conduit for federal funds, federal grant and agency oversight insufficient to establish
contract with the federal government); G-Lam Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 764,
766 (1981) (no agency relationship is created between the United States and state or local
governments through the grant of federal funds to such entities).
Even taking as true the plaintiff’s allegation that the Alexandria General Court
receives federal funds, in view of the foregoing, neither the plaintiff’s complaint nor the
simultaneously filed memoranda of law make a non-frivolous allegation of any of the
elements necessary to establish the existence of a contract between the federal
government and the plaintiff. See Felts v. United States, No. 12-806C, 2012 WL
6005159, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 30, 2012) (dismissal appropriate where plaintiff failed to
allege existence of contract). Cf. Parker v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 159, 163 (2010)
(dismissal appropriate where plaintiff alleged State of Michigan took property, but failed
to allege some affirmative act by federal government). As such, the plaintiff has failed to
identify a basis for a breach of contract claim within the ambit of the Tucker Act, and the
court must dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for lack of jurisdiction.
4 II. This court lacks jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process or the Civil Rights Acts
The court also lacks jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claims premised on alleged
violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process as set forth in her
complaint. The Federal Circuit has made clear that that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not “obligate the government to pay money damages.” See
Lewis v. United States, 476 F. App’x 240, 244 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Therefore, the plaintiff’s
due process claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In addition, it is well-
established that the Court of Federal Claims does not possess jurisdiction over civil rights
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Evans v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
In the United States Court of Federal Claims NOT FOR PUBLICATION No. 13-148C (Filed: March 8, 2013)
) BRIDGET ALLEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) )
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Bridget Allen (“Ms. Allen” or “the plaintiff”) filed her pro se complaint against
the United States (“the government” or “the defendant”) on February 27, 2013. 1 The
complaint alleges breach of contract, due process violations, and violations of several
federal civil rights statutes arising from the acts or omissions of the employees, officials,
and judges of the City of Alexandria General District Court (“Alexandria General
1 Ms. Allen applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on February 27, 2013. This application is GRANTED for the purpose of filing the complaint. Court”). 2 Compl. at 1-3. The plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction, a declaration
regarding the Alexandria General Court’s conduct, and damages for emotional and
mental distress. Compl. at 1; ¶ 37.
Before addressing the substance of Ms. Allen’s claims, the court must ascertain
whether it possesses the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear her complaint. See
Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the Federal Circuit
noted in Duncan v. United States, 446 F. App’x (Fed. Cir. 2011), “[t]he Court of Federal
Claims is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. . . . In other words, the Court of
Federal Claims only has the authority (i.e., jurisdiction) to hear certain types of cases.”
Id. at 304-05 (citing Massie v. United States, 226 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). If
the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the entire complaint must be
dismissed. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Although the court will
grant a pro se plaintiff leniency in construing her pleadings, Wilson v. United States, 404
F. App’x 499, 500 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the court cannot overlook the absence of a non-
frivolous claim within the court’s jurisdiction. See id. at 500; Henke v. United States, 60
F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
I. The plaintiff has not identified any contract with the United States entitling her to the payment of money damages
In her complaint, Ms. Allen alleges that the Alexandria General Court denied the
plaintiff’s multiple requests for “subpoenas and subpoenas [duces] tecum” in connection
2 The court is aware that Ms. Allen filed additional actions in the United States Court of Federal Claims on January 4, 2013 (Case No. 13-11C) and February 14, 2013 (Case. No. 13-120).
2 with her state-court lawsuit against the Chief Executive Officer of JP Morgan Chase.
Compl. at 1; ¶¶ 20-24, 27. Specifically, Ms. Allen alleges that she was misled by certain
staff in Clerk’s Office, Compl. ¶¶ 22-27, 33-35, and that the presiding judge erroneously
rejected Ms. Allen’s request for the subpoenas. Compl. ¶¶ 28-35. Although Ms. Allen
does not identify any federal officials or agencies directly involved in the alleged
misconduct, she asserts that, by virtue of the alleged distribution of federal funds to
Alexandria’s courts, the acts of its court employees, officials, and judges must be imputed
to the United States Department of Justice, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Compl. ¶¶ 3a, 5-11, 43. In this
connection, Ms. Allen asserts that this “contractual” relationship is sufficient to invoke
this court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). Compl. ¶¶ 3-8.
This court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction includes “any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a). However, the Tucker Act does not create a substantive right to money damages
against the federal government. Searles v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 801, 803 (2009)
(cases cited therein). Rather, the right to damages must come from some federal
provision, statute, contract, or regulation that gave rise to the claim. Id. In other words,
this court cannot hear Ms. Allen’s case unless she identifies a federal law or contract
entitling her to seek money from the federal government. See Hernandez v. United
States, 93 Fed. Cl. 193, 199 (2010) (dismissing complaint in absence of allegations
3 suggesting privity of contract between federal government and plaintiff). Where, as here,
the plaintiff alleges that a contractual relationship existed as a result of a local
government’s receipt of federal funds, the court does not have jurisdiction unless the
plaintiff alleges privity between the plaintiff and the federal government. See Katz v.
Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (even when local agency acts merely as
conduit for federal funds, federal grant and agency oversight insufficient to establish
contract with the federal government); G-Lam Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 764,
766 (1981) (no agency relationship is created between the United States and state or local
governments through the grant of federal funds to such entities).
Even taking as true the plaintiff’s allegation that the Alexandria General Court
receives federal funds, in view of the foregoing, neither the plaintiff’s complaint nor the
simultaneously filed memoranda of law make a non-frivolous allegation of any of the
elements necessary to establish the existence of a contract between the federal
government and the plaintiff. See Felts v. United States, No. 12-806C, 2012 WL
6005159, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 30, 2012) (dismissal appropriate where plaintiff failed to
allege existence of contract). Cf. Parker v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 159, 163 (2010)
(dismissal appropriate where plaintiff alleged State of Michigan took property, but failed
to allege some affirmative act by federal government). As such, the plaintiff has failed to
identify a basis for a breach of contract claim within the ambit of the Tucker Act, and the
court must dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for lack of jurisdiction.
4 II. This court lacks jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process or the Civil Rights Acts
The court also lacks jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claims premised on alleged
violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process as set forth in her
complaint. The Federal Circuit has made clear that that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not “obligate the government to pay money damages.” See
Lewis v. United States, 476 F. App’x 240, 244 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Therefore, the plaintiff’s
due process claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In addition, it is well-
established that the Court of Federal Claims does not possess jurisdiction over civil rights
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Evans v. United States,
249 F. App’x 201, 203 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Exclusive jurisdiction over such claims . . . lies
in the United States district courts.” Id.; see also Jefferson v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl.
81, 89 (2012) (Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 not money mandating);
Braddy v. United States, 12-788C, 2012 WL 5935685, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 27, 2012)
(court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Clarke v. United States,
No. 10-283C, 2010 WL 2143675, at *2 (Fed. Cl. May 24, 2010) (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242
not money mandating) aff’d, No. 2010-5133, 2010 WL 4569961 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5,
2010); Todd v. Short, No. 2:12-CV-1887, 2012 WL 6698564, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21,
2012) (42 U.S.C. § 2000b does not grant an individual a private right of action).
Congress has vested the district courts with the exclusive right to hear these claims, and
5 The Court of Federal Claims is without authority to hear the plaintiff’s claims based on
these statutes. See Searles, 88 Fed. Cl. at 805. 3
III. Conclusion
For all of these reasons, the clerk shall enter judgment DISMISSING this case
under 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy B. Firestone NANCY B. FIRESTONE Judge
3 To the extent that the plaintiff’s complaint should be read as a request to review the judgment of the Alexandria General Court to deny Ms. Allen’s request for subpoenas, the request must be denied. See Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to review state court judgments).