Briand v. Morin, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: December 9, 2003
• Docket: CV-03-176-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Briand v . Morin, et a l . CV-03-176-M 12/09/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

John Briand, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 03-176-M Opinion N o . 2003 DNH Jennifer Morin and Dayna Strout of the Milan Police Department, Defendants

O R D E R

John Briand, a federal prisoner, brings this civil suit

seeking damages from two Milan, New Hampshire, police officers

for alleged civil rights violations arising from his arrest and

processing on August 3 , 2002. Defendants have moved for summary

judgment, but plaintiff has not responded.

This is the third civil suit brought by Briand in this court

concerning the same set of operative facts — his August 3 , 2002,

arrest and subsequent administrative processing. Defendant

Strout was named as a defendant in one of the two earlier cases,

N o . 03-052-JD, and Defendant Morin was a named defendant in the

other, N o . 02-540-JD. In those earlier suits, Briand also sought

damages for asserted injuries arising from his arrest and processing on August 3 , 2002, specifically the setting of what he

alleged to be excessive bail. Summary judgment was granted in

favor of these defendants in each earlier case. See Briand v .

Morin and Blanchette, Civil N o . 02-315-M, 2003 DNH 027 (D.N.H.

February 2 5 , 2003) and Briand v . Dayna Strout and Cecile Strout,

Civil N o . 03-052-JD, 2003 DNH 091 (D.N.H. May 2 9 , 2003).

Where, as here, both the prior suits and the current suit

were filed in federal court, federal law governs the preclusive

effect given the earlier litigation. See Massachusetts School of

Law at Andover, Inc. v . American Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 2 6 , 37 (1st

Cir. 1998); Faigin v . Kelly, 184 F.3d 6 7 , 78 (1st Cir. 1999).

The difficulty faced by plaintiff in this case is that his prior

suits against Strout and Morin related to the same nucleus of

operative facts — his arrest, detention, and administrative

processing on August 3-4, 2002. When there is an identity of

parties in a present and earlier suit, the earlier suit was

resolved by entry of final judgment in favor of the defendant,

and an identity exists between the causes of action asserted

earlier and those asserted in the present case, the doctrine of

res judicata, or claim preclusion, operates to bar not only

2 relitigation of issues previously raised, but also any issues

that could have been raised in the earlier action. Allen v .

McCurry, 449 U.S. 9 0 , 94 (1980).

As defendants correctly point out, present and past causes

of action are sufficiently related to trigger the preclusive

effect of res judicata: “if each related to a set of facts which

can be characterized as a single transaction or series of related

transactions.” Mass. School of Law, at 38 (quoting Apparel Art

Intern., Inc. v . Amertex Enterprises Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st

Cir. 1995)). “This boils down to whether the causes of action

arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.” Id. (citation

omitted). “In mounting this inquiry, we routinely ask ‘whether

the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation,

whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their

treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations.’” Id.

(quoting Aunyx Corp. v . Canon U.S.A., Inc., 978 F.2d 3 , 6 (1st

Cir. 1992)).

Here, Briand seeks to litigate alleged civil rights

violations different from those previously litigated, but arising

3 out of the same basic events — his arrest, detention and

processing on August 3-4, 2002. Briand was arrested for criminal

threatening with a firearm and assault. His car was at the scene

(on someone else’s property) and it was towed. Although Briand

wished the car to be towed to a friend’s residence, the friend

refused to take i t . Accordingly, it was towed to an impound lot

and subsequently released to the primary lienholder (who also

held legal title to the vehicle). Briand now seeks damages from

these individual police officers for what he perceives to be a

deprivation of his property without due process.

Following his arrest, when Briand was unable to make bail

set by a commissioner, he was taken to the Coos County House of

Correction to be detained pending a formal bail hearing. The

County House of Correction apparently would not accept Briand as

an inmate until a medical evaluation was performed. S o , Briand

was taken to a local hospital to be examined. He was later

billed by the hospital for that service. Briand, probably

correctly, asserts that the bill should be paid by the arresting

police department, or the county, or the state. But, because he

was billed, Briand asserts that he has been deprived by these

4 individual defendants of “his right to be free from all liability

associated with care and medical health treatments . . . while

being detained at defendants[’] request, when they failed to

compensate the Upper Connecticut Valley Hospital for services

rendered.” Complaint at 8 .

As the two claims advanced in this case arise from the same

set of operative facts as the earlier cases — Briand’s arrest,

detention, and processing — he could have and should have

asserted them when he filed the earlier suits against these same

defendants. He is now barred from doing so under the doctrine of

res judicata.

Parenthetically, Briand’s current claims do not describe

actionable deprivations of constitutional rights. Even assuming

these defendants personally released Briand’s seized vehicle to

the primary lienholder “without providing prior knowledge or

securing permission from the plaintiff,” as he says (Complaint at

2 ) , there would seem to be nothing inherently wrong with

following that course. (In New Hampshire the primary lienholder

generally retains the motor vehicle certificate of title for the

5 very purpose of facilitating repossession of the vehicle when

warranted.) Certainly, Briand does not adequately plead a claim

for the deprivation of property without due process.

With regard to the medical bill Briand contests, he himself

pleads that it was Deputy William Joyce, and not one of the named

defendants, who took him to the hospital for the pre-detention

medical evaluation. Complaint at 3 . It is difficult to discern

how either of the named defendants could be liable, under any

theory, to reimburse Briand for medical fees that have been

assessed for that evaluation (and he does not claim to have paid

those charges). In any event, while the town, county, or state

may well be liable to pay for the cost of Briand’s pre-detention

medical examination, that a bill for services was sent to Briand

hardly rises to the level of a deprivation of constitutional

rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Briand, at best, has a

civil claim for reimbursement if and when he pays the bill, and

he could probably straighten the matter out with a simple request

to the billing hospital that it resend the invoice to the Milan

Police Department.

6 Conclusion

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res

judicata, and, in any event, the complaint does not describe

claims actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’ unopposed

motion for summary judgment (document n o . 5 ) is hereby granted.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close

the case.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

December 9, 2003

cc: John Briand Steven E . Hengen, Esq.