Brian Pearson v. Tyler Eldridge

2022 DNH 039

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: March 28, 2022
• Docket: 21-cv-567-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Brian Pearson

v. Case No. 21-cv-567-PB Opinion No. 2022 DNH 039 Tyler Eldridge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Brian Pearson has sued Tyler Eldridge, an officer with the

Ossipee Police Department, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly

violating his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

unreasonable seizures and excessive force. Eldridge has moved

for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity.

Because Eldridge has not established that qualified immunity

shields him from suit, I deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND 1

Late one summer night, Pearson drove his truck to the Top

Cat Car Wash in Ossipee, New Hampshire. This was a 24-hour

facility that offered self-serve vacuums and trash receptacles

in a well-lit parking lot behind the car wash. Pearson parked

next to one of the vacuums, took out some of his belongings and

placed them on the ground nearby, and began cleaning the

interior of his truck.

1 The facts are taken from Pearson’s complaint and construed in his favor. See Kando v. R.I. State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2018). While Pearson was cleaning his truck, Eldridge sped into

the parking lot, parked his police cruiser close to Pearson, and

approached him. Eldridge immediately asked Pearson what he was

“up to” and pointed to a baseball bat laying on the ground with

Pearson’s other things. Pearson responded that he was cleaning

his truck. Eldridge then asked Pearson if he had any

identification on him. Pearson said he did, but before he could

get his driver’s license, Eldridge took out his handcuffs and

told Pearson that he would conduct a pat-down search. When

Pearson asked why, Eldridge told him to “relax.” After he

handcuffed Pearson, Eldridge informed him that he was being

detained because he was parked at the car wash late at night,

had a lot of stuff around, was “animated,” and was not familiar

to Eldridge. Pearson disputes that he was animated.

Eldridge then instructed Pearson to go to the police

cruiser, lean against it, and spread his feet. After Pearson

complied, Eldridge asked him for his name. Pearson did not

respond at first, but he gave his full name when asked a second

time. Eldridge then quickly gave Pearson the Miranda warnings.

Immediately after, without provocation, Eldridge violently threw

Pearson against the hood of the police cruiser. He held Pearson

face-down on the hood, with his body weight on Pearson’s back

and his hand on Pearson’s neck, until two other officers arrived

on the scene a few minutes later. The encounter ended with

2 Eldridge taking Pearson to a local jail under the pretext of

taking him into protective custody.

Pearson eventually filed this action in state court, which

Eldridge removed to federal court. Pearson alleges that

Eldridge detained him without sufficient justification and used

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Eldridge

now moves for judgment on the pleadings, and Pearson objects.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings at any time

“[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the

pleadings is subject to the same standard of review as a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Kando v. R.I. State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir.

2018). Accordingly, when a defendant moves for judgment on the

pleadings, I must accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d

178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). I may enter judgment on the pleadings

“only if the uncontested and properly considered facts

conclusively establish the movant’s entitlement to a favorable

judgment.” Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st

Cir. 2006).

3 III. ANALYSIS

Eldridge argues that he is entitled to judgment on the

pleadings on Pearson’s § 1983 claims because qualified immunity

shields him from lawsuit. His argument fails to appreciate that

the immunity analysis at this early stage is based on how a

reasonable officer in his position would view the case given

Pearson’s version of events, as described in the complaint. If

Pearson’s allegations are true and no mitigating factors are

later established, the qualified immunity defense would fail.

The qualified immunity doctrine “protects government

officials from trial and monetary liability unless the pleaded

facts establish ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Marrero–

Mendez v. Calixto–Rodriguez, 830 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2016)

(quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). The

“clearly established” requirement is satisfied when “the legal

contours of the right in question were sufficiently clear that a

reasonable officer would have understood that what he was doing

violated the right,” and “in the particular factual context of

the case, a reasonable officer would have understood that his

conduct violated the right.” Stamps v. Town of Framingham, 813

F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648

F.3d 24, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2011)). Although a “case directly on

4 point” is unnecessary to pierce qualified immunity, “existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12

(2015) (quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).

The complaint asserts two Fourth Amendment claims. First,

it alleges that Eldridge’s detention of Pearson, from the time

he was handcuffed until he was released from custody, amounted

to an unreasonable seizure. I construe that claim to challenge

Pearson’s initial detention as an unlawful Terry stop and his

subsequent incarceration as unlawful protective custody.

Second, the complaint alleges that Eldridge used excessive force

when he slammed Pearson against the police cruiser. I analyze

Eldridge’s qualified immunity defense as to each set of claims

in turn.

A. Unreasonable Seizure Claim

Pearson asserts that Eldridge, while acting under color of

state law, violated his constitutionally protected right to be

free from unreasonable seizures. Eldridge assumes that his

seizure of Pearson would be unreasonable absent probable cause.

As described in the complaint, however, the encounter began as

an investigative Terry stop, which required only reasonable

suspicion. See United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 26 (1st

Cir. 2011). The subsequent taking of Pearson into protective

5 custody, however, required probable cause. See Alfano v. Lynch,

847 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2017).

1. Investigative Stop

A police officer may stop and briefly detain an individual

based on reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed,

or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27

(1968); Pontoo, 666 F.3d at 26. As part of a Terry stop, the

police may frisk a temporarily detained suspect if they have

reason to believe that the suspect may be armed and dangerous.

United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2004).

Reasonable suspicion requires “specific and articulable facts”

that would lead a reasonable police officer in the circumstances

to suspect that criminal activity is afoot. United States v.

Ramdihall, 859 F.3d 80, 91 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Pontoo, 666

F.3d at 28).

The facts alleged in the complaint, if credited, establish

that Eldridge conducted an unlawful Terry stop and frisk.

Contrary to Eldridge’s suggestion, a reasonable officer in his

position would not have suspected that Pearson was loitering at

the time of the stop. Under New Hampshire law, a person is

guilty of loitering “if he knowingly appears at a place, or at a

time, under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of

persons or property in the vicinity.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 644:6, I. There was no indication that Pearson had engaged or

6 intended to engage in an activity that threatened public safety.

The complaint alleges that Pearson was patronizing a business

during its regular hours for the legitimate purpose of cleaning

his vehicle. He did not try to conceal his presence there or

otherwise act in a suspicious manner. When Eldridge inquired,

Pearson accounted for his presence at the car wash by explaining

that he was cleaning his truck. That explanation fit Pearson’s

actions at the time. His truck was parked next to a self-serve

vacuum, and he was using it to clean its interior. The presence

of a baseball bat, which Pearson had taken out of his truck with

his other things and placed on the ground nearby before Eldridge

arrived, was not enough to raise alarm. Under the

circumstances, the only reasonable inference was that Pearson

had taken his belongings out of his truck so that he could more

easily clean the interior. Without more, a reasonable officer

would not have believed that he needed to handcuff and frisk

Pearson.

Eldridge leans heavily on the complaint’s acknowledgment

that he had described Pearson as “animated” and told him to

“relax.” But the complaint does not admit that Pearson was

actually animated; instead, it alleges that Eldridge’s assertion

was a mere pretext for his actions. Eldridge may have a

different view of the facts, but at this point, I cannot credit

his version of the encounter. See Norton v. Rodrigues, 955 F.3d

7 176, 184 (1st Cir. 2020) (when defendant invokes qualified

immunity on summary judgment, “the court must determine whether

the plaintiff’s version of the facts makes out a violation of a

protected right”) (cleaned up).

Eldridge also points out that he needed to ask Pearson

twice for his name as evidence that Pearson had disobeyed a

police officer, in violation of Chapter 265:4 of the New

Hampshire Revised Statutes. Pearson’s brief refusal to identify

himself, however, came only after he was handcuffed. It,

therefore, cannot provide justification for the Terry stop. See

Pontoo, 666 F.3d at 26 (noting that a Terry stop “must be

justified at its inception”).

Even if Pearson’s version of the events would support a

finding that the investigative stop was unlawful, Eldridge

argues that he should prevail because the right at issue was not

clearly established at the time of the encounter. I disagree.

In terms of the clarity of the law in general, a reasonable

officer would know that it is unconstitutional to stop,

handcuff, and frisk a person without reasonable suspicion. See

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Applying that law, a reasonable officer

in Eldridge’s shoes would have realized that there were

insufficient articulable facts to suspect Pearson of criminal

activity or dangerousness. Put differently, the presence of

reasonable suspicion was not even “arguable” here. See Eldredge

8 v. Town of Falmouth, 662 F.3d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, at this time, qualified immunity cannot bar the

claim that the Terry stop was illegal.

2. Protective Custody

Pearson also alleges that Eldridge violated his right to be

free from unreasonable seizures when he took Pearson into

protective custody. The protective custody statute permits an

officer who “encounters a person who, in the judgment of the

officer, is intoxicated” to “take such person into protective

custody,” including booking the person into a local jail for up

to 24 hours. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 172-B:3, I. The statute

defines “intoxicated” to mean “a condition in which the mental

or physical functioning of an individual is substantially

impaired as a result of the presence of alcohol in his system.”

Id. § 172-B:1, X.

The Fourth Amendment “requires officers acting under a

civil protection statute to have probable cause before taking an

individual into custody of a kind that resembles an arrest.”

Alfano, 847 F.3d at 77; see Fredyma v. Hurley, 2019 DNH 043,

2019 WL 1171415, at *4 (D.N.H. Mar. 13, 2019) (holding that

protective custody under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 172-B:3 requires

probable cause). A police officer has probable cause to take a

person into protective custody if, based on the totality of the

information known to the officer, he has a reasonable basis to

9 believe that the person is intoxicated. See United States v.

Diallo, 29 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1994).

Eldridge argues that he had probable cause to believe that

Pearson was intoxicated. But the complaint does not admit that

Pearson was either intoxicated or appeared to be so. On the

contrary, Pearson alleges that Eldridge took him into protective

custody under pretext. If I credit Pearson’s allegations, there

were no facts from which a reasonable officer in Eldridge’s

position could have believed that placing Pearson into protected

custody was warranted.

The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis does

not favor Eldridge either. A reasonable officer would have been

on clear notice that taking a person into protective custody

absent probable cause to believe that the person is intoxicated

was unconstitutional. See Alfano, 847 F.3d at 77. It also

would have been sufficiently clear that the presence of probable

cause was not even “arguable” in this case. See McInnis v.

Maine, 638 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2011). Thus, Eldridge is not

entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to the unreasonable

seizure claim.

B. Excessive Force Claim

A Fourth Amendment excessive force claim requires proof

that “the defendant officer employed force that was unreasonable

under the circumstances.” Kenney v. Floyd, 700 F.3d 604, 609

10 (1st Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Courts must assess the

reasonableness of a use of force “from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene” and must account “for the fact

that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary

in a particular situation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

396–97 (1989). To evaluate the reasonableness of the force

used, courts consider (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”;

(2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety

of the officers or others”; and (3) “whether the suspect is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Ciolino v. Gikas, 861 F.3d 296, 302 (1st Cir. 2017)

(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (cleaned up).

Assuming the truth of the allegations, Eldridge used

excessive force against Pearson. Pearson was handcuffed and

compliant when Eldridge suddenly and without provocation

violently slammed him against the police cruiser and held him

pinned in that position for several minutes. Pearson had

committed no crime and showed no attempt to resist or flee when

Eldridge used significant force to subdue him. In those

circumstances, a reasonable officer in Eldridge’s position

“would have taken a more measured approach.” Id. at 304.

11 Eldridge likewise cannot prevail on the second prong of the

qualified immunity test. The legal contours of the right to be

free from the use of excessive force were clearly established.

Morelli, 552 F.3d at 23–24. Indeed, “the conduct was such an

obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition

on unreasonable force that a reasonable officer would not have

required prior case law on point to be on notice that his

conduct was unlawful.” Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 38

(1st Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Nor does the complaint reveal any

circumstances that would support Eldridge’s use of force as

reasonable. See id. at 39-40. Crediting Pearson’s allegations

and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, “the level

of force chosen by the officer cannot in any way, shape, or form

be justified,” which precludes the qualified immunity defense at

this stage. See Morelli, 552 F.3d at 24.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 6) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge

March 28, 2022

cc: Counsel of record