BRIAN WASHINGTON * NO. 2025-CA-0047
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL STATE FARM FIRE AND * CASUALTY COMPANY, LYFT, FOURTH CIRCUIT AND DANIEL STEILBERG * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2022-11324, DIVISION “N-8” Honorable Ethel Simms Julien ****** Judge Rachael D. Johnson ****** (Court composed of Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Karen K. Herman, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)
Brian Washington 2673 Madrid Street New Orleans, LA 70122
PRO SE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Andrea L. Albert Stephen J. Eckholdt GALLOWAY JOHNSON TOMPKINS BURR & SMITH Three Sanctuary Boulevard Suite 301 Mandeville, LA 70471
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED JUNE 12, 2025 RDJ KKH Pro se Appellant, Brian Washington (also known as Secret Washington and NEK hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Washington”), appeals the district court’s October
23, 2024 judgment granting State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”)
and Lyft, Inc.’s (“Lyft”) (collectively, “Appellees”) motion for contempt and
dismissing Lyft with prejudice. Ms. Washington alleges that her claims were
improperly dismissed because of a fraudulent notarization, misrepresentation of
identity, and manipulated arbitration process. After reviewing the record, we affirm
the district court’s ruling.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about December 14, 2021, Ms. Washington and her aunt were
passengers in Daniel Steilberg’s (“Mr. Steilberg”) vehicle via a Lyft rideshare.
While en route to their destination, Mr. Steilberg suddenly ended the trip and
demanded that Ms. Washington and her aunt exit the vehicle. Ms. Washington
alleges that while waiting to retrieve her belongings from the trunk, she was struck
by the vehicle after Mr. Steilberg put the vehicle in drive. After her aunt
complained about Ms. Washington being struck by the vehicle, Mr. Steilberg
offered Ms. Washington and her aunt a ride back home. As Ms. Washington was
1 re-entering the vehicle, Mr. Steilberg drove off while the passenger door was open,
causing the open car door to slam into her leg and body, resulting in damages and
injuries. Ms. Washington filed suit on December 14, 2022 against State Farm, Lyft,
and Mr. Steilberg.
On September 23, 2023, Lyft filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings, which was granted by the district court on March 5, 2024 (“March 5,
2024 Order”). After the district court granted Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration
and stay proceedings, Ms. Washington sent several emails harassing opposing
counsel. These emails contained profane and offensive language, various sexual
allegations, and photos of what she believed to be opposing counsels’ addresses. In
the interim, Ms. Washington failed to initiate arbitration. State Farm then filed a
motion for temporary relief from stay to compel initiation of arbitration and for
contempt and sanctions against Ms. Washington for the emails sent to opposing
counsel. Included in this motion, State Farm requested that the district court limit
contact between Ms. Washington and opposing counsel. The hearing on this
motion was held on May 24, 2024, and the motion was granted in part and denied
in part on June 14, 2024 (“June 14, 2024 Order”). The district court ordered Ms.
Washington to complete all necessary paperwork and pay half of any required
deposit associated with the arbitration within 90 days from the signing of the
court’s judgment. She was also ordered to refrain from telephone communication
with the attorneys; and, she was limited to email communication about very
specific litigation related matters.1 Ms. Washington paid half the deposit for the
1 The order specifically limited Ms. Washington to emails that (1) notify of retention of new
counsel; (2) notify of the submission of Plaintiff’s claims against Lyft, Inc. to arbitration and/or scheduling of arbitration; and (3) respond to e-mails as necessary to comply with and/or pursuant to the Rules for Louisiana District Courts and/or the Local Rules of the District Court of the
2 arbitration but continued to send harassing messages to opposing counsel outside
of the parameters outlined in the district court order. Lyft also paid its half of the
deposit to the arbitration firm.
The meeting with the arbitrator was initially scheduled for September 16,
2024. On September 9, 2024, Ms. Washington withdrew her deposit for the
arbitration, claiming that she forfeited the deposit, that the arbitration contract was
falsified, and that she never signed a contract or agreed to terms regarding an
arbitration. As a result, the arbitration was cancelled. State Farm and Lyft filed a
motion for contempt and dismissal citing Ms. Washington’s failure to comply with
the district court’s March 5, 2024, and June 14, 2024 orders. The district court held
a hearing on the motion for contempt and Lyft’s dismissal on October 11, 2024 and
granted the motion on October 23, 2024.
On appeal, Ms. Washington raises the following assignments of error: (1)
the district court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice without considering
the fraudulent notarization and misrepresentation; (2) the district court failed to
recognize that the arbitration process was manipulated, rendering its enforcement
unjust; (3) the dismissal violated Ms. Washington’s due process rights by denying
her a fair opportunity to present evidence; and (4) the district court’s ruling
constitutes a manifest injustice requiring reversal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a ruling on a motion to dismiss is the abuse of
discretion and manifest error standard. Jones v. Cisneros, 20-0582, p. 3 (La. App. 4
Parish of Orleans, including, but not limited to, responding to State Farm’s circulated Judgment under Rule 9.5 of the Rules for Louisiana District Courts.
3 Cir. 4/7/21), 315 So. 3d 959, 962 (citing Liberty Bank and Tr. Co. v. Dapremont,
07-0518, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/16/08), 984 So.2d 152, 154).
DISCUSSION
The first two assignments of error raised by Ms. Washington are not related
to the October 11, 2024 judgment. Both assignments of error pertain to the district
court’s March 5, 2024 Order and the June 14, 2024 Order, which enforced Ms.
Washington’s compliance of the arbitration process. A decision granting a motion
to compel arbitration is considered an interlocutory judgment and cannot be
considered for appeal unless it would result in irreparable harm. See Collins v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 99-1423, pp. 5-6 (La. 1/19/00), 752 So. 2d 825, 829;
La. C.C.P. art 2083. “Generally, requiring a party to go to trial does not constitute
irreparable injury turning an otherwise interlocutory order into an appealable one.”
Collins, 99-1423, p. 7, 752 So. 2d at 830. Because arbitration is a substitute for
trial, a ruling granting a motion to compel arbitration does not constitute
irreparable harm. Id. at 8, 752 So. 2d at 830.
Ms. Washington could have raised these two assignments of error by filing a
supervisory writ application with this Court, within 30 days of the notice of signing
of judgment pursuant to Rules 4-2 and 4-3 Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.
However, the record does not reflect that Ms. Washington filed a supervisory writ.
This Court does have discretion to convert an appeal of an interlocutory judgment
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BRIAN WASHINGTON * NO. 2025-CA-0047
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL STATE FARM FIRE AND * CASUALTY COMPANY, LYFT, FOURTH CIRCUIT AND DANIEL STEILBERG * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2022-11324, DIVISION “N-8” Honorable Ethel Simms Julien ****** Judge Rachael D. Johnson ****** (Court composed of Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Karen K. Herman, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)
Brian Washington 2673 Madrid Street New Orleans, LA 70122
PRO SE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Andrea L. Albert Stephen J. Eckholdt GALLOWAY JOHNSON TOMPKINS BURR & SMITH Three Sanctuary Boulevard Suite 301 Mandeville, LA 70471
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED JUNE 12, 2025 RDJ KKH Pro se Appellant, Brian Washington (also known as Secret Washington and NEK hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Washington”), appeals the district court’s October
23, 2024 judgment granting State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”)
and Lyft, Inc.’s (“Lyft”) (collectively, “Appellees”) motion for contempt and
dismissing Lyft with prejudice. Ms. Washington alleges that her claims were
improperly dismissed because of a fraudulent notarization, misrepresentation of
identity, and manipulated arbitration process. After reviewing the record, we affirm
the district court’s ruling.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about December 14, 2021, Ms. Washington and her aunt were
passengers in Daniel Steilberg’s (“Mr. Steilberg”) vehicle via a Lyft rideshare.
While en route to their destination, Mr. Steilberg suddenly ended the trip and
demanded that Ms. Washington and her aunt exit the vehicle. Ms. Washington
alleges that while waiting to retrieve her belongings from the trunk, she was struck
by the vehicle after Mr. Steilberg put the vehicle in drive. After her aunt
complained about Ms. Washington being struck by the vehicle, Mr. Steilberg
offered Ms. Washington and her aunt a ride back home. As Ms. Washington was
1 re-entering the vehicle, Mr. Steilberg drove off while the passenger door was open,
causing the open car door to slam into her leg and body, resulting in damages and
injuries. Ms. Washington filed suit on December 14, 2022 against State Farm, Lyft,
and Mr. Steilberg.
On September 23, 2023, Lyft filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings, which was granted by the district court on March 5, 2024 (“March 5,
2024 Order”). After the district court granted Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration
and stay proceedings, Ms. Washington sent several emails harassing opposing
counsel. These emails contained profane and offensive language, various sexual
allegations, and photos of what she believed to be opposing counsels’ addresses. In
the interim, Ms. Washington failed to initiate arbitration. State Farm then filed a
motion for temporary relief from stay to compel initiation of arbitration and for
contempt and sanctions against Ms. Washington for the emails sent to opposing
counsel. Included in this motion, State Farm requested that the district court limit
contact between Ms. Washington and opposing counsel. The hearing on this
motion was held on May 24, 2024, and the motion was granted in part and denied
in part on June 14, 2024 (“June 14, 2024 Order”). The district court ordered Ms.
Washington to complete all necessary paperwork and pay half of any required
deposit associated with the arbitration within 90 days from the signing of the
court’s judgment. She was also ordered to refrain from telephone communication
with the attorneys; and, she was limited to email communication about very
specific litigation related matters.1 Ms. Washington paid half the deposit for the
1 The order specifically limited Ms. Washington to emails that (1) notify of retention of new
counsel; (2) notify of the submission of Plaintiff’s claims against Lyft, Inc. to arbitration and/or scheduling of arbitration; and (3) respond to e-mails as necessary to comply with and/or pursuant to the Rules for Louisiana District Courts and/or the Local Rules of the District Court of the
2 arbitration but continued to send harassing messages to opposing counsel outside
of the parameters outlined in the district court order. Lyft also paid its half of the
deposit to the arbitration firm.
The meeting with the arbitrator was initially scheduled for September 16,
2024. On September 9, 2024, Ms. Washington withdrew her deposit for the
arbitration, claiming that she forfeited the deposit, that the arbitration contract was
falsified, and that she never signed a contract or agreed to terms regarding an
arbitration. As a result, the arbitration was cancelled. State Farm and Lyft filed a
motion for contempt and dismissal citing Ms. Washington’s failure to comply with
the district court’s March 5, 2024, and June 14, 2024 orders. The district court held
a hearing on the motion for contempt and Lyft’s dismissal on October 11, 2024 and
granted the motion on October 23, 2024.
On appeal, Ms. Washington raises the following assignments of error: (1)
the district court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice without considering
the fraudulent notarization and misrepresentation; (2) the district court failed to
recognize that the arbitration process was manipulated, rendering its enforcement
unjust; (3) the dismissal violated Ms. Washington’s due process rights by denying
her a fair opportunity to present evidence; and (4) the district court’s ruling
constitutes a manifest injustice requiring reversal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a ruling on a motion to dismiss is the abuse of
discretion and manifest error standard. Jones v. Cisneros, 20-0582, p. 3 (La. App. 4
Parish of Orleans, including, but not limited to, responding to State Farm’s circulated Judgment under Rule 9.5 of the Rules for Louisiana District Courts.
3 Cir. 4/7/21), 315 So. 3d 959, 962 (citing Liberty Bank and Tr. Co. v. Dapremont,
07-0518, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/16/08), 984 So.2d 152, 154).
DISCUSSION
The first two assignments of error raised by Ms. Washington are not related
to the October 11, 2024 judgment. Both assignments of error pertain to the district
court’s March 5, 2024 Order and the June 14, 2024 Order, which enforced Ms.
Washington’s compliance of the arbitration process. A decision granting a motion
to compel arbitration is considered an interlocutory judgment and cannot be
considered for appeal unless it would result in irreparable harm. See Collins v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 99-1423, pp. 5-6 (La. 1/19/00), 752 So. 2d 825, 829;
La. C.C.P. art 2083. “Generally, requiring a party to go to trial does not constitute
irreparable injury turning an otherwise interlocutory order into an appealable one.”
Collins, 99-1423, p. 7, 752 So. 2d at 830. Because arbitration is a substitute for
trial, a ruling granting a motion to compel arbitration does not constitute
irreparable harm. Id. at 8, 752 So. 2d at 830.
Ms. Washington could have raised these two assignments of error by filing a
supervisory writ application with this Court, within 30 days of the notice of signing
of judgment pursuant to Rules 4-2 and 4-3 Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.
However, the record does not reflect that Ms. Washington filed a supervisory writ.
This Court does have discretion to convert an appeal of an interlocutory judgment
to a supervisory writ if it is filed within the thirty-day period allowed for filing of
applications for supervisory review. Glazer v. Glazer, 23-0502, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4
Cir. 4/3/24), 390 So. 3d 765, 768 (citing Lirette v. Adams, 22-0552, p. 15 (La. App.
4 Cir. 1/31/23) 382 So.3d 122, 132). Ms. Washington failed to file within the
4 thirty-day period for filing a supervisory writ, as such this Court cannot exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction. As a result, these issues are not properly before this Court.
Due Process
Ms. Washington argues that she was not given a fair opportunity to present
her case and that the district court dismissed her claims before she could present
key evidence. As a result of this premature dismissal, she was deprived of
procedural fairness, and the district court’s judgment should be reversed. After
review of the record, we find this argument is without merit.
Ms. Washington did not present any evidence to support her claim that her
due process rights were violated. In her brief, she references Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) in support of her position that a
litigant should have a fair opportunity to present their case. However, Matthews is
not applicable to the case sub judice. In Matthews, the Supreme Court reviewed
“whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the
termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded
an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 323, 96 S.Ct. at 897. The
Supreme Court ruled “that an evidentiary hearing [was] not required prior to the
termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures
fully comport with due process.” Id. at 349, 96 S.Ct. at 910. Ms. Washington’s
argument that her due process rights were violated in this case is not analogous to
the denial of social security disability benefit payments in Matthews. Ms.
Washington has provided no other support for her due process violation claim. Ms.
Washington was afforded an opportunity to be heard at the compel hearing, the
first sanction hearing, and the final contempt hearing prior to this appeal. As such,
we find that this assignment of error it without merit.
5 Manifest Injustice
Lastly, Ms. Washington argues that because of the alleged fraud and
retaliation involved in her case, the district court’s dismissal constitutes manifest
injustice. Ms. Washington’s sole argument that the dismissal constituted manifest
injustice is that the Appellees committed fraud and retaliation throughout the
arbitration process. Ms. Washington cites Burke v. Baton Rouge Metro. Airport,
940 So. 2d 120, 124 (La. 2006) in support of her arguments. However, this case
does not exist.2 Further, the arbitration never took place because Ms. Washington
withdrew her deposit and cancelled the arbitration before it began. With no
supporting evidence and no arguments or case law to show that there was manifest
injustice in the district court’s judgement, we find Ms. Washington’s argument
without merit.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s October 23, 2024
judgment granting Appellees motion for contempt and dismissing Lyft in its
entirety.
AFFIRMED
2 It should be noted that a case exists with the same name as the one referenced by Ms.
Washington, however it has a different citation and does not relate to the legal issue in the case sub judice. In Burke v. Baton Rouge Metro Airport, 97-0947 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 712 So. 2d 1028, the issue was whether the appointing authority’s decision to suspend an Officer for five days without pay for leaving the Baton Rouge Metro Airport premises during his shift was not arbitrary and capricious. This clearly has no relation to the case sub judice as it does not determine whether a district court’s decision should be reversed due to manifest injustice.