Brian Nelson v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 12, 2024
DocketDE-315H-21-0119-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Brian Nelson v. Department of the Army (Brian Nelson v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brian Nelson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BRIAN R. NELSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-315H-21-0119-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: April 12, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Aaron J. Gragg , Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for the appellant.

Richard C. Wolfe , Esquire, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On petition for review, the appellant argues that he has new evidence showing that he finished his initial probationary period before the agency terminated him. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). As noted above, the appellant claims he has new evidence that he received from the agency on or about May 26, 2021, and he asserts that it was not available to him, despite his due diligence, before the close of the record below. Petition for Review File, Tab 2 at 5, 9. He argues that the new evidence, a Standard Form 50 (SF-50) dated April 22, 2020, states that he completed his initial probationary period. Id. at 7, 9. However, with its motion to dismiss the appeal filed below, the agency attached a copy of the same document and it explained that the document was issued in error because the appellant had only completed 1 year of the 2-year initial probationary period statutorily required by 10 U.S.C. § 1599e (repealed 2022). 2 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 4-5, 11. 2 At the time of the appellant’s appointment to his position, individuals appointed to a permanent competitive-service position at the Department of Defense (DOD), such as the appellant, were subject to a 2-year probationary period and only qualified as “employees” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2016) if they completed 2 years of current continuous service. 10 U.S.C. § 1599e(a), (b)(1)(A), (d) (2016). As found by the administrative judge, the appellant had not completed 2 years of service at the time of his termination. On December 27, 2021, President Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (2022 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541. The 2022 NDAA repealed the 2-year probationary period for DOD appointments made on or after December 31, 2022, and replaced it with a 1-year probationary period. Pub. L. No. 117-81, § 1106, 135 Stat. 1541, 1950. That 3

Similarly, the SF-50 for the appellant’s April 2019 appointment states that the position is subject to a 2-year initial probationary period, but also states that the appellant will be changed from tenure group 2 to tenure group 1 after he completes a 1-year probationary period. IAF, Tab 4 at 14, Tab 9 at 8. However, the Board has long held that an SF-50 is not a legally operative document controlling on its face as to an employee’s status and rights. Stoute v. Department of the Navy, 98 M.S.P.R. 409, ¶ 13 (2005) (citing Grigsby v. Department of Commerce, 729 F.2d 772, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Thus, even though the record does not reflect that the agency issued a corrected SF-50 reflecting that the appellant had not completed his initial probationary period, the 2-year initial probationary period here was a statutory requirement under 10 U.S.C. § 1599e (repealed 2022), which the issuance of an erroneous SF-50 does not change. Id. The initial decision indicates that the administrative judge considered this evidence, and that he correctly found that, because the appellant was appointed after November 26, 2015, to a permanent position in the competitive service within the Department of Defense, and had not completed the 2-year initial probationary period required by 10 U.S.C. § 1599e (repealed 2022), he was not an employee with appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. It is undisputed that the agency appointed the appellant to a position in the competitive service on April 22, 2019, and terminated him less than 2 years later, on January 21, 2021. IAF, Tab 1 at 6-8. Moreover, that appointment was specifically made subject to a statutorily required 2-year initial probationary period beginning on April 22, 2019. Id. at 8; see 10 U.S.C. § 1599e (repealed 2022). As the administrative judge observed, the appellant did not allege that his termination was based on partisan political reasons or marital status. ID at 7. He also observed that the appellant did not allege that his termination was based on

change does not affect the outcome of this appeal. 4

reasons arising in whole or in part before his appointment, so the agency was not required to effect the appellant’s termination in accordance with the procedural requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. ID at 7-8. Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant identified no statutory or regulatory basis for jurisdiction over the appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1).

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Brian Nelson v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brian-nelson-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.