Bridges v. Shell Oil Co.
This text of 272 F. Supp. 242 (Bridges v. Shell Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
This action was filed under the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207.
Defendant contends that plaintiff’s employment was not within the general coverage of the Act as it related to overtime compensation.
It was stipulated that “the greater proportion of Shell Oil Company’s operations in Tennessee involves products shipped and delivered in interstate commerce, and complainant’s duties involved, in large part, the sale of products shipped and delivered in interstate commerce, so that the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219) apply to complainant and defendant and their actions, operations and services, make said act applicable to both, unless exempt under Sections 7 and 13. * * * ”
The Court finds from the stipulated facts that plaintiff was covered by the general provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The second issue (The stipulations provided that “The sole issue in this case is whether, under the provisions of said Act, complainant is excluded from coverage for overtime work.”) is whether plaintiff’s employment is exempt from the overtime provisions of Section 13 (b) (8) of the Act. (29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (8))1
It was stipulated that from September 1964 through February 1966, Ernest Walker Bridges was employed by defendant Shell Oil Company, a Delaware corporation doing business in Tennessee. Shell owns or leases gasoline service stations for their operation but the stations are usually leased or subleased to dealers. Plaintiff was employed by Shell Oil Company to maintain and operate gasoline service stations (The Court is advised that plaintiff operated four or five service stations during the period in question.) owned or leased by Shell in the Knoxville area while the stations were without a dealer or while a new dealer was being trained. None of the stations where plaintiff worked had a gross volume of business of as much as $250,-000.00 per year.
Plaintiff’s duties involved routine service station work such as the sale of gasoline and automobile accessories and the servicing of motor vehicles. He occasionally washed trucks and performed maintenance work on Shell’s motor vehicles, but all of such work was done on the [244]*244premises of the service station where plaintiff was assigned. Plaintiff was carried on the payroll of Shell.
It was further stipulated that plaintiff worked 692 hours in excess of the forty-hour work week but was not paid, overtime and that if he is entitled to recover, the amount would be $432.50.
Some employees of gasoline service stations were first brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by the “Enterprise” Amendment of 1961.2
It is noted that employees of a service station establishment whose gross annual sales are less than $250,000.00 are excluded. None of the stations for which plaintiff worked grossed more than $250,-000.00 per year.
The definition of “establishment” as contained in Section 779.23 of the Interpretative Bulletin of the U. S. Department of Labor means a “distinct physical place of business” rather than “an entire business or enterprise” which may include several places of business.
The term “enterprise” is defined in Sections 3(r) and 3 (s) of the Act. Interpretative Bulletin Section 779.21 states that the term enterprise “means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements.”
Plaintiff was employed by Shell Oil Company, an “enterprise,” and operated filling station “establishments” in the Knoxville area. If he had been employed by the service station establishments rather than Shell Oil Company, his work would have been exempt under Section 3 (s) (1) and (5) and the bulletin interpreting it.3
[245]*245We are constrained to believe that Section ’3(s) (5) and the Interpretative Bulletin quoted in Footnote 3 are applicable to gasoline service stations that are operated as a part of another business, such as grocery stores with gasoline pumps, and do not apply to the Shell Oil Company which operated service stations temporarily that were without a dealer for one reason or another. Mitchell v. Kroger Co., 8 Cir., 248 F.2d 935.
The Court, therefore, concludes that plaintiff’s work was covered by Section 207(a) (1) (2) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.4
An order will be presented awarding $432.50, plus $145.00 attorney’s fees.
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272 F. Supp. 242, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9311, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bridges-v-shell-oil-co-tned-1967.