Briannee Lee Eaglin a/k/a Bri'Annee Eaglin v. Jeremy Kennard Burse

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: November 18, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-00808-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00808-COA

BRIANNEE LEE EAGLIN A/K/A BRI’ANNEE APPELLANT EAGLIN

v.

JEREMY KENNARD BURSE APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/14/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TAMETRICE EDRICKA HODGES COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN S. GRANT IV ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JEREMY KENNARD BURSE (PRO SE) NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 11/18/2025 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.

LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jeremy Burse and Briannee Eaglin share a child, Jamie Burse.1 In August 2023, Burse

filed an emergency petition for child custody, support, and visitation. In December, the Hinds

County Chancery Court issued an order granting Burse temporary custody of Jamie. In

January 2024, Eaglin’s attorney entered an appearance and responded to Burse’s petition.

¶2. In February, Eaglin filed through Mississippi Electronic Courts (MEC) a notice of

service showing that Burse had been sent interrogatories and requests for documentation via

his counsel’s email. Although the email address listed on MEC for Burse’s counsel was

1 An alias is used to protect the identity of the minor child. correct, Eaglin made a typo in the email address when sending the documents, so Burse’s

counsel did not receive them. A few days later, Eaglin filed on MEC another notice of

service of a first set of requests for admissions and again sent them via email to the wrong

address. Burse did not respond to these requests, so in April, Eaglin filed a motion to compel

through MEC. The motion to compel was not set for a hearing.2

¶3. Eaglin still had not received any responses from Burse. With twelve days left before

the scheduled trial, Eaglin filed a motion in limine, a second motion to compel, and a motion

for a continuance. Eaglin argued that she still had not received any responses from Burse and

that even if Burse were able to provide them before the hearing, “irreparable harm and

prejudice” would occur if the chancery court did not “exclude all testimony and evidence

requested in the discovery [Burse] has not answered.”

¶4. Two days before the hearing, Burse filed a motion for a continuance, which Eaglin

joined. The motion alleged that there had been “an unintentional misdirection of

communications” between counsel. The motion requested a continuance “to ensure that each

party has an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful and complete manner” to avoid “undue

prejudice to the claims of [both] part[ies]” and to aid the chancery court in determining the

best interest of the child.

¶5. At the hearing, Eaglin’s counsel explained that he had joined Burse’s motion to

continue because a typo in Burse’s counsel’s email address caused her to not receive the

previous requests for admissions and interrogatories. Eaglin’s counsel said that he had added

2 Eaglin’s counsel tried to have the motion set for a hearing, but the chancellor’s court administrator told him there were no available dates before an already-scheduled hearing.

2 an extra letter to the email address and that the emails had never “bounced back” to him.

After this explanation, the chancery court asked if counsel wanted to address the other

pending motions—the motion to compel and motion in limine—but Eaglin’s counsel said he

did not know if he could argue them in good faith since he had joined Burse’s motion for a

continuance.

¶6. The court responded, “All right. Motion for continuance is denied. We’re going to

move forward today.”

¶7. Burse’s counsel then explained that her motion to continue had been filed in good

faith because she believed Eaglin had tried to get the information and that they were not

trying to delay the court. Burse’s counsel noted that she had not had an opportunity to

respond to Eaglin’s requests, and she did not believe she could present Burse’s interests to

the best of her ability.

¶8. The court still denied the motion to continue.

¶9. At that point, Eaglin’s counsel argued for his motion in limine to be ruled upon,

arguing that even without the email typo, counsel should have received notice of the requests

on MEC. Burse’s counsel said she did receive MEC notifications, but she had been expecting

to receive Eaglin’s filings via email, so she had not checked MEC. Burse’s counsel explained

that she realized her mistake once she began preparing for trial and saw Eaglin’s most recent

motion—the motion in limine—on the docket on MEC. Burse’s counsel said she did not

believe that any of the motions to compel or continue were a “stall tactic.”

¶10. Following a brief recess, the court addressed Eaglin’s motion in limine. Burse’s

3 counsel explained that the first time she had seen Eaglin’s interrogatories and request for

documents was five days before the hearing, when she found the motion in limine filed on

MEC. Burse’s counsel explained that she called Eaglin’s counsel, and they agreed that a

continuance would be the best way to handle the problem, as neither believed the other had

been acting in bad faith.

¶11. However, the chancery court noted that notices of service and motions had been filed

on MEC, and Burse’s counsel should have checked the docket for them when they were filed.

The court also noted that Burse’s counsel had not tried to comply with the requests by

speaking to her client. The court declared that Burse’s counsel was unprepared for trial and

that despite Burse’s counsel not responding to discovery requests, Eaglin was prepared and

ready. Eaglin still requested that the motion in limine be granted.

¶12. The court ruled that it would still deny the motion to continue because the court did

not “make [its] decisions based on an attorney being unprepared.” The court also denied

Eaglin’s motion to compel and motion in limine and said the court would “give the parties

wide latitude to develop their cases.” The court directed the parties to object at any moment

they felt there was unfair surprise or prejudice.

¶13. When the first non-party witness was called, Eaglin objected that the witness had not

been disclosed and was a “complete surprise.” The court responded that the witness “is here

to testify. So you’ll have an opportunity to engage in a full cross of this witness. Furthermore,

let me remind you once more that the court did deny your motion to compel and your motion

in limine as I am giving both parties . . . a great deal of latitude throughout this trial today.”

4 ¶14. Eaglin objected to two of the next four witnesses for the same reason and objected to

the admission of one exhibit that had not been disclosed before trial. All objections were

overruled.

¶15. Following a hearing, the chancery court awarded physical custody to Burse, joint legal

custody, and visitation rights to Eaglin. The chancery court also ordered Eaglin to pay $425

each month in child support and to pay health insurance for Jamie. Burse and Eaglin were

to split school fees, extracurricular activity fees, and any unpaid medical bills. Burse was

allowed to claim Jamie as a dependent for tax purposes.

ANALYSIS

¶16. We first note that Burse did not file a brief. When an appellee fails to file a brief, we

have two options:

The first alternative is to take the appellee’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error and reverse. This should be done when the record is complicated or of large volume and the case has been thoroughly briefed by the appellant with apt and applicable citation of authority so that the brief makes out an apparent case of error. The second alternative is to disregard the appellee’s error and affirm. This alternative should be used when the record can be conveniently examined and such examination reveals a sound and unmistakable basis or ground upon which the judgment may be safely affirmed.

Walker v. Walker, 210 So. 3d 996, 998-99 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015); cf. In re C.T., 228 So.

3d 311, 315 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“When matters on appeal touch the welfare of a

minor child, then regardless of whether a party filed a brief, this Court will reach the merits

of the issues in [the] appeal, though we proceed unaided by a brief from the appellee.”).

“Here, the record is not complicated or voluminous. The error, however, is apparent.”

5 McGrew v. McGrew, 184 So. 3d 302, 306 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). After a review of the

record, we conclude that the chancery court erred by denying the joint motion for a

continuance and by allowing Burse to introduce evidence that should have been disclosed in

response to Eaglin’s discovery requests. Since no appellee’s brief was filed and the appellant

presented a case of apparent error, we reverse the chancery court’s decision. Id.

¶17. Looking at the record and statements made by counsel during the hearing, it is clear

that Eaglin made repeated and good faith efforts to secure Burse’s responses to her discovery

requests. Burse’s counsel filed the motion to continue because she recognized her role in

failing to respond to the discovery requests. Both attorneys explained that they were not able

to present their clients’ cases to the best of their abilities and that neither was seeking to delay

the hearing in bad faith. Instead of recognizing this, the court denied the motion to continue

without further explanation.

¶18. Eaglin then argued that if the court would not continue the matter, it should limit what

evidence and witnesses Burse could present. When addressing Eaglin’s motion in limine, the

court chastised Burse’s counsel for not seeing Eaglin’s filings earlier on MEC and for not

trying to comply with the requests before seeking a continuance. The court’s statements seem

to indicate unhappiness with Burse’s counsel’s unpreparedness. Yet the court denied the

motion in limine and announced the parties would have “wide latitude” to put on their cases.

During the hearing, the court overruled each of Eaglin’s objections to the evidence or witness

on the ground that they had not been disclosed.

¶19. By denying the continuance and denying Eaglin’s motion in limine, the chancery court

6 allowed Burse to present his case unimpeded.3 These rulings resulted in Burse being awarded

physical custody and Eaglin receiving visitation. While the polestar consideration in any

child custody case is the best interest of the child, it is impossible to know in this case if the

outcome would have been the same had Eaglin had a fair opportunity to prepare for Burse’s

evidence and witnesses. But see Gilcrease v. Gilcrease, 918 So. 2d 854, 859 (¶¶8-9) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2005) (affirming custody determination despite evidentiary errors because “[c]hild

custody is a judicial determination” and not “merely [an] evidentiary matter”). Much of the

chancellor’s application of the Albright4 factors in this case relied extensively on the

evidence presented by Burse’s witnesses, particularly on the topic of who had been Jamie’s

primary caretaker. Eaglin was completely unprepared and blindsided by the evidence given

by Burse’s witnesses. But for the chancellor’s evidentiary rulings, Eaglin may well have been

able to effectively combat the claims made by Burse’s witnesses. Put simply, based on this

underdeveloped record, we cannot determine whether giving Burse custody of Jamie is

actually in Jamie’s best interest.

¶20. Given these facts and the appellant’s brief, “with apt and applicable citation of

authority,” we find that the court’s denial of the motion to continue, coupled with the denial

of the motion in limine, was an abuse of discretion. Walker, 210 So. 3d at 998-99 (¶5). We

reverse the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion in the

3 Indeed, before ruling from the bench, the chancellor apologized to Burse’s counsel for saying she was not prepared because counsel had “proved throughout this trial that [she had] been more than prepared.” 4 Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).

7 Hinds County Chancery Court.

¶21. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.