Bridges v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Bridges v. State

604 So. 2d 943, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 10061, 1992 WL 235337

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedSeptember 25, 1992

DocketNo. 91-2592

StatusPublished

This text of 604 So. 2d 943 (Bridges v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bridges v. State, 604 So. 2d 943, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 10061, 1992 WL 235337 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was tried and convicted of two counts of delivery of cocaine¹ and two counts of possession of cocaine.² The trial court found that appellant was an habitual felony offender and sentenced him to two concurrent eight year terms of incarceration for the two counts of possession (counts 2' and 4) and two concurrent fifteen year terms of incarceration for the two counts of delivery (counts 1 and 3), to be served consecutive to the eight year terms. However, the fifteen year terms were suspended upon appellant successfully completing five years probation. We affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences for the two counts of possession, but reverse the sentences for the two counts of delivery (counts 1 and 3) and remand for resen-tencing.

The sentence of fifteen years suspended after completion of probation constitutes a “conditional suspended sentence” as in Bryant v. State, 591 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA1992) and is an unauthorized sentencing alternative. Even if construed as a straight term of probation, the penalty is improper because in State v. Kendrick, 596 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA1992), review pending, No. 79,953, this court held that the habitual felony offender statute mandates a sentence of a term of years and does not allow imposition of straight probation. Therefore, appellant’s sentences for counts 1 and 3 are reversed and remanded for imposition of legal sentences.

[944]*944AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH, W. SHARP and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was tried and convicted of two counts of delivery of cocaine¹ and two counts of possession of cocaine.² The trial court found that appellant was an habitual felony offender and sentenced him to two concurrent eight year terms of incarceration for the two counts of possession (counts 2' and 4) and two concurrent fifteen year terms of incarceration for the two counts of delivery (counts 1 and 3), to be served consecutive to the eight year terms. However, the fifteen year terms were suspended upon appellant successfully completing five years probation. We affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences for the two counts of possession, but reverse the sentences for the two counts of delivery (counts 1 and 3) and remand for resen-tencing.

The sentence of fifteen years suspended after completion of probation constitutes a “conditional suspended sentence” as in Bryant v. State, 591 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA1992) and is an unauthorized sentencing alternative. Even if construed as a straight term of probation, the penalty is improper because in State v. Kendrick, 596 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA1992), review pending, No. 79,953, this court held that the habitual felony offender statute mandates a sentence of a term of years and does not allow imposition of straight probation. Therefore, appellant’s sentences for counts 1 and 3 are reversed and remanded for imposition of legal sentences.

[944]*944AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH, W. SHARP and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

604 So. 2d 943, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 10061, 1992 WL 235337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bridges-v-state-fladistctapp-1992.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack