Brian Taylor v. C. Carter

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 1, 2024
• Docket: 23-2772
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

DLD-137 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2772 ___________

BRIAN L. TAYLOR, Appellant

v.

C. CARTER, Deputy of Unemployment Insurance – Appeal Tribunal; DAWN GARDENSHIRE, Claims Examiner – Appeal Tribunal; NANCY HUNT, Board of Review Member; JOSEPH SIEBER, Board of Review Member; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT; AM RETAIL GROUP, INC. ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.N.J. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-18578) District Judge: Honorable Jessica S. Allen ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 June 13, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 1, 2024) _________

OPINION * _________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Appellant Brian Taylor, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from an

order of the District Court denying his motion to file a reply brief relating to a motion for

reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District

Court’s order.

After he was terminated from his job for threatening a co-worker, Taylor

unsuccessfully sought unemployment benefits through the New Jersey Department of

Labor (“NJDOL”). Taylor then filed a civil action in federal court raising various claims

relating to that denial of benefits, including but not limited to claims of discrimination

and negligence. The Defendants moved to dismiss the action on various grounds,

including lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The District

Court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the

Defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

Taylor filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Defendants opposed. The

District Court denied the motion. In so doing, it noted that it would not consider a reply

brief submitted by Taylor as he had not first obtained the District Court’s permission to

file a reply as required by Local Rule 7.1. D.Ct. ECF No. 65 at 1 n.1. The District Court

further noted that it nonetheless was “not persuaded that [Taylor]’s reply would have any

bearing on the outcome” of the motion for reconsideration. Id. Taylor thereafter

2 submitted a motion “seeking permission … to submit a response brief” in further support

of the already-denied motion for reconsideration. D.Ct. ECF No. 68 at 3. The District

Court denied the motion. See D.Ct. ECF No. 77. Taylor appeals that denial. 1

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr.,

Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“Most post judgment orders are final

decisions within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as long as the district court has

completely disposed of the matter.” (cleaned up)). We review for abuse of discretion “a

district court’s application and interpretation of its own local rules.” Weitzner v. Sanofi

Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018). We may summarily affirm a District

Court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v.

Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

An abuse of discretion can result from “an errant conclusion of law, an improper

application of law to fact, or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” McDowell v. Phila.

Hous. Auth. (PHA), 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005). We discern no abuse of discretion

in the District Court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to file a reply brief, particularly where

the motion was not filed until after the motion for reconsideration had already been

denied. As noted by the District Court, it previously observed that nothing in the

1 To the extent Taylor’s filings can be construed as seeking to appeal any other orders of the District Court, his notice of appeal is timely only as to the order denying his request to file a reply brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).

3 proposed reply “would have any bearing on the outcome” of the original motion for

reconsideration. D.Ct. ECF No. 77 at 2. In addition, the exhibits which Taylor sought to

have considered did not constitute new, previously unavailable evidence that could have

properly formed a basis for reconsideration. See id. at 2 n.2.

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the decision of the District Court.