USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-2185
BRIAN HORSLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KBP INVESTMENTS; FQSR, LLC, trading as KBP Foods,
Defendants - Appellees, and
GBENGA OLAGBAJU, KFC, General Manager,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paula Xinis, District Judge. (8:20-cv-03241-PX)
Submitted: June 20, 2024 Decided: June 27, 2024
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian Horsley, Appellant Pro Se. James Randall Coffey, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellees. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Brian Horsley filed an amended complaint against his former employer, FQSR, LLC
d/b/a KBP Foods (“KBP”), alleging that KBP failed to provide reasonable
accommodations for his disability and, instead, unlawfully terminated his employment due
to this disability or in retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodations, all in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1202 to 12213, and the
Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606 (2023).
KBP moved to dismiss the amended complaint as a sanction for Horsley’s failure to
respond to its discovery requests, appear for his deposition, and comply with the district
court’s orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). KBP also
requested compensation for the expenses it incurred due to Horsley’s failure to attend his
deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3). The district court granted KBP’s motions,
ordering Horsley to pay $200 to compensate KBP for the cost of the court reporter and
dismissing the amended complaint. Horsley appeals that order and challenges several of
the court’s discovery-related rulings. We affirm.
“In reviewing a district court’s findings and discovery rulings, we are mindful of
the broad discretion accorded to district courts to supervise discovery, including the
imposition of sanctions for discovery abuses, as part of their case-management authority.”
Mey v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 203, 217 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). And
because “[a] district court has wide latitude in controlling discovery,” “its rulings will not
be overturned absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on
erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United States v. Davis,
99 F.4th 647, 653 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, fails to appear for
a deposition, or fails to serve a response after being served with interrogatories or a request
for production, the district court may order sanctions, including” dismissing the complaint.
Mey, 71 F.4th at 218; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). But “[w]hen the sanction involved
is [dismissal], the district court’s range of discretion is more narrow because the district
court’s desire to enforce its discovery orders is confronted head-on by the party’s rights to
a trial by jury and a fair day in court.” Mey, 71 F.4th at 218 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, “only the most flagrant case, where the party’s noncompliance represents
bad faith and callous disregard for the authority of the district court and the Rules, [should]
result in the extreme sanction of dismissal.” Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Richards &
Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989).
To determine the propriety of dismissal as a sanction for discovery violations, the
court must consider: “(1) whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith; (2) the
amount of prejudice his noncompliance caused his adversary; (3) the need for deterrence
of the particular sort of noncompliance; and (4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions.”
Mey, 71 F.4th at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “a party is entitled to
be made aware of the drastic consequences of failing to meet the court’s conditions at the
time the conditions are imposed, when he still has the opportunity to satisfy the conditions
and avoid the sanction.” Id. (cleaned up).
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A district court also has the authority to dismiss an action for a party’s failure to
comply with its orders, and we review a court’s decision to dismiss on this ground for an
abuse of discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Atkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 620, 625-
27 (4th Cir. 2019). “Given the inherent judicial authority to make such dismissals, a court
may, in appropriate circumstances, enter such a dismissal sua sponte, even absent advance
notice of the possibility of dismissal.” Atkisson, 925 F.3d at 625 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But “recognizing the severity of dismissal as a sanction,” we have “identified
four criteria that guide a district court’s discretion in dismissing a case under Rule 41(b).”
Id. Specifically, the court “should weigh: (1) the plaintiff’s degree of personal
responsibility; (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant; (3) the presence of a
drawn out history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion; and (4) the effectiveness
of sanctions less drastic than dismissal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Limiting our review to the issues raised in Horsley’s informal brief, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s order granting KBP’s motions for sanctions. See
Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important
document; under [4th Cir. R. 34(b)], our review is limited to issues preserved in that
brief.”). Specifically, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Horsley acted in bad faith by failing to respond to KBP’s discovery requests, even after the
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USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-2185
BRIAN HORSLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KBP INVESTMENTS; FQSR, LLC, trading as KBP Foods,
Defendants - Appellees, and
GBENGA OLAGBAJU, KFC, General Manager,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paula Xinis, District Judge. (8:20-cv-03241-PX)
Submitted: June 20, 2024 Decided: June 27, 2024
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian Horsley, Appellant Pro Se. James Randall Coffey, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellees. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Brian Horsley filed an amended complaint against his former employer, FQSR, LLC
d/b/a KBP Foods (“KBP”), alleging that KBP failed to provide reasonable
accommodations for his disability and, instead, unlawfully terminated his employment due
to this disability or in retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodations, all in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1202 to 12213, and the
Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606 (2023).
KBP moved to dismiss the amended complaint as a sanction for Horsley’s failure to
respond to its discovery requests, appear for his deposition, and comply with the district
court’s orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). KBP also
requested compensation for the expenses it incurred due to Horsley’s failure to attend his
deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3). The district court granted KBP’s motions,
ordering Horsley to pay $200 to compensate KBP for the cost of the court reporter and
dismissing the amended complaint. Horsley appeals that order and challenges several of
the court’s discovery-related rulings. We affirm.
“In reviewing a district court’s findings and discovery rulings, we are mindful of
the broad discretion accorded to district courts to supervise discovery, including the
imposition of sanctions for discovery abuses, as part of their case-management authority.”
Mey v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 203, 217 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). And
because “[a] district court has wide latitude in controlling discovery,” “its rulings will not
be overturned absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on
erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United States v. Davis,
99 F.4th 647, 653 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, fails to appear for
a deposition, or fails to serve a response after being served with interrogatories or a request
for production, the district court may order sanctions, including” dismissing the complaint.
Mey, 71 F.4th at 218; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). But “[w]hen the sanction involved
is [dismissal], the district court’s range of discretion is more narrow because the district
court’s desire to enforce its discovery orders is confronted head-on by the party’s rights to
a trial by jury and a fair day in court.” Mey, 71 F.4th at 218 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, “only the most flagrant case, where the party’s noncompliance represents
bad faith and callous disregard for the authority of the district court and the Rules, [should]
result in the extreme sanction of dismissal.” Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Richards &
Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989).
To determine the propriety of dismissal as a sanction for discovery violations, the
court must consider: “(1) whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith; (2) the
amount of prejudice his noncompliance caused his adversary; (3) the need for deterrence
of the particular sort of noncompliance; and (4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions.”
Mey, 71 F.4th at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “a party is entitled to
be made aware of the drastic consequences of failing to meet the court’s conditions at the
time the conditions are imposed, when he still has the opportunity to satisfy the conditions
and avoid the sanction.” Id. (cleaned up).
4 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2185 Doc: 39 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 5 of 6
A district court also has the authority to dismiss an action for a party’s failure to
comply with its orders, and we review a court’s decision to dismiss on this ground for an
abuse of discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Atkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 620, 625-
27 (4th Cir. 2019). “Given the inherent judicial authority to make such dismissals, a court
may, in appropriate circumstances, enter such a dismissal sua sponte, even absent advance
notice of the possibility of dismissal.” Atkisson, 925 F.3d at 625 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But “recognizing the severity of dismissal as a sanction,” we have “identified
four criteria that guide a district court’s discretion in dismissing a case under Rule 41(b).”
Id. Specifically, the court “should weigh: (1) the plaintiff’s degree of personal
responsibility; (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant; (3) the presence of a
drawn out history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion; and (4) the effectiveness
of sanctions less drastic than dismissal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Limiting our review to the issues raised in Horsley’s informal brief, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s order granting KBP’s motions for sanctions. See
Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important
document; under [4th Cir. R. 34(b)], our review is limited to issues preserved in that
brief.”). Specifically, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Horsley acted in bad faith by failing to respond to KBP’s discovery requests, even after the
court directed him to do so; that KBP was prejudiced by Horsley’s recalcitrance; that
Horsley’s discovery violations and noncompliance with the court’s orders was misconduct
that needed to be deterred; and that any sanction less drastic than dismissal would not serve
that purpose. We also find no merit to Horsley’s challenges to the district court’s
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discovery-related orders, see Bresler v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 855 F.3d 178, 189
(4th Cir. 2017) (reviewing discovery rulings for abuse of discretion), and conclude that
Horsley’s allegations of misconduct by counsel and the district court are entirely baseless.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s discovery-related orders and its order
granting KBP’s motions for sanctions and dismissing Horsley’s amended complaint.
Horsley v. KBP Invs., No. 8:20-cv-03241-PX (D. Md. Jan. 24, May 17, July 28, and
Nov. 7, 2022). We deny Horsley’s motion to vacate the district court’s final order, motion
for reconsideration of several of our orders, and motion to stay certain orders and expedite
the decision. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED