Brian Boling v. Spireon, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedOctober 27, 2022
DocketE2021-00598-COA-R3-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Brian Boling v. Spireon, Inc. (Brian Boling v. Spireon, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brian Boling v. Spireon, Inc., (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

10/27/2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE May 10, 2022 Session

BRIAN BOLING v. SPIREON, INC.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County No. 3-343-18 Deborah C. Stevens, Judge ___________________________________

No. E2021-00598-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________

This appeal involves a contractual dispute related to the plaintiff’s employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

W. Edward Shipe, R. Cuyler Haskins, and Avery C. Lovingfoss, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brian Boling.

Taylor A. Williams and Lindsey M. Collins, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Spireon, Inc.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from the sale of a company named Spireon. Brian Boling, Spireon’s previous CEO, asserts that the company treated him wrongfully during the sale in regard to certain contractual rights held by Boling as co-founder of Spireon. According to Boling, Spireon attempted to close the sale, distribute the proceeds, and exclude payment for Boling’s rights.1 Spireon argues in response that Boling seeks to renegotiate his remuneration years after he resigned and signed an all-encompassing, fully-integrated

1 Boling opines that Spireon was unhappy with business decisions he made subsequent to leaving the company and after the expiration of his non-compete agreement. separation agreement that limited his compensation.

In order to better understand the dispute before us, some background information is required. In 2011, Spireon, then known as ProconGPS, Inc., began discussions with Bertram Capital Management, LLC, (“Bertram Capital”) a venture capital firm, to introduce Bertram Capital as a new majority shareholder. One significant purpose of the venture capital investment was to seek a short-to-mid-term sale of Spireon, thus allowing both the prior shareholders and Bertram Capital to receive a return on investment. In order to proceed with the sale, Bertram Capital required that co-founder/CEO Boling agree to continue as CEO after the sale.2 Boling acknowledges that he was positioned to, and did, actively negotiate special protections for his interest and that held by Tim Welch in the event Spireon terminated their employment without cause.

Spireon created a “Management Phantom Equity Plan” (“Plan”), dated February 16, 2011, to “offer selected persons a proprietary interest in the success of [Spireon] through the grant of Incentive Units.” Rather than grant stock options or ownership, the Plan created a Bonus Pool from the proceeds of any Liquidity Event and granted management rights to receive portions of that Bonus Pool through the grant of these “Incentive Units.” Incentive Units are what is known as a dilutable interest (“Outstanding Incentive Units shall not be adjusted upon the subsequent issuance of Incentive Unit awards under the Plan.”), which means that an Incentive Unit can decrease in value because it is not fixed as a percentage of the future Bonus Pool; instead, Spireon has the ability to grant additional Incentive Units that reduce a current holder’s future claim. The Bonus Pool is defined as a percentage of the Net Equity Proceeds, which do not exist until there is a sale of the company (“Upon a Liquidity Event other than an IPO, a bonus pool shall be established equal to 12% of the Net Equity Proceeds.”). Generally, the Net Equity Proceeds are the sale proceeds less expenses.

Boling claims that the Plan is both a macro document, meant to govern unnamed current and future management of Spireon, and a micro document narrowly focused on Boling’s and Welch’s special rights as senior management. Boling asserts that he was given additional protections of his right to receive management incentives. He contends that the parties agreed Spireon should not be permitted to use a termination without cause to deprive Boling of his full management bonus.3

2 Boling and the other co-founder, Tim Welch, surrendered majority control of Spireon as part of the deal.

3 Section 11 of the Plan dealt with the rights specifically granted to Boling and Welch: “In the event Brian Boling or Tim Welch are terminated by the Company other than for cause, death or disability, they shall be entitled to elect, by written notice to the Company within thirty (30) days of the termination date, to . . . convert their outstanding vested Incentive Units into a non-dilutable interest[.]” Interestingly, Welch has no specific recollection of the conversations discussing the conversion. -2- Under the macro portion, distribution of the Bonus Pool is governed by Section 8 of the Plan. Section 8(a) provides that “[i]n the event of a Liquidity Event other than an IPO, if the conditions for distribution set forth in the Plan are satisfied, the Bonus Pool will be distributed as follows . . . [.] This section includes the provision in dispute here, Section 8(c), which places an expiration date on distributions of the Bonus Pool, stating that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, in no event will a distribution upon a Liquidity Event be made to any Participant who has terminated his or her relationship as an employee or consultant of the Company or Company subsidiary more than five (5) years prior to the closing date of such Liquidity Event.”

Section 7 of the Plan creates the Bonus Pool for the macro portion of the Plan as “12% of the Net Equity Proceeds” but, according to Boling, the founder-specific Section 10 modifies Section 7 by redefining the Bonus Pool. He asserts that the decision to address this carve-out in Section 10 rather than simply adding language to Section 7 confirms the founder-specific focus of Sections 10 and 11 because those sections isolate and treat separately those specific rights granted to Boling and Welch from the general macro rights to unnamed management. Similarly, Boling claims this ordering confirms and is consistent with the view that the macro-focused Sections 6 and 8 deal only with distributions of the Bonus Pool for the “macro” participants, not Boling’s interest. Further, he contends that the “other than” clause in Section 12 of the Plan expressly excludes his rights from reduction to the size of the Bonus Pool. Collectively, according to Boling, these provisions serve to put a protective barrier around the Bonus Pool for management with only a single exception – Boling’s surrender and conversion rights as founder of Spireon.

Boling’s employment with Spireon ended effective October 1, 2013. On October 19, 2013, Boling exercised his right to surrender and convert his interest.4 Boling entered into a confidential Settlement and Release Agreement (“Separation Agreement”), dated October 22, 2013. The Separation Agreement expressly indicates that Boling and Spireon “desire to resolve and completely settle any and all claims that now exist or may hereinafter arise between them regarding” Boling’s employment. Paragraph 10.5 states that the Separation Agreement, “contain[s] the entire agreement between [the parties], and . . . supersedes any other agreement either oral or in writing between the parties.”

Paragraph 2.3(a) of the Separation Agreement provides that upon Boling’s departure, he would cease participating in any of Spireon’s benefits plans, and any right to receive existing benefits from those plans would be governed by the Separation Agreement and the terms of the respective plans. Paragraph 2.3(a) explicitly provides that Boling is not entitled to any other compensation, bonus, commission, or other benefit except as set

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Bluebook (online)
Brian Boling v. Spireon, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brian-boling-v-spireon-inc-tennctapp-2022.