This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1093
Brian Scott Poquette, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed May 16, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-10-2339
Charles F. Clippert, Clippert Law Firm, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Lee W. Barry, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and T. Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from the denial of a postconviction petition, appellant argues that he
is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was involuntary. We affirm. FACTS
In 2010, the state charged appellant Brian Poquette with two counts of second-
degree murder for an incident that occurred in 1992 involving two separate victims.
Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the state. The agreement called for
appellant to plead guilty to second-degree unintentional murder (count one) and first-
degree assault (count two). In exchange for his guilty plea, appellant would receive 336
months in prison. At appellant’s plea hearing, the district court stated, “And just so I’m
clear, the focus of the plea negotiation is the sentence of 336 months and we’re uncertain
at this point how we’re going to get there, but if it requires consecutive sentencing, the
parties are prepared to do that.” Appellant’s attorney and the prosecutor confirmed that
this was the agreement. The plea agreement also allowed appellant to receive credit for
his time served in custody out of state since 1992. The district court sentenced appellant
to 195 months in prison for count one and 141 months for count two, to be served
consecutively. The district court gave appellant credit for 1,909 days served, which is
approximately 65 months, of which 1,597 days, or approximately 54 months, were served
outside of Minnesota. This resulted in 159 months of actual time to be served, assuming
no violations. The parties were in agreement on these terms.
Nearly two years later, appellant moved to correct his sentence under Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9. He argued that his 141-month sentence
for count two was not authorized by law because the sentencing guidelines require a
permissive consecutive sentence to be calculated using a criminal-history score of zero,
but the district court used a criminal-history score of five. He contended that his sentence
2 for count two should have been 81 months instead of 141 months. The state agreed, but
argued that appellant should not have received credit for time served in other states and
should have received credit only for the 312 days he served in Hennepin County.
The district court granted appellant’s motion to correct his sentence and reduced
his sentence for count two from 141 months to 81 months. The district court also granted
the state’s motion to reduce appellant’s credit for time served from 1,909 days to 312
days. The district court noted that granting both motions would result in appellant
serving more prison time than his plea agreement originally required. The court
determined that it would be unjust for appellant to serve more time than he originally
agreed to in the plea agreement. It therefore reduced his sentence for count one by 21
months to 174 months, resulting in appellant serving the same amount of time in prison
as he would have served under the original plea agreement of 159 months.
Appellant appealed the district court’s decision. He argued that he must be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and that the district court improperly increased his
sentence. This court refused to consider his request to withdraw his guilty plea because
he did not raise the issue before the district court and affirmed the district court’s decision
to correct his sentence. Poquette v. State, No. A13-0953, 2014 WL 1344296 (Minn. App.
Apr. 7, 2014).
Appellant then petitioned for postconviction relief. He maintained that he was
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the state improperly induced him to plead
guilty by promising him credit for time served in other states, which he did not receive.
The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition without a hearing. The
3 postconviction court concluded that appellant’s claim was procedurally barred by the rule
in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), because he did not
raise the issue in his motion to correct his sentence. Alternatively, the district court
concluded that he was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding, without
a hearing, that his petition for postconviction relief was Knaffla-barred and that he is not
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was involuntary. We disagree.
We review the denial of a postconviction petition, including a request for an
evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167
(Minn. 2012). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on
an erroneous application of the law or when its decision goes against logic and facts in
the record. Id. A court may deny a postconviction petition without a hearing if the
petition and record conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014). But a court must allow a defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea after sentencing if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs if the plea is not accurate, voluntary,
and intelligent. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Appellant only
argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary.
To determine whether a plea is voluntary, we examine the parties’ reasonable
understanding of the plea agreement’s terms. Id. at 96. A plea is voluntary when a
4 defendant pleads guilty without improper pressure or coercion. Id. The state cannot
induce a defendant to plead guilty by offering an unfulfilled or unfulfillable promise.
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000). We consider all relevant
circumstances when determining whether a plea is voluntary. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
As part of his plea agreement, appellant was to receive credit for 1,597 days that
he served in custody out of state. The parties agreed at sentencing that “the focus of the
plea negotiation is the sentence of 336 months” and that it was immaterial how the
district court ultimately arrived at that number as long as the total sentence was 336
months. And, as further agreed to by the parties, this would result in appellant having
159 months of actual time served. After the district court corrected the sentence by
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1093
Brian Scott Poquette, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed May 16, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-10-2339
Charles F. Clippert, Clippert Law Firm, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Lee W. Barry, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and T. Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from the denial of a postconviction petition, appellant argues that he
is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was involuntary. We affirm. FACTS
In 2010, the state charged appellant Brian Poquette with two counts of second-
degree murder for an incident that occurred in 1992 involving two separate victims.
Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the state. The agreement called for
appellant to plead guilty to second-degree unintentional murder (count one) and first-
degree assault (count two). In exchange for his guilty plea, appellant would receive 336
months in prison. At appellant’s plea hearing, the district court stated, “And just so I’m
clear, the focus of the plea negotiation is the sentence of 336 months and we’re uncertain
at this point how we’re going to get there, but if it requires consecutive sentencing, the
parties are prepared to do that.” Appellant’s attorney and the prosecutor confirmed that
this was the agreement. The plea agreement also allowed appellant to receive credit for
his time served in custody out of state since 1992. The district court sentenced appellant
to 195 months in prison for count one and 141 months for count two, to be served
consecutively. The district court gave appellant credit for 1,909 days served, which is
approximately 65 months, of which 1,597 days, or approximately 54 months, were served
outside of Minnesota. This resulted in 159 months of actual time to be served, assuming
no violations. The parties were in agreement on these terms.
Nearly two years later, appellant moved to correct his sentence under Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9. He argued that his 141-month sentence
for count two was not authorized by law because the sentencing guidelines require a
permissive consecutive sentence to be calculated using a criminal-history score of zero,
but the district court used a criminal-history score of five. He contended that his sentence
2 for count two should have been 81 months instead of 141 months. The state agreed, but
argued that appellant should not have received credit for time served in other states and
should have received credit only for the 312 days he served in Hennepin County.
The district court granted appellant’s motion to correct his sentence and reduced
his sentence for count two from 141 months to 81 months. The district court also granted
the state’s motion to reduce appellant’s credit for time served from 1,909 days to 312
days. The district court noted that granting both motions would result in appellant
serving more prison time than his plea agreement originally required. The court
determined that it would be unjust for appellant to serve more time than he originally
agreed to in the plea agreement. It therefore reduced his sentence for count one by 21
months to 174 months, resulting in appellant serving the same amount of time in prison
as he would have served under the original plea agreement of 159 months.
Appellant appealed the district court’s decision. He argued that he must be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and that the district court improperly increased his
sentence. This court refused to consider his request to withdraw his guilty plea because
he did not raise the issue before the district court and affirmed the district court’s decision
to correct his sentence. Poquette v. State, No. A13-0953, 2014 WL 1344296 (Minn. App.
Apr. 7, 2014).
Appellant then petitioned for postconviction relief. He maintained that he was
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the state improperly induced him to plead
guilty by promising him credit for time served in other states, which he did not receive.
The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition without a hearing. The
3 postconviction court concluded that appellant’s claim was procedurally barred by the rule
in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), because he did not
raise the issue in his motion to correct his sentence. Alternatively, the district court
concluded that he was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding, without
a hearing, that his petition for postconviction relief was Knaffla-barred and that he is not
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was involuntary. We disagree.
We review the denial of a postconviction petition, including a request for an
evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167
(Minn. 2012). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on
an erroneous application of the law or when its decision goes against logic and facts in
the record. Id. A court may deny a postconviction petition without a hearing if the
petition and record conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014). But a court must allow a defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea after sentencing if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs if the plea is not accurate, voluntary,
and intelligent. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Appellant only
argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary.
To determine whether a plea is voluntary, we examine the parties’ reasonable
understanding of the plea agreement’s terms. Id. at 96. A plea is voluntary when a
4 defendant pleads guilty without improper pressure or coercion. Id. The state cannot
induce a defendant to plead guilty by offering an unfulfilled or unfulfillable promise.
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000). We consider all relevant
circumstances when determining whether a plea is voluntary. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
As part of his plea agreement, appellant was to receive credit for 1,597 days that
he served in custody out of state. The parties agreed at sentencing that “the focus of the
plea negotiation is the sentence of 336 months” and that it was immaterial how the
district court ultimately arrived at that number as long as the total sentence was 336
months. And, as further agreed to by the parties, this would result in appellant having
159 months of actual time served. After the district court corrected the sentence by
granting both parties’ motions, in the interests of justice, it reduced appellant’s sentence
for count one by 21 months so that he would actually serve the same 159 months under
the corrected sentence.
The postconviction court addressed the validity of appellant’s plea in addition to
determining that his claim was procedurally barred. The postconviction court concluded
that appellant was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea “[b]ecause the primary focus of
[appellant’s] initial plea was the total amount [appellant] would serve and [] [appellant] is
actually serving the same amount of time under the amended sentence as the original
sentence.” The court therefore determined that appellant “received what was promised in
the plea deal.”
Even if we were to assume that appellant’s claim is not Knaffla-barred, it fails on
the merits. No evidence in the record contradicts the district court’s conclusion that the
5 length of appellant’s sentence, and the amount of time to be served, was the primary
focus of the plea agreement, not the legal basis by which the district court arrived at that
sentence. By reducing his sentence for both counts, the district court kept this promise
because appellant will actually serve the same amount of time in prison under his
amended sentence as he would have served under the original plea agreement.
Appellant’s plea was therefore voluntary because the promise of getting his time in
prison reduced was fulfilled and he received “exactly what he bargained for.” See Carey
v. State, 765 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Minn. App. 2009) (concluding that, when defendant
agreed to a sentence contrary to sentencing guidelines, he could not prove that his guilty
plea was involuntary because he received “exactly what he bargained for”), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009). The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant’s postconviction petition because the petition and record conclusively
show that he is entitled to no relief.
Affirmed.