Brian Joseph Driscoll v. JEF Investments LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-08054
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Brian Joseph Driscoll, No. CV-25-08054-PCT-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 JEF Investments LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court are (1) three motions to dismiss Plaintiff Brian Driscoll’s 16 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Docs. 9, 26, 29) and (2) Plaintiff’s motion to file 17 exhibits in this Court that were previously filed in state court (Doc. 28). The motions to 18 dismiss are granted and Plaintiff’s motion to file exhibits is denied as moot. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff filed suit in state court against Defendants JEF Investments LLC (“JEF”) 21 and its members, Elaina and Martin Chandler (collectively, the “JEF Defendants”); 22 LoanCare, LLC (“LoanCare”)1 and its Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) David Worall 23 (collectively, the “LoanCare Defendants”); and Fidelity National Financial, Inc. 24 (“Fidelity”) and its President Abigail Johnson. (See Doc. 1-6.) In the FAC, Plaintiff 25 substituted Johnson for Fidelity’s CEO, Mike Nolan (collectively, the “Fidelity 26 Defendants”). (See Doc. 1-12.) 27 1 LoanCare was named in the complaint as LoanCare Account Servicing, LLC (see 28 Doc. 1-6 at 2), but LoanCare’s corporate disclosure statement provides its correct name (see Doc. 10). 1 Fidelity removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1.) Since then, the LoanCare 2 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the JEF Defendants and Fidelity Defendants 3 joined. (Doc. 9; see also Doc. 26 at 1-2 (Fidelity Defendants’ joinder); Doc. 29 at 5 (JEF 4 Defendants’ joinder).) That motion is fully briefed. (Doc. 19 (response); Doc. 25 (reply).) 5 The Fidelity Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss, which the JEF Defendants 6 joined. (Doc. 26; see also Doc. 29 at 5 (joinder).) That motion is also fully briefed. (Doc. 7 30 (response); Doc. 35 (reply).) 8 The JEF Defendants filed a motion to dismiss as well (Doc. 29), which is fully 9 briefed (Doc. 32 (response); Doc. 34 (reply).) The Fidelity Defendants joined this motion. 10 (Doc. 35 at 2.) 11 Finally, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the Court file several hundred pages 12 of exhibits that he included with his hard copies of the FAC served on the defendants. (See 13 Doc. 28 at 1-2.) Defendants have not filed any response opposing Plaintiff’s motion. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 15 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over 17 which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Issues of standing are 18 properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 19 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 21 of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited 22 jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 23 jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, on a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing, 24 the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of 25 Article III standing. See Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “Where, as here, a 26 case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each 27 element.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)). 28 1 B. Rule 12(b)(2) 2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move, “prior 3 to trial, to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. 4 Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). In a motion to dismiss for lack of 5 personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an exercise of 6 jurisdiction is proper. Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 However, “in the absence of an evidentiary hearing,” a plaintiff “need only make a prima 8 facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) 9 (citation omitted). When examining whether there is a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 10 facts, any “uncontroverted allegations in [the complaint] must be taken as true, and 11 conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in 12 [plaintiff’s] favor.” AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 13 1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361 (treating 14 plaintiff’s allegations as true). 15 Because Arizona’s long-arm statute conforms with the requirements of federal due 16 process, the analyses of personal jurisdiction under Arizona law and federal due process 17 are the same. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 18 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004). To comport with federal due process, the non-resident 19 defendant must have certain “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that an exercise 20 of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. 21 at 801 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Personal 22 jurisdiction may be general or specific. 23 C. Rule 8 24 Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim 25 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a) requires not 26 only “fair notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.” Bell 27 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007) (quotation marks and citation 28 omitted). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more 1 than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 3 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. 4 at 555 (a “short and plain statement of the claim” requires “more than labels and 5 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”). 6 “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 7 enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 8 at 557). A complaint does not comply with Rule 8 if “one cannot determine from the 9 complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 10 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). 11 A pleading that “says too much” can also violate Rule 8(a), Knapp v. Hogan, 738 12 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013); thus, “Rule 8(a) has been held to be violated by a pleading 13 that was needlessly long, or a complaint that was highly repetitious, or confused, or 14 consisted of incomprehensible rambling.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 15 Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 16 id. at 1058 (“Although normally verbosity or length is not by itself a basis for dismissing 17 a complaint, we have never held—and we know of no authority supporting the 18 proposition—that a pleading may be of unlimited length and opacity. Our cases instruct 19 otherwise.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179 20 (recognizing that “[p]rolix, confusing complaints . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants 21 and judges”). “The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8 does not depend 22 on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179; see also Li 23 v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction 24 with Rule 8(a)). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 A. Standing 27 The JEF Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s alleged injuries “related . . . to [his] 28 participation in a real estate transaction in . . . Texas, or to rising national interest rates, or 1 to recent tariffs” are not “fairly traceable to any action taken by the JEF Defendants,” so 2 Plaintiff “has no standing to bring them.” (Doc. 34 at 3.) Although the JEF Defendants 3 raised this argument for the first time in their reply brief, the Court must still consider it 4 before addressing the merits because the argument implicates the Court’s jurisdiction. See 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), (3); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 6 To establish standing, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) that she has suffered or likely 7 will suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be caused by the 8 defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be redressed by the requested judicial 9 relief.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380 (2024). The second element— 10 causation—requires the plaintiff to show that his “injury likely was caused or likely will 11 be caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 382. 12 Construing the FAC liberally, see Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 13 2000), the Court does not interpret the FAC to be asserting that the source of Plaintiff’s 14 injury is rising interest rates or tariffs. (See Doc. 1-12 at 34-35.) Rather, the Court interprets 15 the FAC as asserting that his damages continue to be magnified as time passes and he is 16 unable to use his property as collateral due to the JEF Defendants’ alleged actions in failing 17 to release the lien on his property. (See id. at 7-9, 13.) This is essentially an opportunity 18 cost argument. Cf. El Paso County v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840, 851 (W.D. Tex. 2019) 19 (stating that an “economic injury stem[ming] from the loss of a non-illusory opportunity to 20 obtain a benefit” constitutes an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing). Whether 21 or not Plaintiff would be entitled to such relief on the merits is not properly before the 22 Court; at this stage, Plaintiff has sufficient Article III standing to pursue these injuries 23 because the JEF Defendants’ alleged actions are at least part of the “chain connecting the 24 defendant’s unlawful conduct to the plaintiff’s injury,” and the connection is not too 25 tenuous to destroy causation. See Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) 26 (“Causation may be found even if there are multiple links in the chain connecting the 27 defendant’s unlawful conduct to the plaintiff’s injury, and there’s no requirement that the 28 defendant’s conduct comprise the last link in the chain.”); Sywula v. Teleport Mobility, 1 Inc., 652 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (“In this Circuit, a plaintiff ‘need not 2 eliminate any other contributing causes’ beyond the defendant’s purportedly wrongful 3 conduct ‘to establish [his or her] standing.’ Indeed, ‘other factors may also cause’ the 4 injury-in-fact upon which a plaintiff predicates his or her standing, but if ‘the link between 5 the [defendant’s challenged action] and [the alleged injury] is not tenuous or abstract,’ 6 those extraneous factors do not break the causal connection.” (alterations in original) 7 (citation omitted) (quoting Barnum Timber Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 633 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 8 2011))). 9 B. Personal Jurisdiction 10 The Fidelity Defendants argue that Nolan, Fidelity’s CEO, is not subject to personal 11 jurisdiction in Arizona. (Doc. 26 at 6-8.)2 They note that, as alleged in the FAC, Nolan 12 lives and was served in Florida. (Id. at 7-8.) In response, Plaintiff argues that his written 13 communications to Fidelity and Nolan “are more than minimum contacts” and, “regardless 14 of [his] address, Plaintiff has direct claims against him and [Fidelity] because he and his 15 company do[] direct business in Arizona” and received communications from Plaintiff. 16 (Doc. 30 at 3, 5-6.) Plaintiff also points to an instance in which he communicated with a 17 “legal representative[]” for the Fidelity Defendants. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff’s attached exhibits 18 indicates that this representative was Claims Counsel at either Fidelity or Chicago Title 19 Insurance Company. (See id. at 31-32, 43.) The Fidelity Defendants argue in reply that a 20 “CEO cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in every state in which his employer does 21 business.” (Doc. 35 at 3.) 22 Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists over 23 Nolan. It is undisputed that Nolan lives in Florida and was served in Florida (Doc. 1-12 at 24 5; Doc. 26 at 7-8), and Plaintiff does not argue that Nolan is subject to general jurisdiction 25 in Arizona. But Plaintiff’s theory of Nolan’s supposed minimum contacts is insufficient to 26 establish specific jurisdiction. The mere fact that Fidelity does business in Arizona does

27 2 Personal jurisdiction is also a threshold issue that generally must be addressed before proceeding to the merits. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 28 549 U.S. 422, 433 (2007); Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. La.-Pac. Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 840 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005). 1 not necessarily mean that its CEO is subject to personal jurisdiction as a result. See Calder 2 v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (stating that defendant employees’ “contacts with [the 3 forum state] are not to be judged according to their employer’s activities there”). Instead, 4 “[e]ach defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.” Id. 5 Assessing Nolan’s alleged contacts individually, none of them passes muster. The 6 supposed minimum contacts—receiving communications from and communicating with 7 Plaintiff through a representative—are not based on Nolan’s own actions, which is 8 necessary to establish specific jurisdiction. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) 9 (“[T]he relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the 10 forum State.” (quotation marks omitted)). But even if Nolan himself initiated 11 communications with Plaintiff, this alone does not create sufficient minimum contacts for 12 personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 1991) 13 (“Ordinarily use of the mails, telephone, or other international communications simply do 14 not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protection of the forum state.” 15 (citation modified)); Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The 16 mere fact that [the defendant] communicated with [the plaintiff] in the state . . . does not 17 show that [the defendant] purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business 18 in [the forum state].”). Minimum contacts must arise from Nolan’s contacts with Arizona 19 itself, not with Plaintiff. Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (stating the “minimum contacts analysis 20 looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts 21 with persons who reside there” and “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the 22 defendant and the forum”) (quotation marks omitted)); id. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s 23 relationship with a plaintiff . . . standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction. Due 24 process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own 25 affiliation with the State, not based on the random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts he 26 makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.” (citation omitted)). 27 Because Plaintiff has not made “a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts,” Sher, 28 911 F.2d at 1361, due process requires that Nolan be dismissed as a party. See Walden, 571 1 U.S. at 284 (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect 2 the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third 3 parties.”).3 4 C. Rule 8 5 All defendants argue that the FAC should be dismissed under Rule 8 because it is 6 “indecipherable” (Doc. 9 at 1); “lengthy, confusing, [and] convoluted” (Doc. 26 at 2); and 7 “difficult to follow” (Doc. 29 at 2). They further argue that the FAC “fails to distinguish 8 among the allegations that are asserted against multiple defendants, and instead lumps the 9 defendants together as an impermissible group pleading” and, “juxtaposed with [his] 10 citation to nearly sixty statutes and regulations, many with no explanation at all,” such that 11 the FAC does not provide the defendants adequate notice of the claims against each 12 defendant to adequately defend themselves. (Doc. 9 at 3-4; see also Doc. 26 at 4-5; Doc. 13 29 at 5-6.) Plaintiff appears to concede that he “inadvertently labeled ‘all defendants’ where 14 [he] believed as appropriate instead of naming each of them and everyone . . . individually.” 15 (Doc. 19 at 11; see also Doc. 32 at 1.) 16 The Court agrees that Plaintiff should be required to amend the FAC to make it 17 conform to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain statement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 18 The FAC, upon the Court’s review, is “needlessly long, . . . highly 19 repetitious, . . . confused, [and] consist[s] of incomprehensible rambling.” Cafasso, 637 20 F.3d at 1059. The FAC largely lacks a discernible structure and logical order, and it does 21 not delineate each claim Plaintiff intends to bring and against which defendant(s), violating

22 3 It is unclear whether the Court must assess the possibility of leave to amend in connection with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2). See Wilke v. Pacheco, No. 1:23- 23 cv-00134-BLW, 2023 WL 5614908, at *4 n.1 (D. Idaho Aug. 30, 2023) (“Where, as here, the motion to dismiss is based on a lack of personal jurisdiction under the auspices of Rule 24 12(b)(2), there is no guidance from the Circuit that the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. Presumably, that is because an amended complaint cannot cure a plaintiff’s failure 25 to make a prima facie factual showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.”); see also Bobuliski v. Dickson, No. CV 24-02600-MWF (JPRx), 2025 WL 26 863462, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2025) (“When granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, courts differ in their approach to awarding leave to amend.”). To the 27 extent such an analysis is required, the Court finds amendment would be futile and denies leave to amend because Plaintiff does not suggest any other facts that could subject Nolan 28 to personal jurisdiction in Arizona. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (leave to amend is properly denied if amendment would be futile). 1 Rule 8. See Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 762 (9th Cir. 2025) (“A collectively 2 pleaded complaint may fail to provide fair notice to a defendant, where there are multiple 3 defendants and claims, and the complaint fails to differentiate among them.”). For example, 4 Plaintiff asserts that “all defendants committed gross negligence and intentional 5 misconduct throughout this case,” but then proceeds to only expressly describe actions 6 taken by LoanCare and JEF. (See Doc. 1-12 at 9-13.) In another instance, Plaintiff claims 7 Fidelity violated certain Arizona statutes but does not explain how Fidelity violated them. 8 (See id. at 21.) In yet another instance, Plaintiff alleges “[o]ther nonconformance with 9 statutes and contract terms by all Defendants” and proceeds to cite several federal and state 10 statutes without explaining the factual basis for how each defendant is alleged to have 11 violated them. (See id. at 26 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 33-34.) 12 From the Court’s review of the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff has a long history 13 with at least some of the defendants and was caught up in trying to explain the context of 14 his claims that the claims themselves are buried in old grievances and tangents. (See Doc. 15 19 at 2 (stating that “even the FAC had limited space to tell the full story”).) It also appears 16 that Plaintiff’s goal was to mention as many statutes and regulations as he could to survive 17 a motion to dismiss, in other words, to throw everything at the wall to see what sticks. (See 18 id. (arguing that the complaint “cites enough federal and state statutes to support claims 19 and asks the court for relief”).) Both are problems that must be remedied in a new 20 complaint. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (disapproving of complaint that “consist[ed] 21 largely of immaterial background information”); Austin v. County of Alameda, No. C-15- 22 0942 EMC, 2015 WL 3833239, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2015) (noting that Rule 8(a)(2) 23 “requires that any complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the case” and 24 “litigants are not well served by throwing all possible allegations and legal terms into a 25 complaint in an effort to see what will stick”). 26 In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set out each claim he 27 asserts and must indicate which defendant(s) he believes is liable for that claim and why. 28 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (“Each allegation [in a pleading] must be simple, concise, and 1 direct.”); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (approving a sample complaint that “fully sets forth 2 who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide 3 discovery”). This is important both so that Defendants can understand the basis of 4 Plaintiff’s claims to defend against them and so that the Court can understand the basis of 5 Plaintiff’s claims to rule on the parties’ motions and manage the direction of the litigation. 6 See Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1059 (noting that nonconforming complaints “burden [the 7 plaintiff’s] adversary with the onerous task of combing through a . . . pleading just to 8 prepare an answer that admits or denies such allegations, and to determine what claims and 9 allegations must be defended or otherwise litigated”); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179 10 (recognizing that “[p]rolix, confusing complaints . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants 11 and judges”); Maiman v. Talbott, No. SACV 09-0012 AG (ANx), 2010 WL 11484000, at 12 *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (“Defendants should not be forced to piece together different 13 parts of the Complaint to determine what Plaintiffs might be saying.”). Plaintiff is warned 14 that the Court will not do his work for him in matching up his factual allegations with the 15 statutes and regulations he believes Defendants have violated. See Allen v. Tewalt, No. 16 1:20-cv-00287-DCN, 2020 WL 5961094, at *5 (D. Idaho Oct. 7, 2020) (“Plaintiff cannot 17 state a large number of allegations and then list a large number of constitutional provisions 18 and expect the Court to match them up.”). 19 D. Plaintiff’s Motion to File Exhibits 20 Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that hundreds of pages of exhibits be filed in 21 federal court that were previously filed in state court. (Doc. 28 at 1-2.) He claims that these 22 exhibits are referenced in his complaint. (See id. at 4; see also Doc. 1-12 at 40-55 (including 23 with the FAC a table of seventy-six exhibits that Plaintiff requested the Court “take[] 24 judicial notice of”).) With his motion, however, these documents were filed in the public 25 docket. (See Docs. 28-1, 28-2, 28-3, 28-4.) The motion is thus denied as moot, as it is 26 unclear what additional relief Plaintiff seeks. 27 That said, the hundreds of pages of exhibits Plaintiff seeks to attach to his FAC are 28 another example of Plaintiff’s noncompliance with Rule 8. (See Doc. 1-12 at 7 (citing 1 Exhibit #22 in support of allegation “Jef Investments LLC by and through the Chandlers 2 failed to abide by nearly all contract terms”); id. (citing several exhibits of unclear 3 relevance beyond background information).) Plaintiff is warned that the Court will not sift 4 through hundreds of pages of documents to attempt to discern the factual basis for his 5 claims in connection with his Second Amended Complaint. See Scott v. Hill, No. 3:24-cv- 6 2400-WQH-MSB, 2025 WL 1507159, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2025) (“A plaintiff may 7 refer to and attach exhibits as necessary to support factual allegations contained in his 8 Complaint; however, the Court is not obligated to sift through multiple exhibits to find a 9 factual basis for Plaintiff’s individual claims.”). Instead, Plaintiff “must set forth his 10 allegations within the body of the complaint and not expect the court to ferret through more 11 than two hundred pages of exhibits to frame his claims for him”; merely “attaching a 12 plethora of exhibits” does not “provide substance to his claims.” Willis v. Folsom State 13 Prison Med. Staff, No. CIV S-10-1631 MCE GGH P, 2010 WL 3258339, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 14 Aug. 17, 2010); see also Sanchez v. Prison, No. 3:18-cv-00373-MMD-WGC, 2019 WL 15 13250087, at *3 (D. Nev. May 29, 2019) (“Plaintiff is advised that he may not simply 16 attach exhibits to the amended complaint in the hopes that the Court will spend time 17 looking through them to try to guess which facts he is relying upon to try and state a claim. 18 The Court will not do that. Rather, in the amended complaint, for each claim, Plaintiff must 19 allege the particular facts he is relying upon to state a claim against each defendant.” 20 (footnote omitted)). 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 Accordingly, 23 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 9, 26, 29) and 24 dismissing the FAC. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Mike Nolan is dismissed from this 26 action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate 27 Defendant Nolan as a party. 28 . . . . 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must file a Second Amended 2 || Complaint within 30 days of this Order. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not file a Second Amended Complaint, the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action without further notice. 5 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED denying as moot Plaintiff’s request to file certain 6|| exhibits in this Court (Doc. 28). 7 Dated this 8th day of December, 2025. 8

10 Michael T. Liburdi 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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