Brick Township Pba Local 230 and Michael Spallina Vs.

140 A.3d 577, 446 N.J. Super. 61
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division·Decided June 21, 2016·No. A-1979-14T3·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1979-14T3

BRICK TOWNSHIP PBA LOCAL 230 APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

and MICHAEL SPALLINA, June 21, 2016

Plaintiffs-Appellants, APPELLATE DIVISION

v.

TOWNSHIP OF BRICK,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued May 16, 2016 – Decided June 21, 2016 Before Judges Lihotz, Fasciale and Higbee.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-

2815-13.

Stephen B. Hunter argued the cause for appellants (Detzky, Hunter & DeFillippo, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Hunter, of counsel and on the brief).

Louis N. Rainone argued the cause for respondent (DeCotiis, FitzPatrick & Cole, LLP, attorneys; Mr. Rainone and Victoria A.

Flynn, of counsel and on the brief).

Paul L. Kleinbaum argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Policemen's Benevolent Association (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman, attorneys; Mr.

Kleinbaum and Marissa A. McAleer, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by FASCIALE, J.A.D.

In this declaratory judgment action, Brick Township PBA Local 230 (PBA Local 230) and Michael Spallina (collectively plaintiffs) appeal from a November 13, 2014 order granting summary judgment to the Township of Brick (the Township). Spallina retired as a police officer on accidental disability. The order required Spallina to contribute to the cost of his health insurance provided as a benefit along with disability retirement payments. The judge concluded that Spallina's obligation was required by N.J.S.A. 40A:10-21.1, L. 2011, c. 78, § 42, effective June 28, 2011 (Chapter 78).

Plaintiffs argue Chapter 78 does not require Spallina to make contributions towards the cost of his health insurance premiums because his retirement was due solely to a disability. The Township contends Chapter 78 excludes from the obligation to contribute to the cost of health care benefits, only those employees completing twenty or more years of public service by the effective date of Chapter 78. We granted amicus status to the New Jersey State Policemen's Benevolent Association (State PBA), which urges we reverse the court's decision, emphasizing Chapter 78 does not require any public employee who retires with

disability retirement benefits to make contributions towards the cost of his or her health care insurance premiums.

We hold that Chapter 78 does not require ordinary or accidental disability retirees to make premium payments for health insurance benefits. Therefore, we reverse the order under review, remand, and direct the judge to address plaintiffs' contention, raised in the complaint, that Spallina is entitled to reimbursement for his prior health insurance premium contributions.

I.

PBA Local 230 is the recognized majority representative for all non-supervisory police officers employed by the Township. Spallina worked as a Township police officer from 1994 to 2012. The Township, a municipal corporation, is a public employer within the meaning of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -14.

PBA Local 230 and the Township were parties to a collective negotiations agreement (CNA) covering terms and conditions of police officers within the Township from January 2012 through December 2015. Article XI, Paragraph 9 of the CNA provides:

Any Officer who retires from the Township shall no longer have health insurance premium sharing responsibilities, except as in accordance with Chapter 2 and supplemented by Chapter 78 of Public Law 2011.

The Township is self-insured and its health insurance is administered by Horizon Blue Cross. The provision for health insurance coverage for employees and retirees, and the premium sharing requirements for employees and retirees, is governed by N.J.S.A. 40A:10-16 to -25.

In January 2011, Spallina sustained injuries in the line of duty. He applied for accidental disability retirement. The New Jersey Division of Pensions approved Spallina's application, effective October 1, 2012.

The Township advised Spallina he must continue making health insurance premium contributions to maintain his retiree health benefits coverage, based on Chapter 78. According to the Township, the obligations imposed by Chapter 78 extended to individuals who retired, whether because of years of service or disability.

Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51 to -62, seeking a declaration from the court that Chapter 78 and Article XI, Paragraph 9 of the CNA do not require Spallina to continue making health insurance premium contributions to the Township because he was receiving a disability retirement. Plaintiffs also sought reimbursement for past health contributions remitted. The parties filed

stipulated facts and agreed adjudication would be by summary judgment.

The judge conducted oral argument, entered the order under review, and rendered a written opinion. The judge found the text of Chapter 78 to be clear and unambiguous. He concluded Chapter 78 exempted only employees with twenty or more years of service from the imposed contribution requirement. Because Spallina had less than twenty years of service, the judge concluded he was not entitled to Chapter 78's exemption.

On appeal, plaintiffs and the State PBA argue that the premise of the judge's conclusion, that Chapter 78 applies to disabled retirees, is fundamentally flawed. They maintain government employees who receive disability retirement benefits are not subject to Chapter 78, no matter their years of service. Accordingly, plaintiffs and the State PBA contend Spallina is relieved from health insurance premium sharing responsibilities pursuant to Article XI, Paragraph 9 of the CNA.

II.

The primary issue on appeal is whether Chapter 78 applies to government employees who receive disability retirement benefits. This is a matter of statutory interpretation to which we accord no deference to the trial judge's interpretive conclusions. Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. InterArch, Inc., 417

N.J. Super. 329, 334 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 519 (2011); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (indicating that "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference" (citations omitted)).

Our paramount goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature's intent, and "generally[] the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citation omitted). When interpreting a statute, we give words "their ordinary meaning and significance." Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492). Only when the statutory language is ambiguous and yields more than one plausible interpretation do we turn to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93.

A.

The language in Chapter 78 plainly identifies which employees are subject to its requirements. Therefore, we need not turn to extrinsic sources to resolve the issue on appeal. State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011) (stating that "[w]hen the Legislature's chosen words lead to one clear and unambiguous

result, the interpretive process comes to a close, without the need to consider extrinsic aids" (citation omitted)).

N.J.S.A. 40A:10-21.1 states, in part:

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Brick Township Pba Local 230 and Michael Spallina Vs., 140 A.3d 577, 446 N.J. Super. 61 (N.J. Ct. App. 2016).

140 A.3d 577 (Brick Township Pba Local 230 and Michael Spallina Vs.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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