Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September 29, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-1725 Lower Tribunal Nos. F20-7010, F19-3967 ________________
Brian Hodges, Petitioner,
vs.
The State of Florida, Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.
Michael A. Catalano, P.A., and Michael A. Catalano; Beckham Solis, PLLC, and Helmuth Solis, for petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Joanne Diez, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Before MILLER, LOBREE, and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J. Petitioner, Brian Hodges, seeks writs of prohibition to prevent the
assigned trial judge from further presiding over his criminal case and habeas
corpus challenging the legality of his pretrial detention. Reiterating the well-
entrenched adage that “the laws governing judicial disqualification were
never intended ‘to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of
adverse rulings made,’” for such rulings are reviewable otherwise, “but,
instead, serve ‘to prevent his [or her] future action in the pending case’” and
concluding Hodges is properly detained under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.132 and section 907.041, Florida Statutes (2021), we deny both
petitions. Quintas Vazquez v. Smith, 318 So. 3d 579, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021) (citations omitted).
BACKGROUND
In early 2019, Hodges was charged by information with several
alcohol-related crimes, including driving under the influence (“DUI”) with
serious bodily injury and damage to property or person. See § 316.193(1),
(3), Fla. Stat. After he was released on felony bond, he was again arrested
and charged with committing a myriad of crimes, including boating under the
influence (“BUI”) manslaughter and vessel homicide. See §§ 327.35(3),
782.072, Fla. Stat. The trial court revoked his bond on the initial charges.
2 The State filed a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.132 and section 907.041, Florida Statutes. Citing a
prior DUI conviction from the State of New York, the State asserted Hodges
had “previously violated conditions of release and no further conditions of
release [were] reasonably likely to assure his appearance at subsequent
proceedings;” he “pose[d] a threat of harm to the community,” as he “[was]
charged with a dangerous crime, to wit, . . . [m]anslaughter;” there was “a
substantial probability that [he] committed such crime, the factual
circumstances of the crime indicate[d] a disregard for the safety of the
community, and there [were] no conditions of release reasonably sufficient
to protect the community from the risk of physical harm to persons.” The trial
court convened a hearing, at the conclusion of which it found the criteria for
pretrial detention was satisfied and ordered Hodges held without bond.
A jury later acquitted Hodges of the crimes precipitating the initial
arrest. Hodges unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the pretrial
detention order, and the instant petitions ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Although a trial court has discretion in setting reasonable pretrial
release conditions, [the] authority to order pretrial detention is circumscribed
3 by the state constitution and relevant statutes.” Blair v. State, 15 So. 3d 758,
760 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
ANALYSIS
Finding the motion for disqualification filed below was legally
insufficient, we deny the petition for writ of prohibition without further
elaboration and focus our analysis instead on the propriety of continued
pretrial detention. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle
to challenge an order of pretrial detention. State v. Broom, 523 So. 2d 639,
641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see also Miller v. State, 980 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2008); Holmes v. State, 933 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
The traditional purpose of bail is “to insure the defendant’s appearance
and submission to the judgment of the court.” Reynolds v. United States, 80
S. Ct. 30, 32 (1959). Of equally salient consideration, however, are the
alternative purposes of warding off witness intimidation and preventing the
repetition of dangerous acts by incapacitating the accused. As relevant to
the latter objective, the legislature enacted section 907.041, Florida Statutes,
entitled “[p]retrial detention and release,” to ensure “the protection of the
community from risk of physical harm to persons.” § 907.041(1), Fla. Stat.
To that end, the statute authorizes the refusal of bond under certain closely
circumscribed circumstances.
4 Section 907.041, provides, in pertinent part:
The court may order pretrial detention if it finds a substantial probability, based on a defendant’s past and present patterns of behavior, the criteria in s. 903.046, and any other relevant facts, that any of the following circumstances exist:
....
The defendant poses the threat of harm to the community. The court may so conclude, if it finds that the defendant is presently charged with a dangerous crime, that there is a substantial probability that the defendant committed such crime, that the factual circumstances of the crime indicate a disregard for the safety of the community, and that there are no conditions of release reasonably sufficient to protect the community from the risk of physical harm to persons.
§ 907.041(4)(c), Fla. Stat.
In the instant case, during a lengthy hearing, the State adduced
evidence that Hodges, having been previously convicted of DUI in another
state, committed several offenses while out on felony bond. One of those
crimes involved the death of another.
Relying upon his acquittal on the underlying charges, Hodges argues,
however, this evidence was insufficient to satisfy the statutory criteria. Here,
the trial court did not purport to predicate its finding upon the conduct for
which Hodges was acquitted. Instead, the gravamen of the pretrial detention
order was that Hodges, having been previously convicted of a DUI-related
offense, violated the conditions of his release by engaging in crimes
5 demonstrating a disregard for the safety of the community. Consequently,
the acquittal does not operate to nullify the basis for ordering detention.
Hodges further contends that the instant charges do not qualify as
“dangerous crimes” under the pretrial detention statute. 1 As with the analysis
of any statute, we “begin[] with ‘the language of the statute,’” and, in this
case, because that “language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.”
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (citations
omitted). Section 907.041, Florida Statutes, contains an exhaustive list of
those crimes deemed by the legislature sufficiently dangerous to
demonstrate the accused poses a risk of harm to the community. Among
those included are “homicide” and “manslaughter.” § 907.041(4)(a), Fla.
Stat.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September 29, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-1725 Lower Tribunal Nos. F20-7010, F19-3967 ________________
Brian Hodges, Petitioner,
vs.
The State of Florida, Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.
Michael A. Catalano, P.A., and Michael A. Catalano; Beckham Solis, PLLC, and Helmuth Solis, for petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Joanne Diez, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Before MILLER, LOBREE, and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J. Petitioner, Brian Hodges, seeks writs of prohibition to prevent the
assigned trial judge from further presiding over his criminal case and habeas
corpus challenging the legality of his pretrial detention. Reiterating the well-
entrenched adage that “the laws governing judicial disqualification were
never intended ‘to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of
adverse rulings made,’” for such rulings are reviewable otherwise, “but,
instead, serve ‘to prevent his [or her] future action in the pending case’” and
concluding Hodges is properly detained under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.132 and section 907.041, Florida Statutes (2021), we deny both
petitions. Quintas Vazquez v. Smith, 318 So. 3d 579, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021) (citations omitted).
BACKGROUND
In early 2019, Hodges was charged by information with several
alcohol-related crimes, including driving under the influence (“DUI”) with
serious bodily injury and damage to property or person. See § 316.193(1),
(3), Fla. Stat. After he was released on felony bond, he was again arrested
and charged with committing a myriad of crimes, including boating under the
influence (“BUI”) manslaughter and vessel homicide. See §§ 327.35(3),
782.072, Fla. Stat. The trial court revoked his bond on the initial charges.
2 The State filed a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.132 and section 907.041, Florida Statutes. Citing a
prior DUI conviction from the State of New York, the State asserted Hodges
had “previously violated conditions of release and no further conditions of
release [were] reasonably likely to assure his appearance at subsequent
proceedings;” he “pose[d] a threat of harm to the community,” as he “[was]
charged with a dangerous crime, to wit, . . . [m]anslaughter;” there was “a
substantial probability that [he] committed such crime, the factual
circumstances of the crime indicate[d] a disregard for the safety of the
community, and there [were] no conditions of release reasonably sufficient
to protect the community from the risk of physical harm to persons.” The trial
court convened a hearing, at the conclusion of which it found the criteria for
pretrial detention was satisfied and ordered Hodges held without bond.
A jury later acquitted Hodges of the crimes precipitating the initial
arrest. Hodges unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the pretrial
detention order, and the instant petitions ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Although a trial court has discretion in setting reasonable pretrial
release conditions, [the] authority to order pretrial detention is circumscribed
3 by the state constitution and relevant statutes.” Blair v. State, 15 So. 3d 758,
760 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
ANALYSIS
Finding the motion for disqualification filed below was legally
insufficient, we deny the petition for writ of prohibition without further
elaboration and focus our analysis instead on the propriety of continued
pretrial detention. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle
to challenge an order of pretrial detention. State v. Broom, 523 So. 2d 639,
641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see also Miller v. State, 980 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2008); Holmes v. State, 933 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
The traditional purpose of bail is “to insure the defendant’s appearance
and submission to the judgment of the court.” Reynolds v. United States, 80
S. Ct. 30, 32 (1959). Of equally salient consideration, however, are the
alternative purposes of warding off witness intimidation and preventing the
repetition of dangerous acts by incapacitating the accused. As relevant to
the latter objective, the legislature enacted section 907.041, Florida Statutes,
entitled “[p]retrial detention and release,” to ensure “the protection of the
community from risk of physical harm to persons.” § 907.041(1), Fla. Stat.
To that end, the statute authorizes the refusal of bond under certain closely
circumscribed circumstances.
4 Section 907.041, provides, in pertinent part:
The court may order pretrial detention if it finds a substantial probability, based on a defendant’s past and present patterns of behavior, the criteria in s. 903.046, and any other relevant facts, that any of the following circumstances exist:
....
The defendant poses the threat of harm to the community. The court may so conclude, if it finds that the defendant is presently charged with a dangerous crime, that there is a substantial probability that the defendant committed such crime, that the factual circumstances of the crime indicate a disregard for the safety of the community, and that there are no conditions of release reasonably sufficient to protect the community from the risk of physical harm to persons.
§ 907.041(4)(c), Fla. Stat.
In the instant case, during a lengthy hearing, the State adduced
evidence that Hodges, having been previously convicted of DUI in another
state, committed several offenses while out on felony bond. One of those
crimes involved the death of another.
Relying upon his acquittal on the underlying charges, Hodges argues,
however, this evidence was insufficient to satisfy the statutory criteria. Here,
the trial court did not purport to predicate its finding upon the conduct for
which Hodges was acquitted. Instead, the gravamen of the pretrial detention
order was that Hodges, having been previously convicted of a DUI-related
offense, violated the conditions of his release by engaging in crimes
5 demonstrating a disregard for the safety of the community. Consequently,
the acquittal does not operate to nullify the basis for ordering detention.
Hodges further contends that the instant charges do not qualify as
“dangerous crimes” under the pretrial detention statute. 1 As with the analysis
of any statute, we “begin[] with ‘the language of the statute,’” and, in this
case, because that “language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.”
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (citations
omitted). Section 907.041, Florida Statutes, contains an exhaustive list of
those crimes deemed by the legislature sufficiently dangerous to
demonstrate the accused poses a risk of harm to the community. Among
those included are “homicide” and “manslaughter.” § 907.041(4)(a), Fla.
Stat. The statute does not purport to distinguish between, degrees, residual
categories, or varieties of the delineated crimes.
Like voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, BUI
manslaughter falls under the broad umbrella of “manslaughter.” See
Manslaughter, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (3d ed. 2011)
1 Hodges argues that pretrial detention considerations relating to DUI manslaughter are included in section 907.041(4)(c), Florida Statutes, thus, alcohol-related crimes resulting in death are thereby excluded from section 907.041(4)(a), Florida Statutes. This argument is unavailing, as the legislature gave no separate consideration to BUI manslaughter or vessel homicide.
6 (“Manslaughter: A. Voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.
. . . B. And causing death by reckless or dangerous driving.”); see also
Garcia v. Junior, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1605 (Fla. 3d DCA July 14, 2021)
(noting DUI manslaughter is delineated as a “dangerous crime”). Further, it
is hardly debatable that vessel homicide constitutes a form of “homicide.”
Accordingly, we decline to intrude upon the prerogative of the legislature and
carve out an unpenned exception to the statute.
Noting the threat of community harm finding is further supported by
Hodges’ out-of-state DUI conviction, we discern no error in the decision to
order pretrial detention. See § 907.041(4)(c)4., Fla. Stat. (“[C]onditions that
would support a finding . . . that the defendant poses a threat of harm to the
community include, but are not limited to, any of the following: a. The
defendant has previously been convicted of any crime under s. 316.193, or
of any crime in any other state or territory of the United States that is
substantially similar to any crime under s. 316.193.”). Thus, we deny both
petitions.
Petitions denied.