Brian Minick v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
This text of Brian Minick v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Brian Minick v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
BRIAN MINICK,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-2157-JAR
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,1
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Authorization of Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 23), which seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) in the amount of $10,590.00, reduced by $8,000.00 that counsel already received under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for a total award of $10,590.00, reduced by $8,000.00 already paid under the EAJA, for a net fee award of $2,590.00. I. Background Plaintiff Brian Minick filed his Complaint on April 29, 2024, asking this Court to review the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security to deny his Social Security Disability benefits. This Court concluded that the Commissioner’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence, so it reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. The Court therefore substitutes him as the defendant here under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). proceedings consistent with its opinion.2 After remand, the parties agreed to an attorney-fee award under the EAJA in connection with Plaintiff’s court-related representation during the appeal in the amount of $8,000, which the Court granted.3 On remand, the Administrative Law Judge issued a favorable decision finding Plaintiff disabled. On September 2, 2025, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) sent Plaintiff a
Notice of Award, itemizing the benefits it owed Plaintiff and his payment schedule.4 The notice states that SSA “withheld $22,711.00 from your first check . . . in order to pay the approved representative’s fee.”5 On September 7, 2025, SSA notified Plaintiff that it withheld an additional amount of $2,379.00 from his widower’s benefits to pay legal fees. According to the notices provided by SSA, these sums represent 25% of the total past-due benefits award of $93,234.00.6 Plaintiff now moves for a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). He seeks a total attorney- fee award of $10,590.00, reduced by the $8,000.00 in EAJA fees he has already been paid, for a net fee award of $2,590.00. The Commissioner does not support or oppose the request for
attorney fees or contest that the total fee award is reasonable. The Commissioner asks the Court to make clear that its reasonableness determination applies to the total award sought. II. Standard Title 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a
2 Doc. 19. 3 Doc. 22. 4 Doc. 23-1 at 1. 5 Id. at 4. 6 Id. at 2–3, 8. The Court notes that the total amount withheld appears to exceed 25% of the total past-due benefits award. reasonable [attorney] fee . . . not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits.”7 This provision allows the Court to award attorney fees in conjunction with a remand for further proceedings where a plaintiff eventually is awarded past-due benefits.8 The amount of a fee award under § 406(b) is committed to the Court’s sound discretion.9 In determining whether a contingent-fee agreement produces reasonable results or
whether the fee award should be reduced, the Supreme Court has directed courts to consider several factors, specifically: (1) the character of the representation and whether the results it achieved were substandard; (2) whether the attorney was responsible for delay that caused benefits to accrue during the pendency of the case; and (3) whether the benefits awarded are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.10 The Supreme Court noted that “the comparison of amount of benefits to time spent might be aided by submission of plaintiff’s attorney’s billing record and normal hourly billing rate.”11 “If counsel is awarded fees under both the EAJA and the SSA, counsel must refund the smaller amount to the claimant.”12 III. Discussion
Applying the factors described above, the Court concludes that the total requested fee of $10,590.00 is reasonable. As to the first two factors, counsel achieved a favorable result and was
7 “The [statute] deals with the administrative and judicial review stages discretely: § 406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; § 406(b) controls fees for representation in court.” McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493, 498 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002)). “Under the SSA scheme, each authority sets fees for the work done before it; thus, the court does not make fee awards for work at the agency level, and the Commissioner does not make fee awards for work done before the court.” Id. 8 Id. at 503. 9 Id. at 505; see also Gordon v. Astrue, 361 F. App’x 933, 934 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “a district court enjoys considerable discretion in the setting of a fee award for work done before it”). 10 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (citations omitted). 11 Robbins v. Barnhart, No. 04-1174-MLB, 2007 WL 675654, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). 12 McGraw, 450 F.3d at 497–98. not responsible for any delay in the case. The only question is whether the benefits awarded are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case. Plaintiff ultimately received past-due benefits in the amount of $93,234.00, and counsel now seeks attorney’s fees in the total amount of $10,590.00, which represents about 11 percent of the total award. In Gisbrecht,13 the Supreme Court instructed that the contingency agreement should be
given significant weight in fixing a fee, subject to the district judge’s independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the fee. In determining the reasonableness of the fees, the court may consider the hours spent representing the claimant and counsel’s normal hourly billing charge for non-contingent fee cases.14 And in cases awarding large benefits, the court should disallow unreasonable fees that would constitute a windfall.15 Although Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee arrangement with counsel in which he agreed to a fee of 25 percent of past due benefits,16 counsel seeks well below this amount. Counsel submitted an itemized invoice showing that he and his firm spent 45.9 hours representing Plaintiff, with an average hourly rate of $231. The billed amount exceeds the
amount of fees sought in this matter. Counsel also contends that the fees sought are reasonable based on the results in the case and his firm’s deep experience litigating Social Security appeals. The Court has reviewed Counsel’s affidavit setting forth his law firm’s experience and agrees. Accordingly, the Court finds that a total fee award of $10,590.00 is reasonable under the circumstances of this case.
13 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. 14 Id. 15 Id.
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Brian Minick v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brian-minick-v-frank-bisignano-commissioner-of-the-social-security-ksd-2025.