Brian Davis v. Delta Air Lines Inc.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00954
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 BRIAN DAVIS, CASE NO. C24-0954-KKE 8 Plaintiff(s), v. ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND 9

DELTA AIR LINES INC, 10 Defendant(s). 11

12 Plaintiff Brian Davis filed this putative class action in King County Superior Court alleging 13 that Defendant Delta Air Lines Inc. (“Delta”) violated Washington’s Equal Pay and Opportunity 14 Act (“EPOA”) by failing to disclose certain pay information in a job posting. See Wash. Rev. 15 Code § 49.58.110; Dkt. No. 1-1. Delta removed the case to this Court (Dkt. No. 1) and Davis now 16 moves to remand it back to state court (Dkt. No. 27). 17 This Court must remand a removed case to state court if the plaintiff lacks standing to bring 18 a federal suit under Article III of the United States Constitution. Article III standing requires, 19 among other things, a concrete injury-in-fact. Although he applied for a position, Davis never 20 alleges he was genuinely interested in gaining employment with Delta. Accordingly, he fails to 21 plead a cognizable injury resulting from Delta’s alleged violation of the pay disclosure 22 requirement. Recognizing this possible defect in the Court’s removal jurisdiction, Delta presents 23 its own allegations and evidence in an attempt to show that Davis was, in fact, serious about getting 24 1 a job. At best, however, Delta shows that he met the minimum qualifications; and, on balance, the 2 record undermines Delta’s contention. 3 Because Delta has not carried its burden to show the existence of subject matter

4 jurisdiction, the Court will grant Davis’s motion to remand. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 Davis alleges that on April 24, 2024, he applied to Delta for an “In-Flight Service (IFS) 7 Field Operations Support Coordinator” position that he found through a job posting on Delta’s 8 website. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 25, 30; id. at 15. According to his complaint, the job posting “did not 9 disclose the wage scale or salary range being offered[,]” causing him “to complete the entire 10 application without learning the rate of pay.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. Davis further alleges that Delta’s 11 failure to post wage or salary information “negatively impacts [his] current and lifetime wages,” 12 adversely affects his “ability to negotiate pay,” and resulted in “lost valuable time[.]” Id. ¶¶ 32–

13 34. 14 Davis filed this lawsuit in King County Superior Court claiming Delta violated a provision 15 of the EPOA that became effective January 1, 2023, requiring employers to disclose certain pay 16 information in job postings. Dkt. No. 1-1; Wash. Rev. Code § 49.58.110. In particular, the 17 provision requires employers “with 15 or more employees” to disclose the “wage scale or salary 18 range” and a “general description” of other compensation and benefits in each posting for an 19 available position. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.58.110(1)(a), (3). The statute provides a private right 20 of action authorizing any “job applicant” or “employee” to sue an employer for violating the pay 21 disclosure requirement. Id. § 49.58.110(5). 22 In this suit, Davis seeks to represent a class of individuals who responded to job postings

23 lacking the same information for Delta positions in Washington. Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶ 21. Delta removed 24 the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). 1 Dkt. No. 1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (d)). Delta then moved to dismiss the complaint under 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that Davis failed to allege 3 facts showing he was a “job applicant” under the statute. Dkt. No. 9 at 9. Davis moved to remand

4 the case back to state court, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction because, among other reasons, 5 Davis lacks Article III standing. Dkt. No. 10 at 1. 6 On October 11, 2024, amid briefing on these motions, the Washington State Supreme Court 7 accepted review of a certified question concerning the EPOA from Judge John H. Chun of this 8 Court. Branson v. Wash. Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC, 557 P.3d 253 (Wash. 2024). The certified 9 question asked: “What must a Plaintiff prove to be deemed a ‘job applicant’ within the meaning 10 of RCW 49.58.110(4)? For example, must they prove that they are a ‘bona fide’ applicant?” 11 Branson v. Wash. Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC, 2:24-CV-00589-JHC, 2024 WL 4510680, at *1 12 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2024). Finding the certified question relevant to the pending motions in

13 this case, this Court stayed the case until the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Branson. Dkt. 14 No. 16. 15 On September 4, 2025, the Washington Supreme Court answered the certified question as 16 follows: 17 A job applicant need not prove they are a “bona fide” applicant to be deemed a “job applicant.” Rather, in accordance with the plain language of RCW 49.58.110(4), a 18 person must apply to any solicitation intended to recruit job applicants for a specific available position to be considered a “job applicant,” regardless of the person’s 19 subjective intent in applying for the specific position. Branson v. Wash. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, 574 P.3d 1031, 1040 (Wash. 2025). As requested by 20 the parties, this Court lifted the stay. Dkt. No. 20. Davis again moved to remand (Dkt. No. 27), 21 and Delta filed an answer to the complaint (Dkt. No. 28). The Court finds oral argument on the 22 motion to remand unnecessary, and the motion is now ripe for consideration. 23

24 1 II. ANALYSIS 2 A. Legal Standard for Remand 3 A party may remove a state court action to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441

4 only if the action could have originally been filed in federal court. Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet 5 Growers, Inc., 150 F.4th 1076, 1091 (9th Cir. 2025); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If the district court 6 determines, after removal, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must remand the case back to state 7 court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). As a general rule, courts apply a “strong presumption” against 8 removal. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Nishimoto v. Federman– 9 Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir.1990)). However, “no antiremoval 10 presumption attends cases invoking CAFA[.]” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. 11 Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). Nevertheless, “the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction 12 remains, as before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co.,

13 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). 14 A plaintiff seeking remand of a removed action can mount either a “facial” or “factual” 15 challenge to the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations in the notice of removal. Harris v. KM 16 Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 2020). “A facial attack accepts the truth of the defendant’s 17 allegations but asserts that they are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. 18 (citation modified). A “factual attack[,]” on the other hand, “contests the truth of the allegations 19 themselves.” Id. (citation modified). Once a plaintiff contests the removal notice’s jurisdictional 20 allegations, the defendant must present “competent proof” establishing the jurisdictional fact “by 21 a preponderance of the evidence[.]” Id. at 699, 701 (quoting Salter v. Quality Carriers, 974 F.3d 22 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020)).

23 B. Article III Standing 24 In something of a role reversal from the typical case, Davis argues he lacks Article III 1 standing while Delta defends his standing to sue. In “every federal case[,]” standing is a “threshold 2 question” that “determin[es] the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 3 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). In class actions, the standing analysis focuses on the individual class

4 representatives. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (“[I]f none of the named 5 plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the 6 defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.”). 7 Standing requirements “can neither be waived by the parties nor ignored by the court[.]” Yakima 8 Valley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 932 n.17 (9th Cir. 2011). As 9 the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, Delta has the burden of showing the existence of 10 standing. Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 682 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Lujan v. Defenders 11 of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 12 Standing exists if the plaintiff has an injury-in-fact that is concrete, particularized, actual

13 or imminent, fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and likely to be redressed 14 by a favorable decision. Cal. Sea Urchin Comm’n v. Bean, 883 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2018), 15 as amended (Apr. 18, 2018) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 16 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). Importantly, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even 17 in the context of a statutory violation.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016), as revised 18 (May 24, 2016). 19 Here, Davis’s suit is based on the alleged violation of his rights under the EPOA. When 20 standing is based on statutory rights, “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 21 harm” does not “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id. Statutes may elevate 22 intangible harms to the status of a concrete injury if the statutory violation presents a “risk of real

23 harm” or “has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a 24 basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts[.]” Id. at 340–41. Still, a “procedural violation 1 of an informational entitlement” like the EPOA will not “suffice to keep a claim in federal court” 2 unless the plaintiff “allege[s] at least that the information had some relevance to her.” Magadia v. 3 Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original) (quoting Brintley

4 v. Aeroquip Credit Union, 936 F.3d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2019)). To determine if a statutory violation 5 creates a concrete injury-in-fact, the Ninth Circuit in Magadia instructed courts to consider (1) 6 “whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect ... concrete interests (as 7 opposed to purely procedural rights)” and (2) “whether the specific procedural violations alleged 8 in th[e] case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such interests.” Id. As detailed 9 below, the Court concludes that Davis’s suit fails this test. 10 Beginning with Magadia’s first step, several courts in this District have held that 11 Washington’s legislature enacted the EPOA’s pay disclosure requirement “to protect concrete, 12 non-procedural rights for job applicants and employees.” Hill v. ACV Auctions Inc. (“Hill I”), No.

13 C25-616 MJP, 2025 WL 1582249, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 4, 2025); see also Partridge v. 14 Heartland Express Inc. of Iowa, No. 3:24-CV-05486-DGE, 2024 WL 4164245, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 15 Sep. 12, 2024) (“[EPOA] protects job applicants’ concrete interest in receiving ‘sufficient 16 information to ensure fair and equitable pay negotiations.’”) (quoting Spencer v. Vera Whole 17 Health, Inc., No. C24-337 MJP, 2024 WL 3276578, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 2, 2024)). This Court 18 agrees. By arming job applicants with wage and salary information early in the application 19 process, the EPOA’s disclosure requirement protects applicants’ interest in negotiating fair pay 20 and “avoid[ing] wast[ed] time interviewing for positions whose pay would never be adequate.” 21 Hill I, 2025 WL 1582249, at *3. 22 The parties dispute whether Davis’s suit satisfies Magadia’s second step. As numerous

23 courts in this District have held, unless the plaintiff was “a bona fide applicant” for employment, 24 an EPOA violation involving “a job posting with no compensation information included” does not 1 “by itself … manifest concrete injury[.]” Hill v. Les Schwab Tire Ctrs. of Wash. LLC (“Hill II”), 2 No. 24-CV-425-BJR, 2025 WL 3062646, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2025) (citing cases); see 3 also, e.g., Eggleston v. Bruckner Truck Sales Inc., No. C25-1467JLR, 2025 WL 3153503, at *3

4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2025) (“Absent a showing of bona fide intent or good faith, Mr. Eggleston 5 cannot show an injury-in-fact.”). This makes sense because failing to disclose pay information 6 cannot impact pay negotiations, time spent interviewing, or compensation for a job the plaintiff 7 never actually intended to pursue. Thus, “a nominal applicant with no interest in the position will 8 neither receive a benefit from early pay disclosure nor be harmed by the lack thereof.” Hill II, 9 2025 WL 3062646, at *4. And while Branson held that such applicants are “job applicants” under 10 the statute, it did not purport to address whether an EPOA violation harms their concrete interests 11 for Article III standing purposes. 574 P.3d at 1040. 12 1. Scope of the standing inquiry

13 Before determining whether Davis meets the “bona fide applicant” requirement, the Court 14 must resolve a preliminary dispute regarding the nature of the Court’s standing inquiry on a motion 15 to remand. Delta contends that, as the party seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction, its 16 jurisdictional allegations must be accepted as true unless Davis factually challenges them. Dkt. 17 No. 30 at 9–13. Delta also presents two declarations, which it argues prove Davis was more likely 18 than not a bona fide applicant. Id. at 3, 12, 15. Davis, on the other hand, argues that the standing 19 analysis looks only to the allegations in the complaint and faults Delta for relying on “documents 20 outside [the] complaint.” Dkt. No. 33 at 2. Delta agrees that the complaint’s allegations are also 21 relevant but argues that Davis’s allegations of harm independently establish his standing to sue. 22 Id. at 13–16.

23 The Court agrees with Delta that it is not limited to the allegations in the complaint in 24 evaluating its removal jurisdiction. “[A] defendant seeking to remove an action … must allege the 1 underlying facts supporting each of the requirements for removal jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 2 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567). When a motion to remand 3 challenges those requirements, Courts evaluate the motion using the “same framework” that

4 applies to motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 5 Procedure 12(b)(1). Id. Under that framework, as explained above, a remand motion can assert 6 either a facial or factual challenge. Id. at 1121–22. If the plaintiff asserts a facial challenge— 7 meaning, he accepts “the removal notice’s factual allegations but … asserts that those allegations 8 are facially insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction”—courts “accept the notice’s factual 9 allegations as true[.]” DeFiore v. SOC LLC, 85 F.4th 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2023). If, on the other 10 hand, the plaintiff asserts a factual challenge—meaning, he disputes the truth of the facts on which 11 removal jurisdiction is based—the defendant is obligated to defend its jurisdictional allegations 12 “with competent proof.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1123. In either case, once the defendant alleges a

13 factual basis for federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff seeking remand cannot avoid being in federal court 14 simply because the complaint omits certain jurisdictional facts. 15 In advocating for a contrary approach, Davis relies on caselaw applying the “well-pleaded 16 complaint” rule, which determines the existence of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1331 based solely on the complaint. Dkt. No. 33 at 3 (citing Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. 18 Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. 19 for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1983)). Under that rule, courts look exclusively to “the plaintiff’s 20 own claims and allegations” to determine if the “complaint includes the requisite federal question” 21 to invoke federal jurisdiction. Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26–27. Because the plaintiff is “the master 22 of the complaint,” “[s]he gets to determine which substantive claims to bring” and, “in doing so,

23 … can establish—or not—the basis for a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 35; see 24 also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257–58 (2013) (explaining that federal question jurisdiction 1 exists if “federal law creates the cause of action asserted” or a state law claim necessarily raises 2 certain federal issues). 3 But unlike the choice of whether to plead a federal issue, Article III standing turns on facts

4 on the ground—for instance, whether Davis in fact applied to Delta intending to seek employment. 5 And courts treat issues of jurisdictional fact differently than those that turn on “the plaintiff’s 6 decision … to add or subtract claims or parties.” See Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 38 n.8 (contrasting 7 the effect of amending the complaint to “reduc[e] the alleged amount-in-controversy” with the 8 decision to drop a federal claim or a diverse defendant). Thus, “a plaintiff may defeat removal by 9 choosing not to plead independent federal claims.” ARCO Env’t Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of 10 Health & Env’t Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Taylor v. Anderson, 11 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914) (explaining the existence of a federal question turns on “what necessarily 12 appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim”). Standing, on the other hand, must be “based

13 on the facts at the time of filing.” Isaacson v. Mayes, 84 F.4th 1089, 1099 n.7 (9th Cir. 2023) 14 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4). Therefore, courts evaluate challenges to standing using the 15 Rule 12(b)(1) framework, which, in the context of removal, considers the defendant’s 16 jurisdictional allegations (in a facial challenge) or “competent proof” (in a factual challenge).1 See 17 White v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., No. 5:24-CV-01827-SPG-SK, 2024 WL 5247959, at *2 (C.D. 18 Cal. Dec. 26, 2024); see also Torres v. Farmay, Inc., No. 25-CV-00146-KAW, 2025 WL 822694, 19 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2025). 20

21 1 Similarly, Davis’s reliance on Faulk v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 159 F.4th 618 (9th Cir. 2025)—which held that an amendment to the complaint excising class action allegations defeats federal jurisdiction under CAFA—is 22 inapposite. Like the decision whether to plead a federal issue (or to sue a diverse defendant), a plaintiff’s decision whether to bring a class action makes or breaks federal jurisdiction under CAFA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 23 Accordingly, courts look only “to the operative complaint, including any post-removal amendments” to determine whether a case is a “class action” as required for CAFA jurisdiction. 159 F.4th at 623. And a plaintiff seeking to defeat federal jurisdiction is free to “sacrifice[] a litigation advantage by excising their class action allegations.” Id. 24 at 625. By contrast, standing depends on facts, not the plaintiff’s choice of what type of lawsuit to bring. 1 Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s reliance on the well-pleaded complaint rule and 2 instead applies the Rule 12(b)(1) framework to determine whether the facts alleged or proven 3 suffice to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction.

4 2. Davis’s challenge to standing is factual 5 Turning to this task, Delta argues that Davis mounts only a facial challenge to standing and 6 that Delta’s jurisdictional allegations must therefore be taken as true. Dkt. No. 30 at 9 (citing Leite 7 v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014)). Although the remand notice itself does not 8 allege anything about Davis’s intent when applying for the position (see Dkt. No. 1), Delta argues 9 that its allegations in its answer—which include that “it is more likely than not that Plaintiff was 10 a bona fide job applicant” (Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 26)—“are treated as amendments to the notice of 11 removal.” Dkt. No. 30 at 11 (citing Gen. Dentistry for Kids, LLC v. Kool Smiles, P.C., 379 F. 12 App’x 634, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2010)). Because Davis has not presented contrary evidence of his

13 intent, Delta argues that the Court should accept its allegations as true. 14 Even assuming, however, that the answer supplements the removal notice, the Court 15 disagrees that Davis’s jurisdictional challenge is facial, rather than factual. Davis largely argues 16 (incorrectly) that the absence of injury-in-fact allegations in his complaint is enough to defeat 17 federal jurisdiction. But that is not the same as “accept[ing] the truth of [Delta’s] allegations” 18 while asserting “they are insufficient on their face” to show standing. Harris, 980 F.3d at 699. 19 The gist of Davis’s argument is that Delta has not shown that he was a “bona fide” applicant, and 20 that the alleged EPOA violation is therefore a mere “technical or procedural violation” of the sort 21 courts have repeatedly held does “not manifest concrete injury[.]” Dkt. No. 33 at 2. This 22 articulates a factual challenge because it attacks the truth of Delta’s allegation that Davis was a

23 bona fide applicant. Delta emphasizes that Davis has not introduced evidence outside the 24 pleadings to refute standing. Dkt. No. 30 at 15. But “[a] factual attack … need only challenge the 1 truth of the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations” with “reasoned argument as to why” the 2 allegations “are not supported by evidence.” Harris, 980 F.3d at 700. Extrinsic evidence is not 3 required.

4 3. Delta fails to show that Davis was a bona fide applicant 5 Because Davis raises a factual challenge, Delta must respond with “competent proof” 6 establishing the disputed fact “by a preponderance of the evidence[.]” Id. at 699, 701 (citation 7 omitted). Perhaps anticipating as much, Delta submitted two declarations, which it contends 8 indicate Davis was a bona fide applicant for employment. See Dkt. Nos. 31, 32. Delta also claims 9 that Davis’s own allegations establish standing. Dkt. No. 30 at 13–16. The Court disagrees and 10 finds that Delta has not carried its burden. 11 In the first declaration, which is by Tara Jackson, a Global Talent Acquisition Compliance 12 Specialist for Delta, Jackson states that Davis completed a mandatory “qualifications assessment”

13 that took him approximately thirty-five minutes to finish. Dkt. No. 31 ¶ 8. But since this 14 assessment was mandatory, completing it does not suggest Davis intended to seek a job rather than 15 simply test Delta’s application for compliance with the EPOA. 16 Jackson also describes the responsibilities of the position Davis applied to, summarizes his 17 prior experience, and attaches his resume. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7–8; see also id. at 6–9. In particular, Jackson 18 highlights that Davis had experience working at transportation companies—namely, Lyft and 19 Southwest Airlines—and states that, based on Jackson’s review, Davis “met the minimum 20 qualifications for the position.” Id. ¶ 9. But, as courts in this District have repeatedly held, being 21 minimally qualified does not mean a plaintiff genuinely intended to apply for a job. See, e.g., 22 Milito v. Wizards of the Coast LLC, No. 24-CV-1111-BJR, 2025 WL 3754049, at *4 (W.D. Wash.

23 Dec. 29, 2025) (claim that plaintiff “was qualified to perform the position for which he applied” 24 failed to “show any actual harm against which the EPOA intends to protect”); Kent v. HCL Techs. 1 Ltd., No. C24-1332 MJP, 2024 WL 4825383, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2024) (“Nor does Kent’s 2 claims regarding his qualifications for the job translate to a claim that he was a ‘bona fide’ 3 candidate who applied to the job with good-faith intent.”); Spencer v. Total Renal Care, Inc., No.

4 C24-1359RSM, 2024 WL 4834901, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2024) (mere “conclusory 5 allegation that Plaintiff was qualified to perform the position” was insufficient to show standing). 6 Indeed, Davis’s resume, if anything, raises more doubt than confidence in his desire to get 7 the job he applied to. According to his resume, Davis has a bachelor’s degree in business 8 administration, is working toward a master’s degree, and has over two decades of experience in 9 business, sales, and logistics roles at various companies. Dkt. No. 31 at 6–9. He currently works 10 as a program manager at Lyft Inc., where his responsibilities include identifying international 11 markets into which Lyft might expand and developing partnerships and strategies to support such 12 expansions. Id. at 6. The position with Delta, on the other hand, does not require a college degree,

13 involves preferred criteria Davis lacks (such as “In-Flight Service experience”), and comes with 14 markedly different responsibilities than Davis’s recent jobs (such as planning “employee 15 engagement activities”; “[t]ravel arrangements and … calendar management”; and ensuring the 16 “base is tidy, clean, well-stocked, [and] safe”). Dkt. No. 1 at 17. Beyond the generic fact that Lyft 17 and Delta are both transportation companies, Davis’s resume does not suggest he genuinely sought 18 the In-Flight Services job. 19 Delta also submitted a declaration by its counsel, which states that she conducted a search 20 of publicly available information and was unable to locate other lawsuits by Davis alleging 21 violations of the EPOA. Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 7. The mere fact that Davis is not a serial litigant, however, 22 is not enough, on its own, to carry Delta’s burden to show that he intended to seek employment.

23 Finally, Delta argues that Davis’s own allegations of harm establish standing. Dkt. No. 30 24 at 13–16. The Court agrees with the chorus of decisions from this District holding that virtually 1 identical allegations are insufficient to establish a plaintiff’s “bona fide” job applicant status. See, 2 e.g., Milito, 2025 WL 3754049, at *4; Kent, 2024 WL 4825383, at *1; Spencer, 2024 WL 4834901, 3 at *3; Hill II, 2025 WL 3062646, at *4; Floyd v. Photon Infotech Inc. (“Floyd II”), No. C24-01372-

4 KKE, 2025 WL 3442736, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2025). Delta points to Davis’s allegations 5 that the nondisclosure of pay information “negatively impact[ed] [his] current and lifetime wages,” 6 adversely affected his “ability to negotiate pay,” and “direct[ly]” resulted in “economic and non- 7 economic harm[.]” Dkt. No. 30 at 15–16 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 32–33, 35). But absent a 8 genuine interest in the position, such allegations do not establish that the nondisclosure “placed 9 [Davis] at a disadvantage relative to other applicants” or “resulted in him having to exit a lengthy 10 interview process after learning the pay was insufficient for his needs.” Floyd II, 2025 WL 11 3442736, at *4 (quoting Partridge, 2024 WL 4164245, at *4); see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 12 Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (holding that conclusory allegations are insufficient to confer

13 standing). Delta never offered Davis an interview, much less a job, so Davis was never in a 14 position to negotiate pay or participate in futile interviews. 15 Delta also points to Davis’s allegation that he “lost valuable time” applying to the position. 16 Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶ 34. But to the extent he was not a bona fide applicant, such harm is self-inflicted 17 and, in any event, “not an injury that the EPOA seeks to prevent or redress.” Hill I, 2025 WL 18 1582249, at *3; Floyd v. Insight Glob. LLC (“Floyd I”), No. 23-CV-1680-BJR, 2024 WL 2133370, 19 at *7 n.8 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024), amended on reconsideration, 2024 WL 3199858 (W.D. 20 Wash. June 26, 2024) (“The Court notes that any time wasted in applying for a job without good 21 faith is actually a self-inflicted harm.”). “A generalized assertion of time lost, therefore, does not 22 support Article III standing.” Partridge, 2024 WL 4164245, at *4.

23 Nothing in the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Branson changes this Court’s 24 standing analysis. Branson answered the question of what a plaintiff must prove to show they are 1 a “job applicant,” and thus authorized to sue, under the EPOA. 574 P.3d at 1033–34. Whether 2 Davis is a “job applicant” or not, his suit cannot proceed in federal court without an Article III 3 injury. See Spokeo, 578 F.3d at 341 (“[A] plaintiff [does not] automatically satisf[y] the injury-

4 in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize 5 that person to sue to vindicate that right.”). 6 In sum, the pleadings do not support, and Delta has not shown by a preponderance of the 7 evidence, that Davis was a bona fide applicant. Because his lack of Article III standing eliminates 8 this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, the Court must remand this 9 case to King County Superior Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 10 C. Jurisdictional Discovery 11 Delta seeks jurisdictional discovery to determine whether Davis suffered an Article III 12 injury in the event the Court finds the pleadings and record insufficient to establish standing. Dkt.

13 No. 30 at 18. In particular, Delta wishes to depose Davis to “confirm whether [he] applied” for 14 the position at Delta “in good faith or experienced any harm by way of his application.” Id. at 19. 15 The decision whether to grant jurisdictional discovery is typically within the discretion of 16 the district court. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 17 1977). In the Ninth Circuit, “discovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing 18 on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts 19 is necessary.” Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation 20 omitted). However, a district court may deny jurisdictional discovery “when it is clear that further 21 discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction,” Am. W. 22 Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Grp., Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), or where the

23 request for discovery is “based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally 24 relevant facts,” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 1 Here, the Court concludes that Delta’s proposed inquiry into Davis’s subjective intent in 2 applying for the position is “based on little more than a hunch” and will therefore deny the 3 requested discovery. Id. Delta has not meaningfully distinguished this case from numerous others

4 involving virtually identical pleadings that have been remanded for lack of standing. And Delta’s 5 additional submissions fail to support—and, if anything, further undermine—the existence of a 6 cognizable injury. 7 Accordingly, the Court denies Delta’s request for jurisdictional discovery. 8 D. Futility Exception 9 Finally, Delta argues that, if the Court finds Davis suffered no injury-in-fact, it should 10 dismiss his complaint rather than remand it because Davis’s action in state court would be futile. 11 Dkt. No. 30 at 19–23. Typically, a district court must remand a removed case upon determining 12 that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th

13 Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). A “narrow ‘futility’ exception to this general rule” allows 14 the court to dismiss the case rather than remand it “if there is ‘absolute certainty’ that the state 15 court would dismiss the action following remand.” Glob. Rescue Jets, LLC v. Kaiser Found. 16 Health Plan, Inc., 30 F.4th 905, 920 n.6 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Polo, 833 F.3d at 1197–98). 17 Delta seeks to apply this narrow exception here, arguing that Washington courts would apply the 18 same “injury in fact” requirement as federal courts to assess Davis’s standing to sue. Dkt. No. 30 19 at 22–23. 20 As in Polo, however, it “is far from clear that a state court would dismiss” Davis’s claims. 21 833 F.3d at 1198. While Delta cites Washington’s two-part standing test—which analyzes (1) the 22 statute’s “zone of interest[]” and (2) the plaintiff’s “injury in fact”—it cites no case by a

23 Washington court dismissing EPOA claims under this test. Dkt. No. 30 at 20–21 (quoting Bass v. 24 City of Edmonds, 508 P.3d 172, 175 (Wash. 2022)). In Branson, the Washington Supreme Court 1 declined to address whether “job applicants who do not have a good faith intent to obtain 2 employment lack statutory standing” but nevertheless observed that such plaintiffs are “likely … 3 within the [EPOA’s] protected zone of interest.” 574 P.3d at 1039 n.7. And in cases like this

4 involving alleged procedural violations, state courts apply a “relaxed” injury requirement, which, 5 as relevant, demands only a “reasonable probability” that the violation “will threaten a concrete 6 interest of the” plaintiff. Five Corners Fam. Farmers v. State, 268 P.3d 892, 896 (Wash. 2011). 7 Against this backdrop, and considering Branson’s discussion of who is entitled “to obtain remedies 8 under the statute[,]” 574 P.3d at 1034, the Court lacks “absolute certainty” that the Superior Court 9 would “simply dismiss” Davis’s “action on remand.” Polo, 833 F.3d at 1198 (citation omitted). 10 Remand, rather than dismissal, is therefore the appropriate remedy.2 11 III. CONCLUSION 12 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Davis’s Motion to Remand. Dkt. No. 27. This case is 13 remanded to King County Superior Court. 14 Dated this 3rd day of April, 2026. 15 A 16 Kymberly K. Evanson 17 United S tates District Judge

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2 Because the Court remands this case for lack of Article III standing, it does not reach Davis’s additional argument 24 that the amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and (d)(2) are not met.