Bridges v. Incorporated Town of Grand View

139 N.W. 917, 158 Iowa 402
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedFebruary 12, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 139 N.W. 917 (Bridges v. Incorporated Town of Grand View) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bridges v. Incorporated Town of Grand View, 139 N.W. 917, 158 Iowa 402 (iowa 1913).

Opinion

Deemer, J.

Plaintiffs claim to have occupied up to a certain line between their lots and the street for many years; that this is the true line originally run in marking out Springer’s addition upon the ground; that they have title by reason of adverse possession; and that, in any event, defendants are estopped from claiming that the line which they now insist upon as the true one is not the one originally established, because with the knowledge of the town and its officials they have laid sidewalks, built fences, improved their properties, and located their houses with reference to the line claimed by them to be the true one, and that, if the city is now permitted [404]*404to change it, it will result in great and irreparable injury. On the other hand, defendants insist that another line is the time one'; that whatever use plaintiffs made of the town’s property was permissive, and could not in ■ any event be adverse as against the town; and that there is no estoppel for the reason that plaintiffs knew, or should have known, that the line claimed by them was not the true one; that they made their improvements subject at all times to the demand of the city; that they should vacate that part of the property which was in the street, and that, in any event, plaintiffs did no more than erect temporary fences, put out sidewalks and make slight and temporary repairs upon their property.

l. Boundaries: street lines : change : burden of proof. I. The first question which arises in all cases of this character is, Where is the true line ? That is to say, where is the line which was run by the surveyor, and marked out uPon the ground? It is conceded by both parties that this line has been lost, and that there are now no known or visible monuments upon the ground. Plaintiffs, however, have' an advantage here because they show possession to a given line unopposed and uncontested for a long series of years, and this line, in so far as disclosed by the record, corresponds with other lines farther north, when projected in that direction. So that under the conceded facts the burden is upon the defendants of showing that the line now claimed by plaintiffs or rather the line established by the trial court is not the correct one, and this they must do by. a preponderance of competent testimony.

2. Same : adverse possession: estoppel. Passing that point, and. conceding, as we must, that plaintiffs could not gain title to any part of the street by adverse possession against the town, for the reason that under our holdings, the statute of limitations will not run against a town in any matter affecting its . . , ,, . governmental powers (see Quinn v. Baage, 138 Iowa, 426; McClenehan v. Town of Jesup, 144 Iowa, 352, we, nevertheless, have the issue of estoppel; for, while the [405]*405statute of limitations may not run against a town, it may, by the conduct of its citizens and of its officers, estop itself from claiming beyond a given line, although another may be, in fact, the true one according to the plat. This doctrine has been placed sometimes upon the theory that the town did not accept the grant tendered it by the owner of the platted property to any greater width than it assumed control over, and sometimes upon the ground that one may not stand by and see valuable improvements made upon his property, on a claim by the one who makes them that they are on his own property, without having his mouth closed from asserting that the improvements were upon his, the owner’s property, and that he will tear them down. Where the doctrine is based wholly on the theory of estoppel by reason of the making of valuable improvements, which will be destroyed or injured in ease they are torn down or removed, the element of time does not figure after the improvements are in fact completed upon property which is claimed as of right. Notwithstanding some dispute between counsel as to the proper rules for such cases, the foregoing are well established by authority. See Corey v. City of Ft. Dodge, 118 Iowa, 742; Mt. Vernon v. Young, 124 Iowa, 517; Johnson v. City, 153 Iowa, 493; Sutton v. Mentzer, 154 Iowa, 1; McElroy v. Hite, 154 Iowa, 453; Eldora v. Edgington, 130 Iowa, 151; Sioux City v. Railroad Co., 129 Iowa, 694; Brown v. City, 117 Iowa, 302; Biglow v. Ritter, 131 Iowa, 213; Quinn v. Baage, 138 Iowa, 426; Baker v. Railroad Co., 154 Iowa, 228; McClenehan v. Jesup, 144 Iowa, 352. While possession may not always amount ‘ ‘ to nine points in the law,” uninterrupted, undisputed, and unchallenged possession of a strip of ground abutting upon a street for a long period of years, followed by the making of improvements thereon, with reference to a given line, casts the burden upon a town or city of showing that the line thus claimed is not the true one. As said in Mt. Vernon v. Young, 124 Iowa, 517, “Where ground has been improved and ornamented with trees and shrubbery, and used as private property within the sight [406]*406and with the knowledge of the town and its officers, and without objection or remonstrance on their part, for the period of an average lifetime, before dispossessing the citizen of such property, the public right thereto must be established by clear’ and unequivocal testimony.” So that the burden is upon the town of showing in the first instance that the line which plaintiffs claim is the true one is not the one located upon the ground at the time the original plat of the addition was made.

3. Same : change of bountary evidence. The town of Grand View was platted in July of the year 1841. By this plat the lot's were sixty bjr one hundred and forty-two feet; and the alleys were sixteen and one-half feet wide. Market street was shown on £|ie piat to be sixty-six feet wide. This plat was on the S. W. % of section 22, in township 75, range 3 W., but the record does not show which part of the quarter section was covered by the plat. Springer’s addition to the town was platted June 7,1843, and a part of it overlapped the original town plat, but the record does not show in what section, township, or range the addition was to be found. It does show that the lots were sixty feet in width by one hundred and forty-two in depth, that the alleys were sixteen feet wide, and the streets from sixty-six to seventy-five feet in width; Market street being sixty-six feet. There is nothing whereby to locate the plat according to lines or comers, except a reference to the original plat of the town, and that contains no definite location. The original plat showed a variation of the streets from the true meridian line of seven degrees east. Plaintiff Hidelbaugh owns lots 1 and 2, and his co-plaintiff, Bridges, owns lots 3, 4, 5, and 6, in block 22, of Springer’s addition. These lots face east on what is designated as Market street; and Hidelbaugh’s dwelling is on lots 1 and 2 and Bridges’ on lot 5. Monroe street is north of the block and Vernon on the south. In the year 1907 the town had an engineer make a survey and plat of the town, and he or his assistant went to the county records, and took [407]*407what purported to be copies of all the plats therefrom.

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Bluebook (online)
139 N.W. 917, 158 Iowa 402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bridges-v-incorporated-town-of-grand-view-iowa-1913.