Brian Joe Baker v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 18, 2006
• Docket: 06-05-00158-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-05-00158-CR

BRIAN JOE BAKER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

---

On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Court

Harrison County, Texas

Trial Court No. 05-0144X

---

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            On New Year's Eve 2004, after a day of horseback riding with thirty-year-old Brian Joe Baker, fourteen-year-old B.C., along with her cousin S.M., joined Baker at a campfire he had built in the woods behind his house. According to B.C.'s trial testimony, later in the evening, as S.M. appeared to sleep, Baker digitally penetrated B.C.'s vagina.

            Baker was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to forty-seven years' imprisonment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because, responsive to Baker's three points of error, we hold (1) Baker preserved no error regarding the State's alleged comments on Baker's failure to testify at trial, (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence concerning B.C.'s emotional stability, and (3) no ineffective assistance of counsel was shown.

(1)       Baker Preserved No Error Regarding the State's Alleged Comments on Baker's Failure To Testify at Trial

            At trial, Baker's counsel suggested that the girls were lying. The State repeatedly responded to that suggestion by arguing that there was nothing controverting their testimony. Baker argues that, because he was the only person who could have controverted the girls' testimony—the three individuals being the only ones present—the State's comments were necessarily a comment on Baker's failure to testify. Baker made no objection to these comments.

            During the guilt/innocence phase of trial, the prosecutor made the following arguably relevant comments:

Yesterday in voir dire, Mr. Jones said the girls were lying, but there weren't [sic] anybody up here, you know, to say they were liars. There wasn't anybody controverting that testimony.

To say something [referring to being able to get hands inside tight hiphugger jeans without removing or lowering them] is physically impossible isn't enough. There should have been testimony to that. There should have been evidence to that effect that this was a physical impossibility.

You don't have anything controverting any of these elements, folks.

[We] may never know why these girls made that up. Well, maybe, maybe, maybe. All this testimony, all this evidence before you, uncontroverted evidence, everything points to one thing. Everything . . . Because there is nothing that controverts it, other than [defense counsel] saying she lied, she lied.

During the punishment phase of trial, this comment was made by the State:

When someone wants to ask you for mercy, it comes a little easier for you to accept that plea for mercy if first they take responsibility for their actions. And that did not happen.

            Prosecutorial comment that refers to an accused's failure to testify violates the accused's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Bustamante v. State, 48 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The comment must clearly refer to the accused's failure to testify, and it is not sufficient that the comment might be construed as an implied or indirect allusion. Bustamante, 48 S.W.3d at 765. The test is whether the prosecutor manifestly intended his language to be such a comment, or whether the language was of such a character that the jury would necessarily and naturally take it as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Id.; Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Such a comment also violates a mandatory statute. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.08 (Vernon 2005); Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Similarly, in order to constitute a violation of Article 38.08, prohibiting comments on the defendant's failure to testify, the language used must be either manifestly intended, or of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Cockerham v. State, 729 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

            But, as with nearly all claims of error, when there is no objection to argument, this type of complaint is not preserved for appellate review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; see Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Berrett v. State, 152 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we do not address the argument on its merits.

            Counsel argues that these arguments are of such import that we should apply Rule 2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to suspend the application of appellate Rule 33.1. See Tex. R. App. P. 2, 33.1. Such arguments have been addressed and decided by the courts of Texas in requiring an objection to preserve various types of complaints, and we see nothing in this record that requires a different result. See generally Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We overrule Baker's first point of error.

(2)       The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding Evidence Concerning B.C.'s Emotional Stability

            Baker next contends that the trial court erred by refusing to permit him to introduce evidence about B.C.'s state of mind. Specifically, Baker sought to introduce evidence for the stated purpose of showing that B.C. was a troubled teen falsifying this charge to get attention from her mother. He sought to do so by the mother's testimony acknowledging that B.C. had been in rehabilitation programs away from home for two years, that B.C. did not want to follow the mother's rules once she returned, that her father had been absent for a year, and that, after the mother returned, she had become concerned for B.C.'s mental health and taken her to an emergency room and from there to a mental health facility. This occurred about five weeks before the date of the Baker incident, and there was testimony that the facility personnel wanted to put B.C. on antidepressants and that B.C.'s mother had fears of B.C.'s possible suicidal behavior.

            The court found that the evidence was not relevant—that it did not show a motive to lie, or show bias or prejudice. Baker argues that it was, in fact, the keystone of his defensive theory, and that, without the evidence, he had nothing but speculation available.

            Rules 401 and 402 of the Texas Rules of Evidence permit the admission of evidence only if it is relevant—that is, if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 401, 402. Evidence tending to affect the probability of truth or falsity of a fact in issue is necessarily logically relevant. Banda v. State, 890 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). We review the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We will not reverse a trial court whose ruling was within the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Green, 934 S.W.2d at 102; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391.

            The proffered evidence shows that B.C. exhibited some degree of emotional instability and was not a particularly obedient teen. The question, however, as set out by the trial objection and the point of error, is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the proffered evidence was not relevant. The evidence does not reflect a tendency to lie. We believe that the stretch here between showing B.C. to be emotionally unstable and tending to establish that she was lying to obtain maternal attention is simply too great. We find the degree of possible relevance of the evidence as presented to be so low as to be within the "zone of reasonable disagreement," and we thus decline the invitation to find that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony. We overrule this point of error.

(3)       No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Was Shown

            Baker finally contends he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not object to the prosecutor's arguments purportedly commenting on Baker's failure to testify. The standard of testing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on this claim, an appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that his or her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id.; Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To meet this burden, an appellant must prove that his or her attorney's representation fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Under this standard, a claimant must prove that counsel's representation so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

            The allegedly offending arguments from the State do not directly address Baker's failure to testify. Our review of them does not reveal that the arguments were such that the jury would necessarily and naturally take them as comments on Baker's failure to testify—with the exception of the comment made during the punishment phase. That comment was necessarily pointed purely at the defendant's failure to "own up" to his crime—with the State taking the position that, because he had failed to do so, he was not likely to be rehabilitated to any extent.

            Under normal circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic decision-making as to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable and professional. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In addressing this reality, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that appellate courts can rarely decide the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel because the record almost never speaks to the strategic reasons that trial counsel may have considered. The proper procedure for raising this claim is therefore almost always by application for writ of habeas corpus. Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Although some claims may be disposed of on direct appeal where "trial counsel's ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003); Freeman, 125 S.W.3d at 506. It appears from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' statements that such situations are quite rare. See Freeman, 125 S.W.3d at 506.

            In this case, the record does not reveal the reasons for counsel's decision not to object to the argument. We, therefore, decline to determine this matter on direct appeal. We overrule this point of error and affirm the judgment.

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date Submitted:          May 1, 2006

Date Decided:             May 18, 2006

Do Not Publish