Bricker v. Bricker

44 Pa. D. & C.2d 417, 1967 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 45
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County
DecidedJuly 21, 1967
DocketEquity Docket no. 12
StatusPublished

This text of 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 417 (Bricker v. Bricker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bricker v. Bricker, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 417, 1967 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967).

Opinion

Brown, J.,

Before the court in this matter is a petition of the Conestoga National Bank of Lancaster, Trustee (bank trustee) of a trust for the use of Walton B. Bricker (Walton) and Marion M. Bricker (Marion) under the will of Katharine B. Bricker, to open a decree entered by the court on April 30, 1965, pursuant to a stipulation. The decree directs the bank trustee to pay $30 each week beginning forthwith from the income of trust funds in its hands to the domestic relations division of the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of the County of Lancaster, Pa., for the support of the three minor children of the said Walton, being the amount which he was ordered to pay by the said court of quarter sessions on April 4, 1962, and towards any arrearages on the said support order. The. petition states that this equity action originally was brought to prevent Walton from assigning his interest in the income of said trust because of the support order above referred to and requesting that same be seized or attached to pay the support order. It is further averred that a preliminary injunction was issued on December 20, 1963, enjoining such assignment, which injunction was continued until final hearing which was never held. Thereafter on April 15, 1965, the above stipulation was entered.

[419]*419'The petition to open the decree further avers that no notice was ever given to the bank trustee of the filing of the stipulation above referred to, and that at the time said order was entered by stipulation certain attachments had been previously served on the bank trustee with respect to the interests of Walton in the said trust. These attachments are as follows:

(a) Attachment to January term, 1962 (prothonotary’s docket indicates this is 1963) execution no. 21, January term, 1963, on judgment to no. 3337 of 1962, being Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Walton B. Bricker, defendant, The Conestoga National Bank of Lancaster, Pa., trustee, garnishee, which was an attachment to enforce an order of support in the amount of $930 and was served on the bank trustee on November 17, 1962;

(b) Attachment execution John F. Kelley’s Administratrix v. Walton Bricker, Patricia Gebhard and Robert J. Gebhard, defendants, and the Conestoga National Bank of Lancaster, Pa., garnishee, execution no. 17, May term, 1965, judgment no. 12, August term, 1962, which attachment was served April 14, 1965. The amount of this attachment appears from the record to be $2,500, with interest from September 18, 1964. On stipulation of counsel it was agreed that the above judgment entered by praecipe against the Conestoga National Bank of Lancaster as garnishee on November 26, 1965, be stricken, and, in lieu thereof, judgment be entered on the praecipe filed on June 22, 1967, nunc pro tunc as of November 26,1965.

(e) 'The aforesaid stipulated decree of April 30, 1965, wherein the court ordered and directed $30 a week to be paid for the support of Walton’s children;

(d) Attachment execution Adele R. Kelley, surviving spouse and administratrix of Estate of John F. Kelley v. Walton Bricker and the Conestoga National Bank of Lancaster, garnishee, execution no. 28, Janu[420]*420ary term, 1967, judgment no. 101, May term, 1966. The amount of this attachment appears from the notes of testimony to be $288.81 and was served on the bank trustee on December 5, 1966.

(e) There was also in force at this time an assignment by Walton of his interest in the trust estate of Katharine B. Bricker to the bank to secure a note of $4,000 which was dated and delivered to the bank oh July 6,1961.

The petition further avers that the officers of bank trustee were not advised of the absolute nature of the decree hereinabove referred to and believed that it was in the nature of an attachment which was subsequent in time and subordinate in effect to the assignment hereinabove mentioned and to the' prior attachments and that the bank applied Walton’s income in the trust to the payment of the note of $4,000 until the same was paid on May 17, 1966. There is also reference in the petition to a spendthrift trust created by Walton not here relevant.

The petition then avers that Walton has now made demand on the trustee that it apply the income of the trust to his support order so that he need not use his own funds to comply with the support order, and that under these circumstances the trustee feels it should not make payment to any person without a determination by the court of the priorities involved in this situation. The petition then finally avers that the entry of the decree of the court in this matter was made without the court’s having been properly informed of the prior attachments and the circumstances of the assignment to the bank, and prays the court to open said order and to determine the relative priorities among the said attachments and the order (decree) in this equity action, and to modify its order accordingly.

[421]*421As a result of this petition and responsive answers by the parties involved, the court took testimony to determine the propriety of opening the decree of April 30, 1965, and, if so decided, the subsequent determination of the relative priorities hereinabove referred to.

Before entering into a further disposition of this matter, the court holds that the petition for allowancé of counsel fees to be paid by the bank trustee from Walton’s interest in the income of the Katharine B. Bricker trust estate, filed at the time of the hearing by Marshall M. Cohen, Esq., attorney for Walton, ■will be dismissed because the court has no jurisdiction whatever to make an order of this kind. The jurisdiction over the trust fund and payments out of it is vested in the orphans’ court and the jurisdiction in equity in this case arises solely from the special statute allowing it to enforce support orders and, of course, to enforce payment of proper attachments in the absence of a spendthrift trust which was not created by testatrix.

At the hearing held in this matter as well as in the brief of counsel for Walton, contention is made that the interest of Walton under the will of Katharine B. Bricker cannot be reached by attaching creditors because the trust created for the benefit of Walton and Marion creates a tenancy by the entireties and that, therefore, Walton’s share cannot be attached by judgment creditors until the fund is actually in his hands by payment to him by the bank trustee and not while in the hands of bank trustee. This position might have some merit were it not for the express language of the will, offered in evidence as C. P. #4, which states as follows:

“. . . b. I direct my said Trustees to pay the balance of said Net Income monthly, in equal shares, (Emphasis supplied by the court) to my said adopted son and his said wife, should both of them survive me, and, [422]*422on the death of the first of them to die, should issue of theirs then be living to convey, transfer, pay over and deliver, and I give, devise and bequeath, one-half (%) of the Principal of the Trust Fund hereby created to their issue, per stirpes, who shall then be living; and thereafter, or after my death should but one (1) of them survive me, to pay the balance of said Net Income monthly to the survivor of them. . . .” Article Third, par. B. II. suibpar. (b) of said will probated on April 12, 1961, together with codicil dated May 12, 1960, in the Register of Wills Office in and for Lancaster County, Pa., in will book L, vol. 4, p. 107.

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Bluebook (online)
44 Pa. D. & C.2d 417, 1967 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 45, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bricker-v-bricker-pactcompllancas-1967.