Brian J. Diehl v. Kim M. Friedlander

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 25, 2024
• Docket: A-1134-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1134-23

BRIAN J. DIEHL,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KIM M. FRIEDLANDER,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Submitted November 13, 2024 – Decided November 25, 2024

Before Judges Chase and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FD-14-0163-18.

Heymann & Fletcher, attorneys for appellant (Alix Claps, on the brief).

Brian J. Diehl, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Kim Friedlander appeals from a November 1, 2023 Family Part

order, granting in part and denying in part, her motion for child support related expenses from plaintiff Brian Diehl. We vacate and remand for further

proceedings.

I.

Plaintiff and defendant are the parents of two children, a ten-year-old and

a seven-year- old. The parties were never married, and their relationship ended

not long after the birth of the second child. Pursuant to a July 2018 order,

weekly child support was set at $94, payable from defendant to plaintiff, with

the parties' proportional net income indicated at 76% and 24%, respectively.

Defendant filed an application with the trial court in July 2023 seeking

reimbursement for numerous out-of-pocket expenses utilizing the proportions of

the parties' net incomes set forth in the 2018 order. Defendant claimed she made

requests for reimbursement from plaintiff for certain non-guidelines expenses

for the children on many occasions but did not receive payment. The parties do

not contest that they have a 50/50 parenting time schedule; the children have

certain non-reimbursed medical bills; the children participate in extra-curricular

activities; and that the children attended preschool as work-related childcare

when they were younger.

A hearing was set for October 17, 2023. Either the day before or two days

before, plaintiff filed opposition papers. The parties appeared for court and oral

A-1134-23 2 argument ensued. Defendant claimed she was owed $8,204.58 for

reimbursement of plaintiff's proportionate share of childcare expenses. Plaintiff

subsequently argued that based on his submissions he was owed $3,459.65.

Most of the argument centered around a question raised concerning funds that

were paid by on behalf of plaintiff, by a subsidy, from the Counsel on Family

Relations ("CFR"). Plaintiff argued he was entitled to full credit for that amount

because it was based on his income level. Defendant argued that her claim was

only for out-of-pocket expenses, which should not include money that was paid

by a third-party. Moreover, defendant posited that if plaintiff was given a credit,

then it should adjust what he owed in child support. Because of the timing of

the opposition, the trial court provided defendant the opportunity to file a reply

after argument, which she did.

The trial court subsequently entered an order on November 1, 2023 which

stated:

Parties appeared via zoom on October 17, 2023. Plaintiff was pro se, and defendant was represented by Ms. Claps. The parties subsequently submitted letters to the court. Having reviewed the submissions and heard the testimony and representations and for good cause: Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant for the following: $1644 for orthodontist; $53.95 for the dermatologist; $325 for the dentist. Plaintiff has previously paid for the therapist and swimming costs, and received a subsidy for childcare, therefore the

A-1134-23 3 request for reimbursement for those items is denied. Any other relief not addressed above is denied without prejudice.

This appeal follows.

II.

"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because

of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433

N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,

412 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of

the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by

or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence

as to offend the interests of justice.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)

(alterations in original) (quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988)).

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to order plaintiff to

pay his proportional share of the out-of-pocket work-related childcare costs for

the parties' two children. Moreover, defendant posits that because there was no

statement of reasons, either in writing or on the record, it is impossible to know

if the court made a legal error or factual error regarding what was calculated for

childcare expenses and credits. Defendant also contends that if he was entitled

A-1134-23 4 to full credit for CFR payments, then his net income for child support should

have been imputed with that amount.

It is fundamental that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum

decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law

thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of

right . . . ." R. 1:7-4(a); see also Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980);

Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103, 110 (2004) (finding the record in a child name

change dispute "deficient to make a meaningful review" because "the trial court

received no testimony from either of the parties and made no findings of fact").

"Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of R[ule] 1:7-4." Curtis, 83 N.J.

at 570.

We appreciate the motion judge's efforts to actively manage a difficult

dispute without the necessity of successive, and undoubtedly costly, motion

practice. We do not pass judgment on the merits of the parties' claims or

defenses but identify them solely to illustrate that by failing to provide any

reasons for its decision, we, along with the litigants, "are left to conjecture as to

what the judge may have had in mind." Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443

(App. Div. 1990). See also Est. of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super.

A-1134-23 5 298, 302 (App. Div. 2018) (noting that Rule 1:7-4's "requirements are

unambiguous").

On remand, the court shall "'state clearly [its] factual findings and

correlate them with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the appellate

courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose] conclusion[s]. '"

Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594-95 (App. Div. 2016)

(alterations in original) (quoting Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 565

(App. Div. 1986)). See also R. 1:7-4.

For these reasons, we are constrained to vacate and remand the matter for

the judge to render findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1134-23 6