Brianna Marie White v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 6, 2026
• Docket: 4:25-cv-02724
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BRIANNA MARIE WHITE, Case No. 25-cv-02724-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AND ENTERING 9 v. JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Re: Dkt. Nos. 18 and 20 11 Defendant. 12 Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, acting in his official 13 capacity, denied Plaintiff Brianna Marie White’s application for disability insurance benefits under 14 Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse that decision and grant her 15 benefits. Dkt. No. 18. The Court DENIES the motion and ENTERS JUDGMENT in favor of 16 Defendant. 17 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff, appearing pro se, is a 33-year-old woman who was found disabled beginning on 20 August 12, 2010. Dkt. No. 9, Administrative Record (“AR”) at 24. At that time, Plaintiff reported 21 experiencing “auditory hallucinations,” “paranoia, violent or argumentative behavior, disorganized 22 though process, and rapid, pressured speed.” AR 24, 28. On October 18, 2022, the agency 23 determined that Plaintiff was no longer disabled, and that determination was upheld on 24 reconsideration. AR 24. 25 Plaintiff appeared before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on January 29, 2024, Dkt. 26 No. 10, AR 550–60, and at a supplemental hearing on June 3, 2024. AR 51–70. The ALJ 27 provided Plaintiff three additional weeks after the hearing to submit any information not contained 1 Plaintiff’s request for benefits. AR 34. 2 The ALJ followed the eight-step sequential evaluation process mandated for determining 3 whether a disability has continued or ended. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994. At Step One, the ALJ must 4 determine whether the claimant has any medically determinable impairments that separately or 5 cumulatively “meet[] or equal[]” an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, Appendix 1. 6 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(i). To find a qualifying impairment, the ALJ must find that Plaintiff 7 had one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in either (1) understanding, remembering, or 8 applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining 9 pace; or (4) adapting or managing oneself, also referred to the as the “paragraph B” criteria. 20 10 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, Appendix 1. 11 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s current medically determinable impairments included 12 bipolar disorder, psychotic disorder, and anxiety disorder. AR 26.1 In determining Plaintiff’s 13 impairments, the ALJ discounted her allegations of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Id. 14 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements alone were insufficient to establish a medically 15 determinable impairment and that her allegations lacked supporting evidence. Id. (citing 20 16 C.F.R. § 416.921). For example, Plaintiff had denied a trauma history and a consultative examiner 17 observed that she did not have a learning disability. Id. 18 The ALJ also determined that none of Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled an 19 impairment found in Appendix 1. AR 26. Among the four categories of limitations, the ALJ was 20 required to find one severe limitation or two marked limitations. She found one mild limitation 21 and three moderate limitations. 22 First, the ALJ found Plaintiff has a mild limitation understanding, remembering, and 23 applying information. Plaintiff asserted that she had a learning disability, but the ALJ found that 24 treatment notes and her testimony indicated she had mostly normal memory and a “good fund of 25 information.” AR 26. Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff has a moderate limitation interacting with 26 others. Id. Plaintiff reported fluctuating moods, depression and social difficulty, expressing that 27 1 she “tr[ies] to stay away [from people],” AR 26–27, and said that dealing with others and taking 2 direction from authority figures was the most difficult part of work. AR 62. Examination notes 3 indicated Plaintiff could be agitated, but cooperative. Two medical sources found she had a 4 moderate limitation interacting with others, which the ALJ credited. AR 27. Third, the ALJ 5 found Plaintiff had a moderate limitation concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace category. 6 Id. Plaintiff reported difficulties concentrating but also reported that she could complete 7 household chores and tasks. Id. Two examining medical professionals found Plaintiff had a 8 moderate limitation in this area, which the ALJ adopted. Id. Fourth, the ALJ found Plaintiff had a 9 moderate limitation adapting or managing oneself. Plaintiff reported difficulty managing 10 irritability and varying moods, but exams showed that she was alert, had poor judgment but fair 11 insight, and had normal thought content. The examining medical sources found Plaintiff had a 12 moderate limitation in this area, and the ALJ adopted that finding. Id. 13 The ALJ also considered whether Plaintiff had “a minimal capacity to adapt to changes in 14 [her] environment or to demands that are not already part of the claimant’s daily life,” also 15 referred to the as the “paragraph C” criteria. AR 27; 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, Appendix 1, 16 12.00(G)(2)(c). The ALJ found that Plaintiff does not live in an environment designed to 17 minimize her symptomology and that the evidence did not show she suffers from marginal 18 adjustment. AR 27. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had medically determinable impairments, 19 but that those impairments did not meet or equal the impairments found in Appendix 1. 20 At Step Two, the ALJ must determine whether medical improvement has occurred. 20 21 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(i), (5)(ii). Medical improvement is any decrease in severity of 22 impairments that were present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision. Id. 23 § 416.994(b)(1)(i). If medical improvement has occurred, the analysis proceeds to the third step. 24 The ALJ found that by October 18, 2022, Plaintiff experienced medical improvement. AR 27–28. 25 She no longer had auditory hallucinations, psychotic symptoms, or the disorganized thought 26 process exhibited from 2010 to 2012. AR 28. The ALJ recognized a gap in Plaintiff’s recent 27 mental health treatment during the COVID-19 pandemic, but noted that she continued taking her 1 At Step Three, the ALJ must determine whether the medical improvement results in an 2 increase in the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(iii). 3 When there is such improvement, the ALJ proceeds to Step Five. Id. The ALJ found, for the 4 purposes of Step Three, that Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity (RFC) which allowed her 5 to perform simple tasks with occasional changes in work routine and occasionally interact with the 6 public and coworkers, given that she will be off task 5% of the workday. AR 28. This was an 7 increase in her RFC that related to her ability to work. Id. 8 At Step Five, the ALJ must determine whether all of the claimant’s current impairments in 9 combination are severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(v). If the impairments do not significantly 10 limit the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, then the impairments are not considered 11 severe. Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff continues to have severe impairments. AR 29. 12 At Step Six, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s ability to do substantial gainful activities, 13 considering whether the claimant can still do the work she performed in the past. 20 C.F.R. 14 § 416.994(b)(5)(vi). Plaintiff had not worked in the previous 15 years, so the ALJ proceeded to 15 Steps Seven and Eight. 16 The ALJ conducted Steps Seven and Eight together, AR 25, 34–35, and considered the 17 claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and RFC to determine whether the claimant 18 could adjust to work that exists in the economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(vii)–(viii). The ALJ 19 must make an RFC finding based on all the evidence, including the claimant’s subjective 20 statements and objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. The ALJ followed the two-step 21 process in which she first determined whether there was an underlying medically determinable 22 impairment, then evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s 23 symptoms to determine the limitations they posed to basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. 24 § 416.929(a). When statements are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ 25 makes a finding as to the consistency of the statements based on the evidence in the entire case. 26 Id. § 416.929(d). 27 For purposes of Steps Seven and Eight, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform simple 1 coworkers, given that she will be off task 5% of the workday. AR 29. In making this 2 determination, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s statements that could be reasonably accepted as 3 consistent with objective medical evidence and opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929, 4 416.920c. 5 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and 6 limiting effects of her symptoms were not consistent with the medical evidence. AR 29–30. 7 Plaintiff testified that she has PTSD, persistent insomnia, daily depression, and difficulty getting 8 out of bed and going places. AR 30 (citing AR 51, 60–61). She reported that she does not like 9 being in public and prefers to stay away from others, and lives in an apartment with a roommate.2 10 Id. Plaintiff testified that her typical day includes taking her dog for two walks, attempting to sell 11 old clothes online, listening to music or watching YouTube videos, and caring for her personal 12 needs like laundry and dishes. Id. Her mother performs her grocery shopping and Plaintiff helps 13 her mother with her candle business. AR 30 (citing AR 56–59). Plaintiff also reported difficulty 14 concentrating long enough to endure a full workday. Id. (citing AR 62–63). 15 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s treatment history did not fully support the limitations she 16 claimed. AR 30. Before April 2022, there was a substantial gap in treatment, but when she 17 returned, her mental status reflected a normal state and she denied depression, mania, anxiety, 18 hallucinations or paranoia. AR 30 (citing AR 473). Plaintiff was not seen again until August 19 2023, when she explained that she was experiencing anxiety and reported getting into arguments, 20 but denied hallucinations, paranoia, or side effects from Risperdal. AR 30 (citing AR 496). Her 21 mental status exam remained largely benign, and she was prescribed an anxiety medication. 22 AR 30 (citing AR 498). Two months later, she reported that she was “not going out much due to 23 anxiety,” but was helping her mother’s business at home and was not taking her new anxiety 24 medication. AR 30 (citing AR 493). The mental status exam findings were normal except for the 25 anxious mood. AR 30 (citing AR 494–95). In November, she was still not taking the new 26 medication, but reported that certain environments like the grocery store triggered her anxiety. 27 1 AR 31 (citing AR 516–17). She also reported depressive symptoms. Id. In January 2024, 2 Plaintiff reported stress and insomnia, which she said were linked to her menstrual cycle. AR 31 3 (citing AR 512–13). Her mood was stable and she had not picked up her anxiety medication. AR 4 31 (citing AR 512–14). In February 2024, she was seen for a physical where her mother 5 expressed concern about recent weight loss, but Plaintiff was alert and appeared well. AR 31 6 (citing AR 530). In April 2024, she was added to a referral list for psychotherapy by her regular 7 psychiatrist, Dr. Xiao, and reported taking Risperdal and remaining stable. AR 31 (citing AR 8 529). 9 From the medical record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s conservative treatment was 10 effective and led to no reported deterioration. AR 31. Plaintiff asked for anxiety medication, but 11 never picked it up, and her anxiety symptoms occurred “a couple of times a day” and her insomnia 12 symptoms occurred “monthly or every other month.” Id. Since October 2022, Plaintiff “has 13 remained stable” despite being seen by providers only four times. Id. The ALJ found that the 14 anxiety and depressive symptoms were “clearly not severe” and so could not be debilitating. Id. 15 The ALJ also considered examining experts’ opinions. Drs. Sara Bowerman and Sherri 16 Sedler conducted an evaluation of Plaintiff via video conferencing in July 2022. AR 32 (citing 17 AR 646). They reported that Plaintiff was a fair historian of her conditions and that she had 18 bipolar disorder. Id. Plaintiff reported that she had anxiety but none of those symptoms were 19 observed during the examination. AR 32 (citing AR 465). Her mental status examination 20 revealed a moderate impairment regarding concentration and calculations, mild to moderate 21 impairment for memory tasks and “poor” judgment. AR 32 (citing AR 467–68). They determined 22 she could carry out simple one or two step instructions, with only mild impairment, but that she 23 was mildly to moderately impaired in carrying out detailed or complex instructions. AR 468. Her 24 concentration was moderately impaired, and her ability to respond appropriately to others was 25 mildly to moderately impaired. AR 469. The ALJ afforded their opinion some weight, finding it 26 supported by the exam showing mostly normal findings with mild to moderate impairments in 27 memory and concentration. AR 32–33. The ALJ discounted their opinion about limitations 1 appropriately, finding them unsupported by the record, vague, and not sufficiently defined. AR 2 33. 3 Consultative examiner Dr. Chronister evaluated Plaintiff in April 2023. Dr. Chronister 4 reported that Plaintiff was unimpaired in her ability to perform simple, detailed, or complex tasks, 5 and unimpaired in accepting instructions from supervisors. AR 33 (citing AR 479–80). Dr. 6 Chronister found that Plaintiff was moderately impaired interacting with coworkers and the public, 7 maintaining regular attendance, and dealing with the usual stress of a workplace. AR 33 (citing 8 AR 480). The ALJ afforded Dr. Chronister’s opinion some weight. AR 33. The ALJ did not give 9 weight to Chronister’s opinion that Plaintiff would have a moderate limitation maintaining 10 attendance because she found it unsupported by exam findings, but found the opinion otherwise 11 generally consistent. Id. 12 State agency consultants Drs. Patterson and Haroun also provided opinions, which the ALJ 13 afforded some weight. AR 33–34 (citing 83–103, 482–85). They found Plaintiff had moderate 14 limitations in maintaining pace and regular attendance, and that she could perform simple tasks, 15 interact with supervisors, and adapt to changes in the workplace. Id. The ALJ found their 16 opinions consistent with the mental status exams and treatment notes. Id. 17 A vocational expert testified at Plaintiff’s hearing. She stated that an individual who can 18 perform simple tasks with occasional changes in routine and occasional interaction with the public 19 and coworkers while being off-task approximately 5% of the time could be employed as a cleaner, 20 machine packager, or sweeper. AR 65. If that same individual was off-task 10% of time or 21 missed two days or more of work a month, there was no competitive full-time work available in 22 the national economy. AR 65–66. 23 On September 10, 2024, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s disability claim. The ALJ found that 24 Plaintiff had sufficient RFC and the ability to make “a successful adjustment to work,” and 25 adopted the vocational expert’s finding that employment was available. AR 34–35. 26 Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council and submitted a letter from 27 Dr. Angie Xiao. AR 48. The letter indicated that Plaintiff’s condition had deteriorated, and that 1 Xiao also wrote that Plaintiff’s mother reported that police were called to her residence on 2 December 12, 2024 after Plaintiff threatened to burn down the house. Id. The Appeals Council 3 found that the letter “did not show a reasonable probability” that the ALJ’s decision was in error. 4 AR 2. 5 In support of Plaintiff’s appeal to this Court, Plaintiff’s mother submitted a new 6 declaration representing that she has witnessed her daughter’s psychotic episodes, during which 7 she is unable to sleep or eat for several days. Dkt. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 3–4. Her mother helped Plaintiff 8 secure employment at Williams Sonoma and saw her daughter struggle with balancing work and 9 her conditions. Id. ¶ 5. Her mother also reported that Plaintiff becomes aggressive and expresses 10 grandiose sentiments unconnected to reality. Id. ¶¶ 7–10.3 11 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 12 The Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 13 405(g) (“The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the 14 record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 15 Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”). The Court may disturb the 16 Commissioner's decision to deny benefits only if the decision is not supported by substantial 17 evidence or is based on legal error. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). The 18 threshold for “substantial evidence” is not high: “It means—and means only—such relevant 19 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. 20 3 For purposes of this appeal, the Court may only consider evidence considered by the ALJ and the 21 Appeals Council. See Brewes v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court may order the case remanded to permit additional 22 evidence to be considered by the Commissioner of Social Security. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[the Court] may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social 23 Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and 24 the Commissioner of Social Security shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact or the 25 Commissioner's decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision…”). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the evidence in 26 the declaration, which appears to summarize Plaintiff’s mother’s observations over a period of years, is new, or that there is good cause why this information could not have been submitted for 27 consideration in the administrative record. And even if the Court could consider the new 1 Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be more than a 2 mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 3 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 4 interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” 5 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 6 The Court must consider the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence 7 that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 8 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for making determinations of credibility 9 and for resolving evidentiary ambiguities, including conflicting medical testimony. Magallanes v. 10 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, the Court “may not reverse an ALJ's 11 decision on account of an error that is harmless. The burden of showing that an error is harmful 12 normally falls upon the party attacking the agency's determination.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 13 (quotation omitted). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 A. Evidence Before the ALJ 16 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not fully develop the medical record before denying her 17 disability benefits claim, which she argues is reversible error. Dkt. No. 18 at 5. The Court 18 disagrees. 19 A claimant bears the burden of proving disability by providing evidence of medical 20 impairments, and claimant bears the responsibility of ensuring that records are complete. 20 21 C.F.R. § 416.912(a). The regulations only require the ALJ to develop the claimant's complete 22 medical record for at least the 12 months preceding the month in which the claimant filed her 23 disability application, unless there is “reason to believe” the development of an earlier period is 24 necessary to determine the claimant's disability status. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b); Ludwig v. Astrue, 25 681 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.30 (9th Cir. 2012) (“An ALJ's duty … is triggered only when there is 26 ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the 27 evidence.”). 1 medical records that would have further supported my testimony and the [vocational expert’s] 2 conclusions.” Dkt. No. 18 at 5. Those records include progress notes, treatment updates from her 3 psychiatrist and therapist that describe her symptoms. Id. Defendant responds that it is not clear 4 which records are purportedly missing from the administrative record, pointing out that the record 5 contains notes from Plaintiff’s psychiatrist from May 2021–April 2024, AR 450–547, and notes 6 reflecting that Plaintiff was not seeing a therapist in April 2023. AR 478. 7 Plaintiff had the opportunity to review, object to, and supplement the administrative record 8 after her hearing. AR 68–69. Neither party identifies in its brief any supplementary materials 9 submitted after the hearing but before the ALJ’s decision, or any objection lodged during that 10 period.4 Accordingly, the ALJ had no reason to believe the record was incomplete and did not 11 commit reversible error in not further developing the record. Moreover, the administrative record 12 included Plaintiff’s health care provider’s records through April 2024 before her June 2024 13 hearing, and for a year preceding the October 2022 determination. AR 55. To the extent Plaintiff 14 appeals on this ground, that challenge fails. See Ludwig, 681 F.3d at 1055 n.30. 15 B. Consideration of Dr. Xiao’s Office Notes 16 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Xiao’s “medical opinion and treatment 17 notes.” Dkt. No. 18 at 6 (citing AR 473). Plaintiff contends that Dr. Xiao could not consider the 18 severity of her mental condition because Plaintiff was unable to maintain regular appointments 19 during the COVID-19 pandemic and feared involuntary hospitalization such that she was not 20 forthcoming with her care provider during the April 21, 2022 appointment. Dkt. No. 18 at 6–8. 21 “Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments 22 about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and 23

24 4 After the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff’s mother submitted a letter to the “SSA Appeals Dept.” on September 27, 2024. AR 190–92. The letter does not attach any additional evidence, but 25 expresses Plaintiff’s mother’s view that Plaintiff did not receive a fair hearing, and that the Social Security Administration’s “investigation was not thoroughly conducted.” Id. 191-92. The letter 26 asks SSA to continue Plaintiff’s benefits during the appeals process. Id. 191. Plaintiff’s mother then submitted a number of other letters. AR 321-330. Because the Appeals Council made these 27 documents part of the record, AR 6, the Court considers them and the other documents listed by 1 prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 2 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(1). It does not appear that Dr. Xiao provided any medical opinion in 3 support of Plaintiff’s disability claim other than the letter submitted to the Appeals Council, which 4 the Court considers later. Instead, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ could not rely on Dr. 5 Xiao’s treatment notes on the ground that Dr. Xiao did not have certain information. In that 6 context, the Court assesses whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision given 7 Plaintiff’s representation that she feared “disclosing the full extent of [her] symptoms to Dr. 8 Xiao.” Dkt. No. 18 at 7. 9 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s consideration of the treatment notes. Those notes 10 reflect Dr. Xiao’s observations from the visit, which are consistent with other visit notes from the 11 same period. They reflect a benign mental status exam, that continued Risperdal was effective, 12 and that Plaintiff “has been doing well” despite not being seen for more than a year. AR 473. 13 This was consistent with the examinations by Dr. Chronister, AR 478–79, Drs. Bowerman and 14 Sedler, AR 646, and Dr. Xiao’s other examinations, AR 493, 496–98, 512–13, 516–18. Even if 15 Plaintiff did not fully disclose her symptoms at the April 2022 office visit, as Plaintiff alleges, the 16 ALJ reasonably relied on the substantial evidence in the record which allowed her to assess 17 Plaintiff’s functional abilities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ did not commit reversible 18 error in this regard.5 19 C. Expert Opinion of Dr. Chronister 20 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in considering the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. 21 Chronister. She contends that the ALJ discounted Dr. Chronister’s report that Plaintiff appeared 22 agitated, with poor judgment, and only fair insight, which was consistent with the pattern of 23 Plaintiff minimizing her symptoms. Dkt. No. 18 at 8. Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ did not 24 5 Dr. Xiao submitted a letter after the ALJ’s decision, AR 48, which the Appeals Council found 25 did “not show a reasonable probability it would change the outcome of the [ALJ’s] decision.” AR 2. Plaintiff does not raise any specific issues related to this letter on appeal. Even if she had, 26 the Appeals Council’s findings were not unreasonable. Dr. Xiao’s letter does not say that it reflects any of her own medical conclusions or observations regarding Plaintiff’s condition. 27 Instead, the letter makes clear that it is passing on either Plaintiff’s own self-reporting (without 1 properly discount the experts’ opinions given her PTSD and avoidant behavior. Defendant 2 counters that Plaintiff cannot rebut the medical record with her subjective self-evaluations alone, 3 and that the ALJ’s conclusions were consistent with the objective record. Dkt. No. 20 at 5–8. The 4 Court finds the ALJ did not commit reversable error as to this issue. 5 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, an ALJ does not “defer or give any specific 6 evidentiary weight, including controlling weight to any medical opinions. . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 7 404.1520c(a)(1). The ALJ must assess each opinion using factors codified in the regulation. Id. 8 § 404.1520c(b)(2). The only factors the ALJ is required to consider are consistency and 9 supportability. Id. Consistency assesses whether a medical opinion or finding is congruent “with 10 the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,” while 11 supportability addresses whether the medical opinions are backed up by objective findings and 12 observations. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2). 13 The ALJ did not commit reversible error in affording “some weight” to Dr. Chronister’s 14 assessment. The ALJ found Dr. Chronister’s assessments of Plaintiff’s moderate limitations to be 15 “supported” by exam findings and largely consistent with others reports “finding at most moderate 16 impairments.” AR 33. But where the opinion was not supported by Dr. Chronister’s own 17 assessments of Plaintiff, the ALJ permissibly discounted it. Id. The ALJ also considered the 18 moderate impairment related to dealing with stress in Plaintiff’s RFC findings by limiting her to 19 simple work with occasional changes and limited interactions. Id. 20 While there could have been other reasonable approaches to evaluating Dr. Chronister’s 21 opinion, this Court must defer to the ALJ when “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 22 interpretation.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954. The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Chronister’s opinion was 23 not reversible error. Luther, 891 F.3d at 875. 24 D. Claimant’s Subjective Statements 25 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting her subjective statements about her 26 conditions. She testified at her hearing that she suffered from PTSD from spending time in mental 27 hospitals and being sexually harassed there. She explained that this condition has led her to “stay 1 extent of [her] symptoms to Dr. Xiao might result in psychiatric readmission” and that her 2 statements to experts were not reliable because of these conditions. Dkt. No. 18 at 7–8. 3 Defendant responds that impairments must be supported by “objective medical evidence from an 4 acceptable medical source,” Dkt. No. 20 at 6 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.921), and that the ALJ was 5 not required to credit every allegation of disabling conditions when not supported by objective 6 evidence. Dkt. No. 20 at 7–8 (citing Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022)). 7 In assessing a claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. 8 “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of 9 an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 10 symptoms alleged.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). “If the claimant 11 satisfies the first step of this analysis, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject 12 the claimant's testimony about the severity of [their] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 13 convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1014–15. The question is not whether this Court writing 14 on a blank slate necessarily would reach the same conclusion as the ALJ, but whether the ALJ’s 15 rationale is clear enough that it has “the power to convince.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. If the ALJ 16 fails to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant's subjective 17 symptom testimony, then the ALJ's determination is not supported by substantial evidence. 18 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1025, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Ultimately, the clear and convincing 19 standard requires an ALJ to show their work. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. “Contradiction with the 20 medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting claimant’s subjective testimony.” Brokaw v. 21 Bisignano, No. 24-6710, 2025 WL 3158801, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting Smartt, 53 22 F.4th at 499). 23 The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff alleged that she had post-traumatic stress disorder 24 (PTSD). AR 26. The ALJ observed that “claimant’s symptoms are their own description of their 25 impairments, and their statements [sic] are alone insufficient to establish a medically determinable 26 impairment.” Id. Plaintiff had previously denied a trauma history and generally presented a 27 normal mental status exam, so the ALJ found that PTSD was not a medically determinable 1 The ALJ did not err in making this finding. First, the ALJ was not required to accept 2 subjective self-assessments that were otherwise unsupported by objective medical evidence. 3 Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. Plaintiff’s first assertion of trauma or PTSD as a disabling condition 4 arose at the end of her administrative hearing. AR 66–67. The ALJ was allowed to weigh these 5 statements against the totality of the record, which she found did not support a determination that 6 PTSD was a disabling condition. AR 26; Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498. Where the ALJ finds such 7 subjective statements inconsistent with the medical record, the ALJ is not required to credit those 8 allegations. Id. at 499. 9 Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her PTSD symptoms is inconsistent with the record. At the 10 hearing, Plaintiff testified that her PTSD gave her anxiety around ambulances and caused her to 11 avoid involuntary hospitalizations. AR 66–67. But on appeal, Plaintiff does not point to any 12 office notes or professional observations that supported her alleged PTSD symptoms. Plaintiff’s 13 brief does not indicate that she has been diagnosed with PTSD, Dkt. No. 18 at 3, and Dr. Xiao’s 14 letter does not either, AR 48. Plaintiff only asserts she has symptoms consistent with PTSD. Dkt. 15 No. 18 at 9. Given the nature of Plaintiff’s late-raised symptom allegations and the absence of any 16 diagnosis from a medical professional in the administrative record, the ALJ did not err in 17 discounting claimant’s self-assessment. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. 18 The ALJ also did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s conditions have improved. The ALJ 19 observed that Plaintiff was found disabled in 2012 with psychotic symptoms, but that her 20 symptoms have improved with a medication regime. AR 26. Plaintiff’s assessment of her 21 limitations, irritability, and judgment issues was substantially more severe than found by any 22 examination in the record. Dkt. No. 18 at 3, 9; AR 48. The ALJ did not act unreasonably in 23 discounting Plaintiff’s self-assessment by relying on the observations in the record by 24 professionals, which were supported and consistent. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. 25 E. Jobs in the National Economy 26 Once an ALJ assesses a claimant’s residual functional capacity, it must determine whether 27 there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant could perform. ] routine,” with “occasional interaction with the public and coworkers” and “be off task 5% of the 2 || workday.” AR 35, 65. Based on those limitations, the vocational expert testified that several 3 occupations were available: a cleaner, commercial/institutional, DOT No. 381.687-014; a machine 4 packager, DOT No. 920.685-078; and a sweeper-cleaner, industrial, DOT No. 389.683-010. Jd. 5 Together those three jobs accounted for approximately 374,000 jobs nationwide. /d. The 6 || vocational expert testified that if Plaintiff were off task 10% of the time or missed two or more 7 || days a month, that there would be no jobs in the national economy that she could perform. AR 8 || 65-66. 9 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider that the vocational expert testified that 10 || Plaintiff would not be employable if she was off task 10% of the time or missed two days of work 11 per month due to her conditions. Dkt. No. 18 at 5. 12 The ALJ did not commit reversible error. The ALJ considered the vocational expert’s 13 || testimony and the opinions of Drs. Patterson and Chronister regarding Plaintiff's ability to 14 || maintain regular attendance and decided that Plaintiff could make the adjustment to employment. 3 15 || AR 33, 35. In adopting the vocational expert’s findings of jobs available in the national economy, a 16 || the ALJ necessarily (though implicitly) found that Plaintiff would miss no more than two days of 17 || work per month. AR 35. This explanation “provide[d] sufficient reasoning that allows [the Court] Z 18 to perform [its] own review,” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020), and the ALJ’s 19 || decision was supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. See Smartt, 53 F.4th 20 || at 494. 21 || IV. CONCLUSION 22 The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to reverse the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. No. 18. The 23 Court affirms the Commissioner's decision below. This order TERMINATES docket numbers 18 24 || and 20. The Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and close the case. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: 4/6/2026 Abed § bbl) HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 28 United States District Judge