Brian Clover v. Abel Tesfaye
This text of Brian Clover v. Abel Tesfaye (Brian Clover v. Abel Tesfaye) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 8 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN CLOVER; SCOTT MCCULLOCH, No. 20-55861
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-02507-PA-MRW v.
ABEL M. TESFAYE, PKA The Weeknd; et MEMORANDUM* al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 6, 2021** Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, CHRISTEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Brian Clover and Scott McCulloch (“Plaintiffs”) appeal from summary
judgment entered in favor of Abel Tesfaye, also known as “The Weeknd,” and his
collaborators (collectively, the “Defendants”), in this copyright infringement claim
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). alleging Defendants’ song A Lonely Night illicitly copied Plaintiffs’ song I Need to
Love. Plaintiffs also appeal from various pretrial rulings. Because the parties are
familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Copyright Infringement
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Loomis v. Cornish,
836 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2016). To prevail on a copyright infringement claim,
Plaintiffs must show (1) that they own a valid copyright, and (2) that Defendants
copied their work, and such copying was actionable. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin,
952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Here, Plaintiffs fail to raise a
triable dispute as to the second element.
Because Plaintiffs lack direct evidence of copying, they must demonstrate
copying circumstantially by showing that (1) “the defendant[s] had access to the
plaintiff[s’] work,” and (2) “the two works share similarities probative of
copying”—in other words, a “striking similarity.” Id. (emphases added) (citation
omitted). Plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute as to either. For access, their
allegation that Defendants may have heard I Need to Love through a large song
catalog amounts to no more than “bare corporate receipt,” Loomis, 836 F.3d at 995
(citation omitted), and their admission that I Need to Love was never released to
the public or generated any royalties indicates there is no “reasonable possibility of
2 access . . . [through] ‘wide[spread] disseminat[ion],’” id. at 997 (citation omitted).
For striking similarity, Plaintiffs fail to show the two works are so similar that their
resemblance can be explained only by “copying rather than . . . coincidence,
independent creation, or prior common source.” Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1064
(ellipsis in original) (citation omitted). Indeed, Plaintiffs fail to timely or
adequately address evidence of a prior common source: Blondie’s 1979 song Heart
of Glass. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine dispute as to copying.
2. Pretrial Rulings
Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred when it denied their
motions for a stay of discovery, extension of discovery deadlines, and continuance
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), and when it granted Defendants’ objection to
Plaintiffs’ untimely expert rebuttal report. We review the district court’s rulings
for an abuse of discretion, which “is [a] deferential [standard], and properly so,
since the district court needs the authority to manage the cases before it efficiently
and effectively.” Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.
2005).
The district court permissibly exercised its discretion when it partially
denied Plaintiffs’ motions for a stay, extension, and continuance under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), as Plaintiffs were given ample time to retain new
counsel, conduct discovery, file dispositive motions, oppose summary judgment,
3 and submit a timely rebuttal report. The district court also did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Plaintiffs’ second Rule 56(d) motion for a continuance to
conduct additional discovery, because Plaintiffs did not “diligently pursue[]” their
previous discovery opportunities, Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F.3d
947, 955 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted), and because their request
failed to enumerate the “specific facts” they hoped to gain from further discovery,
Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis and
citation omitted). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Defendants’ objection to Plaintiffs’ untimely expert rebuttal report because
Plaintiffs never requested additional time to augment their expert evidence, even
though they requested other extensions.
AFFIRMED.
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