PONDER, Judge.
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his tort action by directed verdict. The third-party defendant appealed the jury’s award of attorney’s fees to third-party plaintiff.
The issues are:
a. Does the statutory employee exclusion of the Workmen’s Compensation Act prevent recovery by the plaintiff;
b. Is defendant, Stauffer Chemical Company, entitled to indemnification of attorney’s fees from third-party defendant, Brooks Erection Company; and
c. Did the trial court err in denying jury instructions on (1) the care required of those who handle hazardous substances and (2) res ipsa loquitur.
We affirm.
The plaintiff, a pipefitter-welder employed by Brooks Erection Company, was injured while working at Stauffer Chemical Company pursuant to a maintenance contract between Stauffer and Brooks. Plaintiff suffered chemical burns when a valve on which he was working burst open, spraying him with acid.
Plaintiff filed suit against Stauffer for its alleged negligence. Stauffer filed a third-party demand against Brooks seeking indemnification under the terms of their contract for any damages or expenses for which it might be held liable.
At the conclusion of the jury trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict against the plaintiff holding that because he was the statutory employee of Stauffer under La.R.S. 23:1061,1 Stauffer was im-[1094]*1094muñe from tort liability under La.R.S. 23:1032.2 The court submitted the issue of indemnification to the jury, who found that Stauffer was entitled to $2,401.25 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff and Brooks appealed.
As a general rule, maintenance and repair work, as opposed to new construction, is considered to be within the scope of a manufacturing plant’s trade, business or occupation. Boudreaux v. Boudreaux, 369 So.2d 1117 (La.App. 1st Cir.1979); Barnes v. Sun Oil Company, 362 So.2d 761 (La.1978).
Stauffer manufactures industrial chemicals. The corrosive nature of the chemicals dictates constant maintenance and repair and frequent replacement. The project on which plaintiff was injured involved the replacement of a chemical reactor, the installation of a small reactor and the replacement of a large amount of pipe. When injured, plaintiff was installing a chain wheel to control a valve leading to the reactors.
David Thompson, a Stauffer project engineer, testified that Stauffer has a relatively large permanent maintenance crew of about sixty hourly employees. It contracted with Brooks to supplement its work force as necessary, but not for any specialized skills. The only difference between the type of work performed by the two work forces was that Stauffer employees tended to work on the urgent day-to-day problems that required a fairly constant work force, whereas Brooks employees worked on potential intermittent problems of a larger scale. The project on which plaintiff was hurt was not customarily performed by Stauffer.
Both Stauffer and Brooks spend a large amount of time replacing corroded and worn-out pipes, valves and pumps. Chain wheels on which plaintiff was working are common at Stauffer and subject to external corrosion.
Plaintiff stated he was doing more than replacing wornout material; he was adding new equipment. While he would not classify his work as maintenance, plaintiff acknowledged that the processing unit had already been there. Another Brooks employee testified that he had only seen Stauffer do repair work and nothing like the project on which they were working when plaintiff was injured.
The directed verdict in Louisiana is permitted under LSA-C.C.P. Article 1810(A).3 It has its source in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the proper standard in [1095]*1095deciding such a motion is set forth in Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc):
“On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence—not just that evidence which supports the non-mover’s case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. * * * ”
After a review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The work being performed by the plaintiff and other Brooks employees consisted of maintenance and repair services. The work was a regular and integral part of Stauffer’s business and essential for the efficient operation of the plant. Stauffer employees, in fact, set in place and connected the new reactor on a temporary basis until Brooks was able to move it over to a new foundation and reconnect it with new piping permanently. The addition of the smaller reactor was simply an improvement of existing facilities. The contention that it was new construction is not supported by the facts. The work in which plaintiff was engaged was part of the trade, business or occupation of Stauffer.
Brooks asserts that the trial court should have awarded a directed verdict in its favor on the third-party demand. The third-party demand is based on the indemnification agreement between Stauffer and Brooks which is found in Section 7.1 of their contract:
“Contractor agrees to indemnify, defend and save Company (including officers, directors and employees of Company) harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, expense (including reasonable attorney’s fees) claims, suits, and liabilities, based upon damages to, or destruction of, any property or injury (including death) to any person (including employees of Contractor) arising out of or attributable to the performance or nonperformance by Contractor hereunder (including, but not limited to, Contractor’s employees, sub-contractors or agents) even if caused in part by negligence of Company, except for such injuries or damages which are caused solely by the negligence of Company.”
The undisputed evidence shows that the valves, pipes and reactors installed by Brooks were all new and there was no evidence of any chemical flow through this portion of the unit prior to plaintiff’s accident. Thompson testified that after two years he still did not know how the pressurized acid became trapped in the valve.
We are of the opinion that the facts and inferences do not point so strongly and overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of Stauffer that reasonable men could not reach a contrary result. The trial court did not err in submitting the issue of attorney’s fees to the jury.
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PONDER, Judge.
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his tort action by directed verdict. The third-party defendant appealed the jury’s award of attorney’s fees to third-party plaintiff.
The issues are:
a. Does the statutory employee exclusion of the Workmen’s Compensation Act prevent recovery by the plaintiff;
b. Is defendant, Stauffer Chemical Company, entitled to indemnification of attorney’s fees from third-party defendant, Brooks Erection Company; and
c. Did the trial court err in denying jury instructions on (1) the care required of those who handle hazardous substances and (2) res ipsa loquitur.
We affirm.
The plaintiff, a pipefitter-welder employed by Brooks Erection Company, was injured while working at Stauffer Chemical Company pursuant to a maintenance contract between Stauffer and Brooks. Plaintiff suffered chemical burns when a valve on which he was working burst open, spraying him with acid.
Plaintiff filed suit against Stauffer for its alleged negligence. Stauffer filed a third-party demand against Brooks seeking indemnification under the terms of their contract for any damages or expenses for which it might be held liable.
At the conclusion of the jury trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict against the plaintiff holding that because he was the statutory employee of Stauffer under La.R.S. 23:1061,1 Stauffer was im-[1094]*1094muñe from tort liability under La.R.S. 23:1032.2 The court submitted the issue of indemnification to the jury, who found that Stauffer was entitled to $2,401.25 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff and Brooks appealed.
As a general rule, maintenance and repair work, as opposed to new construction, is considered to be within the scope of a manufacturing plant’s trade, business or occupation. Boudreaux v. Boudreaux, 369 So.2d 1117 (La.App. 1st Cir.1979); Barnes v. Sun Oil Company, 362 So.2d 761 (La.1978).
Stauffer manufactures industrial chemicals. The corrosive nature of the chemicals dictates constant maintenance and repair and frequent replacement. The project on which plaintiff was injured involved the replacement of a chemical reactor, the installation of a small reactor and the replacement of a large amount of pipe. When injured, plaintiff was installing a chain wheel to control a valve leading to the reactors.
David Thompson, a Stauffer project engineer, testified that Stauffer has a relatively large permanent maintenance crew of about sixty hourly employees. It contracted with Brooks to supplement its work force as necessary, but not for any specialized skills. The only difference between the type of work performed by the two work forces was that Stauffer employees tended to work on the urgent day-to-day problems that required a fairly constant work force, whereas Brooks employees worked on potential intermittent problems of a larger scale. The project on which plaintiff was hurt was not customarily performed by Stauffer.
Both Stauffer and Brooks spend a large amount of time replacing corroded and worn-out pipes, valves and pumps. Chain wheels on which plaintiff was working are common at Stauffer and subject to external corrosion.
Plaintiff stated he was doing more than replacing wornout material; he was adding new equipment. While he would not classify his work as maintenance, plaintiff acknowledged that the processing unit had already been there. Another Brooks employee testified that he had only seen Stauffer do repair work and nothing like the project on which they were working when plaintiff was injured.
The directed verdict in Louisiana is permitted under LSA-C.C.P. Article 1810(A).3 It has its source in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the proper standard in [1095]*1095deciding such a motion is set forth in Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc):
“On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence—not just that evidence which supports the non-mover’s case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. * * * ”
After a review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The work being performed by the plaintiff and other Brooks employees consisted of maintenance and repair services. The work was a regular and integral part of Stauffer’s business and essential for the efficient operation of the plant. Stauffer employees, in fact, set in place and connected the new reactor on a temporary basis until Brooks was able to move it over to a new foundation and reconnect it with new piping permanently. The addition of the smaller reactor was simply an improvement of existing facilities. The contention that it was new construction is not supported by the facts. The work in which plaintiff was engaged was part of the trade, business or occupation of Stauffer.
Brooks asserts that the trial court should have awarded a directed verdict in its favor on the third-party demand. The third-party demand is based on the indemnification agreement between Stauffer and Brooks which is found in Section 7.1 of their contract:
“Contractor agrees to indemnify, defend and save Company (including officers, directors and employees of Company) harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, expense (including reasonable attorney’s fees) claims, suits, and liabilities, based upon damages to, or destruction of, any property or injury (including death) to any person (including employees of Contractor) arising out of or attributable to the performance or nonperformance by Contractor hereunder (including, but not limited to, Contractor’s employees, sub-contractors or agents) even if caused in part by negligence of Company, except for such injuries or damages which are caused solely by the negligence of Company.”
The undisputed evidence shows that the valves, pipes and reactors installed by Brooks were all new and there was no evidence of any chemical flow through this portion of the unit prior to plaintiff’s accident. Thompson testified that after two years he still did not know how the pressurized acid became trapped in the valve.
We are of the opinion that the facts and inferences do not point so strongly and overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of Stauffer that reasonable men could not reach a contrary result. The trial court did not err in submitting the issue of attorney’s fees to the jury.
Brooks requested an instruction on the extraordinary degree of care required of persons involved with hazardous substances. The court denied the request determining that a negligence standard had been contractually established by the parties and was therefore controlling.
Brooks also complains that the court refused to give a jury instruction regarding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine is properly applicable when the accident is of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the control of the defendant; and evidence as to the cause of [1096]*1096the accident is more readily available to the defendant. Ray v. Ameri-Care Hospital, 400 So.2d 1127 (La.App. 1st Cir.1981), writ denied, 404 So.2d 277 (La.1981).
The trial judge stated that plaintiff was in a position to know as much as, if not more than, Stauffer about the accident, and therefore the doctrine did not apply. He also stated that there were no questions, argument or evidence directed to this issue at trial and that to give the jury such an instruction would only confuse them.
We find no manifest error in either of these decisions by the trial court.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs shall be shared equally by the plaintiff and the third-party defendant.
AFFIRMED.