Brian Glenreginald M. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRIAN GLENREGINALD M.1, Case No. 2:25-cv-01910-PD

12 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION 13 v. AND ORDER VACATING AGENCY DECISION 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, 15 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,2 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff challenges the denial of his applications for Disability 19 Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits. For the 20 reasons stated below, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is 21 vacated, and the Court remands this matter on an open record for further 22 proceedings. 23 24

25 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the United States Judicial Conference Committee on 26 Court Administration and Case Management. 27 2 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Frank Bisignano, the current Commissioner of 28 1 I. Pertinent Procedural History and Disputed Issues 2 On November 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period 3 of disability and disability insurance benefits, and Title XVI application for 4 supplemental security income benefits alleging that he had been disabled 5 since April 1, 2018. Administrative Record (“AR”) 18, 309-317.3 His 6 applications were denied initially on October 11, 2022, and upon 7 reconsideration on May 25, 2023. AR 18, 196-209, 210-224. He requested a 8 hearing, which was held via online video on January 11, 2024, before an 9 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 45-69. Plaintiff appeared with 10 counsel, and the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. 11 Id. On April 10, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff has not been 12 under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act (“SSA”) from April 1, 13 2018, through the date of decision. AR 18-37. On January 15, 2025, the 14 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s 15 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1-7. 16 The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process to assess 17 whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act. Lester v. 18 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded on other grounds by 19 regulation as stated by Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 21 meets the insured status requirements of the SSA through March 31, 2022 22 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activities since April 1, 2018, the 23 alleged onset date. AR 20 ¶¶ 1, 2.4 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 24

25 3 The Administrative Record is CM/ECF Docket Numbers 10-1 through 10-13. Plaintiff’s opening brief is at Docket Number 12, Defendant’s Brief is at Docket 26 Number 17, and Plaintiff’s Reply Brief is at Docket Number 18.

27 4 The ALJ noted that while Plaintiff’s earnings record did not indicate any income 28 since 2019 [AR 335-39], there is evidence of unreported work activity. [AR 20-21.] At 1 has the following severe impairments: “lumbar and cervical spondylosis 2 with radiculopathy; degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees; iliotibial 3 band syndrome and lateral patellar translation of the right knee; carpal 4 tunnel syndrome of the right upper extremity, status-post right carpal tunnel 5 release surgery; left shoulder partial rotator cuff and SLAP tear status post 6 arthroscopy and repair; status-post COVID-19 infection with respiratory 7 failure and asthma; hypertension; coronary artery disease; obesity; and 8 alcohol use disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).” AR 21 ¶ 3. The 9 ALJ found that these medically determinable impairments significantly limit 10 Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities. AR 21. 11 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment 12 or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of 13 one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 14 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). AR 24-25 ¶ 4. 15 Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has 16 the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined by 17 the regulations with the following limitations: 18 19 except he can stand and/or walk 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; 20 occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 21 crawl; can have occasional exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, 22 and poor ventilation; frequently handle and finger with the right upper extremity; and frequently reach overhead with the left 23

24 engaged in significant work activity--working off and on as an Uber driver since 25 December 2018 until the Sunday prior to the hearing. He testified that he worked approximately 30-42 hours per week and would earn between $800 and $1200 per 26 week [AR 52-54]. Plaintiff consistently reported similar information to a psychiatrist in 2022 [AR 2688]. The ALJ stated however, absent additional 27 information regarding income earned and hours worked, there is insufficient 28 information to determine that this work was performed disqualifying substantial 1 upper extremity. 2 AR 25 ¶ 5. 3 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past 4 relevant work. AR 35 ¶ 6. 5 At step five, considering Plaintiff’s age (36 years old on the alleged 6 disability onset date), education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found 7 that there are jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy 8 that Plaintiff can perform, in the occupations of “surveillance system 9 monitor”, “document preparer”, and “escort vehicle.” AR 35-36 ¶¶ 7-10. 10 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, 11 as defined in the SSA, from April 1, 2018, through the date of the decision. 12 AR 37 ¶ 11. 13 Plaintiff raises five issues: (1) Whether the ALJ failed to properly 14 evaluate the treating medical source opinions of Stephen Greene, M.D., 15 Pamela Law, M.D., and Kayvon Yadidi, D.O.; (2) Whether the ALJ failed to 16 properly evaluate the treating medical source opinion of Orthopedic Surgeon 17 Kevin Pelton, M.D. ; (3) Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the 18 examining medical source opinion of Mark Newman, M.D.; (4) Whether the 19 ALJ failed to properly evaluate the treating medical source opinion of Natalie 20 Hammond, Physician Assistant-Certified; and (5) Whether the ALJ failed to 21 properly evaluate the treating medical source opinion of Neurologist Mohsen 22 Hamza, M.D. Dkt. No. 12 at 5-6. 23 II. Standard of Review 24 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the agency’s 25 decision to deny benefits. A court will vacate the agency’s decision “only if the 26 ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 27 whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Coleman v. Saul, 979 28 1 more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 2 evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 3 conclusion.” Id.; Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.97, 103 (2019) (same). 4 It is the ALJ’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence 5 and ambiguities in the record. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 6 2020). Where this evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational 7 interpretation” the ALJ’s reasonable evaluation of the proof should be upheld. 8 Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008); Tran v. 9 Saul, 804 F. App’x 676, 678 (9th Cir. 2020).5 10 Error in Social Security determinations is subject to harmless error 11 analysis. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). Error is 12 harmless if “it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” 13 or, despite the legal error, “the agency’s path is reasonably discerned.” 14 Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). 15 III. Discussion 16 A. The ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate the Medical 17 Opinions 18 1. Applicable Law 19 An RFC is “an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained 20 work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and 21 continuing basis.” Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 22 (1996). It reflects the most a claimant can do despite their limitations. 23 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). An RFC determination 24

25 5 Although statements in unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions “may prove useful [] as 26 examples of the applications of settled legal principles,” the Ninth Circuit has cautioned lower courts not to rely heavily on such memorandum dispositions 27 particularly as to issues of law. Grimm v. City of Portland, 971 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th 28 Cir. 2020) (“a nonprecedential disposition is not appropriately used ... as the pivotal 1 must be based on all of the relevant evidence, including the diagnoses, 2 treatment, observations, and opinions of medical sources, such as treating and 3 examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. It is the ALJ’s responsibility to 4 resolve conflicts in the medical evidence and ambiguities in the record. Ford, 5 950 F.3d at 1149. Where this evidence is “susceptible to more than one 6 rational interpretation” the ALJ’s reasonable evaluation of the proof should be 7 upheld. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. 8 The ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, “is responsible for translating 9 and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r 10 Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). In rendering the RFC, 11 the ALJ “must articulate a ‘substantive basis for rejecting a medical opinion 12 or crediting one medical opinion over another.’” Sandra B. v. Kijakazi, 2022 13 WL 2651981, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 8, 2022) (citing Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 14 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014)). For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Social Security 15 Administration’s new regulations, which alter the framework for how an ALJ 16 must evaluate medical evidence, apply. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the 17 Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 2017 WL 168819, at 5844- 18 45 (Jan. 18, 2017); Loriel C. v. Saul, 2020 WL 4340742, at *11 (E.D. Wash. 19 July 28, 2020). ALJs are now required to articulate “how persuasive [the 20 ALJ] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior administrative 21 medical findings.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b). 22 The factors for considering persuasiveness include supportability, 23 consistency, relationship with claimant (e.g. length of the treatment 24 relationship, frequency of examinations, etc.), specialization, and other factors 25 that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. 26 §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5). While all factors should be considered, the ALJ must 27 articulate how he or she considered the factors of supportability and 28 1 consistency. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2); Buethe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2 2021 WL 1966202, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2021) (explaining that while an 3 ALJ is required to consider all factors, the ALJ must at least explain how she 4 considered the supportability and consistency factors because they are the 5 most important). 6 The ALJ “must do so in sufficient detail to allow a reviewing court to 7 determine whether that reasoning is free from legal error.” Robert D. v. 8 Kijakazi, 2021 WL 5905734, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2021). “The ‘more 9 relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations 10 presented’ and the ‘more consistent’ with evidence from other sources, the 11 more persuasive a medical opinion or prior finding is.” Christopher F. v. 12 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 7022484, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2020) 13 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(C)(1)-(2)). Under the new regulations, an 14 ALJ “cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial 15 evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). 16 An RFC is defective if it fails to take a plaintiff’s limitations into 17 account. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 18 2009). However, “there is no requirement that the RFC recite medical 19 opinions verbatim, rather the ALJ is responsible for translating and 20 incorporating medical findings into a succinct RFC.” McIntosh v. Colvin, 2018 21 WL 1101102, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018); Bufkin v. Saul, 836 F. App’x 578, 22 579 (9th Cir. 2021) (“ALJs need not seek the opinion of a medical expert every 23 time they review new medical evidence and make a RFC determination.”); see 24 also Foster v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 3230472, at *2 (9th Cir. 2022) (“An ALJ 25 considers opinions from medical sources on the issue of a claimant’s RFC, but 26 the final responsibility for deciding this issue is reserved to the 27 Commissioner.”) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations 28 1 omitted). Finally, it is well established that RFC determinations are legal 2 decisions, not medical opinions. Valerie C. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 450675, at 3 *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019). 4 2. Analysis 5 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately articulate the factors 6 of supportability and consistency in evaluating the medical opinions. 7 Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the 8 medical opinions of Dr. Stephen Greene, Dr. Pamela Law, Kayvon Yadidi, 9 D.O., Dr. Kevin Pelton, Dr. Mark Newman, Physician’s Assistant Natalie 10 Hammond, and Dr. Mohsen Hamza. Dkt. Nos. 12 at 5-28; 18 at 2-7. 11 12 i. Dr. Stephen Greene, Dr. Pamela Law and Dr. 13 Kayvon Yadidi 14 In assessing the RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing a 15 range of light work. AR 25 ¶ 5. With respect to the disputed issue, the RFC 16 included the following limitations: Plaintiff can stand and/or walk 2 hours in 17 an 8-hour workday; occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb 18 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 19 crawl; can have occasional exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor 20 ventilation; frequently handle and finger with the right upper extremity; and frequently reach overhead with the left upper extremity. Id. 21 In connection with Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim, Plaintiff saw 22 Dr. Stephen Greene in March 2018 and reported that while he was working at 23 Northrup Grumman on March 10, 2018, he stepped in a hole that was in the 24 floor, and his leg went through the floor up to his right knee. AR 891. 25 Plaintiff also struck his left elbow and left thigh on the floor when he fell. AR 26 891. Plaintiff went to the Antelope Valley Hospital emergency room where x- 27 rays were taken and reported as negative for fracture of the left elbow and 28 1 negative for fracture of the right knee but there was a moderate effusion of 2 the right knee. AR 891. 3 Dr. Greene examined Plaintiff and noted mild to moderate tenderness 4 in his left elbow; abnormal gait; limited range of motion in his right knee; and 5 decreased muscle strength. AR 750, 751, 875, 887, 888, 892, 894-895, 917, 6 924, 928, 933, 937, 942, 945-946. Dr. Greene opined that Plaintiff was only 7 able to perform limited standing and walking; needed sitting work only; was 8 not able to push, pull, or lift over 10 pounds; and needed to use elbow and 9 knee support and a cane. AR 893, 896, 929, 938, 947. Dr. Greene imposed 10 work restrictions for two weeks in March 2018. AR 893, 896, 929, 938, 947. 11 Dr. Pamela Law also treated Plaintiff in connection with his workers’ 12 compensation claim and noted on examination that Plaintiff had an antalgic 13 gait, tenderness to palpation in his right knee, reduced range of motion and 14 limited motor strength in his right knee and tenderness to palpation in his left elbow. AR 836, 847, 857, 865. Dr. Law limited Plaintiff to standing and 15 walking “no more than 10 cumulative minutes per hour;” no bending, 16 twisting, squatting, kneeling, or reaching overhead with the left shoulder; and 17 no pushing, pulling, lifting or carrying more than five pounds. AR 838, 849, 18 850, 861, 869, 872. Dr. Law placed Plaintiff on modified duty for a one-month 19 period between mid-April through mid-May 2018. AR 838, 849, 850, 861, 869, 20 872. 21 In April 2018, Dr. Kayvon Yadidi treated Plaintiff in connection with 22 his workers’ compensation claim and noted on examination that Plaintiff had 23 an antalgic gait, swelling and tenderness in his right knee, and limited range 24 of motion in his right knee. AR 840, 879. Dr. Yadadi imposed similar 25 restrictions to Dr. Greene for a two-day period except he found that Plaintiff 26 must use crutches and knee support. AR 840, 879. Dr. Yadadi opined that 27 Plaintiff was limited to performing sitting work with no pushing, pulling, and 28 1 lifting of more than 10 pounds. AR 840, 879. 2 The ALJ did not find Dr. Greene, Dr. Law and Dr. Yadadi’s opinions 3 persuasive. AR 32-33. The ALJ found them inconsistent with the evidence 4 which noted that Plaintiff had “very high subjective complaints of pain,” and 5 that the diagnostic studies demonstrated no significant structural 6 abnormality warranting further treatment. AR 33 (citing AR 1020, 1044, 7 1059, 1064, 1190). The ALJ found that while the doctors’ opinions may be 8 supported by their own treatment records at the time of the examination 9 because of positive findings found on examination, the opinions also appeared 10 to be partly based on Plaintiff’s own subjective statements, which the ALJ 11 found were not consistent with other objective findings, examinations, and 12 diagnostic studies. AR 33 (citing AR 1020, 1044, 1059, 1064, 1190). The ALJ 13 further noted that there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s crutches or any other 14 assistive device was actually medically necessary and appeared to be based on Plaintiff’s own statements to the providers that it was needed. AR 33. 15 As to the supportability factor, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ never 16 considered the objective medical evidence or supporting explanations of Drs. 17 Greene, Law, and Yadidi and, therefore, failed to properly evaluate their 18 opinions. Dkt. No. 12 at 8-13. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that during 19 numerous examinations with Dr. Greene, Plaintiff’s abnormal findings 20 included mild to moderate tenderness in his left elbow; abnormal gait; limited 21 range of motion in his right knee; and decreased muscle strength. AR 750, 22 751, 875, 887, 888, 892, 894-895, 917, 924, 928, 933, 937, 942, 945-946. 23 Likewise, on examinations with Dr. Law and Dr. Yadidi, Plaintiff had 24 abnormal findings including an antalgic gait, tenderness to palpation in his 25 right knee, reduced range of motion in his right knee, limited motor strength 26 in his right knee, and tenderness to palpation in his left elbow. AR 836, 840, 27 847, 857, 865, 879. 28 1 As to the consistency factor, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ pointed to 2 four pages of diagnostic imaging studies that demonstrated no significant 3 structural abnormality warranting further treatment [AR 33 (citing AR 1020, 4 1044, 1059)] and failed to address the evidence consistent with Drs. Greene, 5 Law, and Yadidi’s opinions. Dkt. No. 12 at 10-12. Contrary to the ALJ’s 6 findings, Plaintiff argues that the diagnostic imaging was consistent with Drs. 7 Greene, Law, and Yadidi’s opinions. Dkt. No. 12 at 11. For example, an MRI 8 of Plaintiff’s right knee showed “bone increased signal of anterior medial 9 condyle to anterior tibial eminence that may be stress-related edema and 10 contusion” and “possible partial tearing about the femoral attachment” [AR 11 920]. Id. In addition, EMG and nerve testing in 2020 showed right median 12 motor delay and left median sensory delay that were consistent with carpal 13 tunnel entrapment neuropathy [AR 1158]; an MRI of Plaintiff’s left shoulder 14 showed extensive tearing of his superior labrum and subscapularis tendon [AR 3770]; and the record also showed abnormal neurological studies as late 15 as 2023 [AR 3756]. Importantly, Plaintiff required surgery on his left 16 shoulder in January 2024. AR 3775-3778. 17 Likewise, the opinions of Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi were consistent 18 with Plaintiff’s ongoing abnormal examination results, which included 19 tenderness in his right knee; limited range of motion in his right knee; limited 20 range of motion in his cervical spine; limited range of motion in his thoracic 21 spine; limited range of motion in his lumbar spine; slow gait; positive straight 22 leg raising bilaterally; limited range of motion in his shoulders; antalgic gait; 23 and muscle spasm. AR 415, 485, 506, 518, 523, 528, 535, 589, 590, 591, 592, 24 697, 706, 794, 806, 819, 897, 899, 901, 959, 1993, 1994, 2394, 3762. 25 The Commissioner responds that Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi 26 assessed short-term work restrictions that were among the “numerous” 27 opinions connected to Plaintiff’s “ongoing workers’ compensation litigation.” 28 1 Dkt. No. 17 at 10 (citing AR 32). The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ 2 explained that while the opinions were somewhat supported by their 3 examinations “at the time”, they were inconsistent with the longitudinal 4 record which demonstrated Plaintiff was not so limited; and their opinions 5 were partially supported by Plaintiff’s “own subjective symptoms” which made 6 them less persuasive. Id. at 11. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ 7 noted that Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi’s opinions were partially based on 8 Plaintiff’s self-reports and the ALJ explained his rationale that the opinions 9 assessed extreme limitations that were belied by the objective findings and 10 other evidence in the record. Id. at 11-12. 11 Plaintiff responds that the ALJ did not indicate that he found Drs. 12 Greene, Law, and Yadidi’s opinions less persuasive because they were “short- 13 term.” Dkt. No. 18 at 2-3. Further, Plaintiff argues that these opinions 14 remained probative and persuasive to the overall evaluation of Plaintiff’s disability and aligned with Dr. Pelton, Plaintiff’s treating physician, who 15 similarly assessed significant work restrictions, including an ability to lift 16 only 5 pounds and a restriction to sedentary work, through September 2019. 17 Id. at 3 (citing AR 550, 555, 742, 769, 1465, 1570). In addition, Plaintiff 18 argues that the Commissioner fails to explain how the ALJ’s findings 19 regarding “inconsistent with the longitudinal record” and “partially” based on 20 Plaintiff’s reported symptoms pertain to the supportability factor. Id. at 3-4. 21 The ALJ was obligated to articulate the supportability and consistency 22 factors in evaluating Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi’s opinions. The ALJ failed 23 to do so. The ALJ failed to properly consider the supportability factor and 24 discuss the abnormal examination findings by Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi. 25 While the ALJ found that Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi’s opinions were 26 “inconsistent with the evidence”, this evaluation does not relate to the 27 supportability factor. Supportability involves the evaluation of a medical 28 1 source’s opinion with the medical evidence and explanation referenced in 2 support of that opinion. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92. The ALJ did not 3 address the medical evidence and supporting explanations provided by Drs. 4 Greene, Law, and Yadidi. 5 Here, the ALJ failed to explain how Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi’s 6 opinions and limitations were belied by the objective findings and other 7 evidence in the record. Further, the ALJ erred when he evaluated the 8 opinions of Drs. Greene, Law, and Yadidi and ignored the fact that these three 9 opinions were each consistent with one another---they all limited Plaintiff to a 10 sitting job and limited his lifting to 10 pounds or less. Because the ALJ failed 11 to consider how consistent each of these opinions were with each other, the 12 ALJ failed to adequately consider the consistency factor. Additionally, the 13 ALJ erred in evaluating the doctors’ opinions together rather than considering 14 them individually. The regulations require an ALJ to analyze medical opinions on a source-by-source basis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1). This means 15 that the ALJ must offer a separate explanation for each medical source who 16 provided opinions. Here though, the ALJ grouped them together. 17 In short, the ALJ did not properly articulate how he considered the 18 supportability and consistency factors. Consequently, the ALJ did not provide 19 an explanation supported by substantial evidence for finding Drs Greene, Law 20 and Yadidi’s opinions not persuasive. 21 22 ii. Dr. Mark Newman’ Medical Opinion 23 On March 27, 2018, Mark Newman, M.D., examined Plaintiff in 24 connection with his workers’ compensation claim and noted Plaintiff had 25 antalgic gait and reduced range of motion in his right knee. AR 883, 911. Dr. 26 Newman opined that Plaintiff was limited to sitting work, with no pushing, 27 pulling, and lifting of more than 10 pounds, and found that Plaintiff must use 28 crutches and knee support. AR 884, 912. 1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate – or even discuss – Dr. 2 Newman’s medical opinion. Dkt. No. 12 at 19. Plaintiff argues that Dr. 3 Newman’s opinion was supported by his examination and consistent with the 4 objective medical evidence and the other medical opinions, including Dr. 5 Yadidi’s opinion that indicated the same limitations. Id. at 20-21. The 6 Commissioner disagrees and asserts that the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. 7 Newman’s opinion and reasonably rejected the extreme limitations he 8 assessed. Dkt. No. 17 at 15. The Commissioner asserts that Dr. Newman 9 was one of the “numerous” providers who assessed temporary work 10 restrictions during Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. Id. (citing AR 32). 11 The Commissioner argues that Dr. Newman appeared to base his limitations 12 on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints rather than his own examination findings 13 and that the ALJ substantively evaluated this opinion when discussing Dr. 14 Yadidi’s opinion, although the ALJ did not cite the exact pages of Dr. Newman’s opinion or identify him by name. Id. at 16 (citing AR 33). 15 The Court notes that the ALJ briefly discussed Dr. Newman stating 16 that during an examination he noted that Plaintiff “appears to be 17 demonstrating gross embellishment and symptom magnification screaming 18 out in pain with feather light touch to his medial lower knee without any 19 other objective findings.” AR 30-31 (citing AR 912). The ALJ, however, did 20 not articulate the persuasiveness of Dr. Newman’s opinion or discuss the 21 supportability or consistency factors. Nor did the ALJ find that Dr. Newman 22 based his limitations on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints rather than his own 23 examination findings. While regulatory provisions may absolve the ALJ from 24 discussing a doctor’s conclusion in the context of another disability program— 25 such as workers’ compensation—that a claimant is “disabled,” those 26 “regulations do not provide, that the ALJ may ignore medical opinions,” 27 especially where the doctor assessed functional limitations or where the 28 1 opinion contains significant and probative evidence. See Pratt v. Comm’r of 2 Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 51193, at *6, *12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2022) (while decisions 3 by other government agencies are not binding in social security cases, “even so 4 . . . despite differences in analysis and terminology, the ALJ is still required to 5 address findings rendered for purposes of a worker’s compensation claims"); 6 Garmany v. O'Malley, 2024 WL 3105824, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2024) 7 (remanding because the ALJ failed to consider the extent to which the 8 medical source’s objective medical evidence actually supported the opinion 9 and noted “district courts in the Ninth Circuit have consistently found error 10 when the ALJ fails to articulate how he considered both the consistency and 11 supportability as required under the regulations and Ninth Circuit case law”). 12 Here, Dr. Newman’s opinion referencing Plaintiff’s limitations and 13 abilities was significant and probative evidence that the ALJ should have 14 addressed, regardless of whether he was a workers’ compensation doctor. And because the ALJ did not address Dr. Newman’s opinion, the Court cannot 15 confidently conclude that the error was harmless. 16 17 B. Remaining Issues and Remedy 18 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision is also erroneous because the 19 ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr. Kevin Pelton, PA Hammond, and Dr. 20 Mohsen Hamza’s medical opinions. Dkt. Nos. 12 at 14-19, 21-27; 18 at 2-6. 21 Because the Court concludes that this case be remanded on an open record, 22 the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s other claims of error. Google LLC v. 23 Oracle America, Inc., 591 U.S. 1, 20 (2021) (appellate courts “should not 24 answer more than is necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute” on appeal); see 25 also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“While Smith 26 raises a number of issues on appeal, the court addresses only those relevant to 27 its decision to remand the case to the agency[.]”); Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1278 28 1 | record may change on remand.”). 2 3 4 5 6 7 IV. Order

8 For all the reasons stated above, the ALJ’s decision is vacated, and the g || case is remanded on an open record. A separate judgment will issue. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 Dated: March 31, 2026 44, I, mm Lona

14 United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28